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NONQUALIFIED DEFERRED VARIABLE ANNUITIES:
A PRODUCT IN SEARCH OF A COHERENT THEORY
TOMMY F. THOMPSON*
I. INTRODUCTION
Savings is important both for the personal economic security of the
saver and for the well being of the national economy. Economists' thinking
about savings has historically been dominated by the concept of inter-
temporal utility maximization, which has its roots in the life cycle hypothe-
sis (LCH).' That model assumes that individuals are forward looking and
will attempt to smooth out consumption over their lifetime independent of
their level of income at any particular point. It predicts that early in life
they may have low income but may borrow from the future to support their
current needs, which may include buying a home, starting a family, and
beginning a career. Then, sometime in mid-life their expenditure needs will
level off while their income increases, hopefully exceeding their needs. It is
at this point that they will pay off prior borrowings and begin to save for
retirement. In retirement, their income will drop dramatically and they will
use accumulated savings to support consumption needs. 2
The empirical evidence on saving often seems to contradict the LCH.
There is a large heterogeneity in household savings that cannot be explained
by the traditional model. 3 In particular, there are a large number of house-
holds that are close to retirement with little or no accumulated wealth. 4
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1. Franco Modigliani & Richard Brumberg, Utility Analysis and the Consumption Function:
An Interpretation of Cross-Section Data, in POST KEYNESIAN ECONOMICS (K.K. Kurihara, ed.,
1954). Modigliani and Brumberg first formally advanced the Life Cycle Hypothesis in 1954. Id.
The hypothesis has been modified and refined over the years to incorporate the effect of bequests
and precautionary savings due to uncertainty. B. DOUGLAS BERNHEIM, TAXATION AND SAVING,
29-36 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 7061, 1999).
2. See Gary Burtless, An Economic View of Retirement, in BEHAVIORAL DIMENSIONS OF
RETIREMENT ECONOMICS 7-42 (Henry J. Aaron ed., 1999) (describing the LCH in some detail).
3. DOUGLAS BERNHEIM ET AL., WHAT ACCOUNTS FOR THE VARIATION IN RETIREMENT
WEALTH AMONG U.S. HOUSEHOLDS?, (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No.
6227, 1997).
4. ANNAMARIA LUSARDI, EXPLAINING WHY SO MANY PEOPLE DO NOT SAVE, (Center for
Retirement Research at Boston College, Working Paper No. 2001-05, 2001). The author uses data
from the Health and Retirement Survey (HRS), a sample of United States households whose
respondents were born between 1931 and 1941. Id. at 5. The survey follows the households
through time, reinterviewing them every two years. Id. The survey provides detailed information
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Portfolios also vary widely across those households. Retirement assets, like
Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs) and other self-directed retirement
plans, are concentrated among households whose head has at least a high
school education. 5 Only a fraction of households hold stocks and bonds,
and those assets are also highly concentrated among households whose
head has at least a high school education. 6 A sizeable proportion of house-
holds do not hold any conventional financial assets. 7 In addition, the
composition of many of their portfolios is often undiversified and not likely
to produce optimal returns; as many as thirty-two percent of households
have all of their financial wealth in one asset and almost half of households
do not hold any of the assets that historically have delivered high returns. 8
On average, individuals who reach retirement with few assets experience a
surprise-the discovery that their resources are insufficient to maintain their
accustomed standard of living-and they revise their expectations down-
ward.9 It has been estimated that a majority of these older households will
not be able to maintain their accustomed level of consumption after
retirement. 10
Whatever level of wealth a household has on reaching retirement must
be managed to support consumption during retirement, a period of uncertain
on wealth and the retirement process, with a focus on health, labor markets, economic, and
psychosocial factors. Id.; see also www.umich.edu/-hrswww (providing more information on the
HRS). Based on the data, the Working Paper concludes that twenty-five percent of the households
in the sample have less than $30,000 in total net worth (including housing equity but not including
Social security and pensions). LUSARDI, supra, at 6. In addition, half of the households have
$6,000 or less in liquid assets. Id.
5. LUSARDI, supra note 4, at 6.
6. Id. at 6-7.
7. Id. at 7. These assets include checking and savings accounts, certificates of deposit and
Treasury bills, bonds, stocks, IRAs and Keoghs, and other assets. Id.
8. Id. These assets include real estate, businesses, stocks and bonds. Id.
9. BERNHEIM ET AL., supra note 3, at 4-5. Whether this results in less happiness or life
satisfaction is subject to some dispute. Some behavioral economists suggest that there is little
correlation between income and happiness and that the effect of a post-retirement drop in income
on retiree well being is greatly exaggerated. George Loewenstein et al., What, Me Worry? A
Psychological Perspective on Economic Aspects of Retirement, in BEHAVIORAL DIMENSIONS OF
RETIREMENT ECONOMICS, supra note 2, at 215-46.
10. Compare James Moore & Olivia Mitchell, Projected Retirement Wealth and Saving
Adequacy, in FORECASTING RETIREMENT NEEDS AND RETIREMENT WEALTH 68 (Olivia Mitchell
et al. eds. 2000) (estimating that a majority of households are not saving adequately) with ERIC M.
ENGEN ET AL., THE ADEQUACY OF HOUSEHOLD SAVING, (Center for Retirement Research at
Boston College, Working Paper No. 2000-01, 2000) (providing a more sanguine view of the
adequacy of retirement savings). Using a stochastic life-cycle model, in which people save both
for retirement and as a precaution against uncertain future earnings and uncertain lifespan, to
generate optimal wealth accumulation benchmarks, the study concludes that a majority of house-
holds are saving adequately. ENGEN ET AL., supra. However, the study cautions that other inter-
pretations are possible and admits that that there are significant warning signs of potential savings
problems in the future. Id. (citing LUSARDI, supra note 4).
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duration. For example, suppose a female age sixty-five decides to retire and
has accumulated $1,000,000 through savings over her lifetime. How should
she plan to make withdrawals from her savings so as to be certain that she
enjoys the maximum possible standard of living but does not entirely
exhaust the accumulated savings fund before her death?
Without access to an annuity, there is no way for her to be certain of
accomplishing that goal. The level of consumption that an accumulated
investment portfolio can reasonably provide is determined by investment
returns, inflation, and length of life, all of which are uncertain.
With respect to the likely rate of return she will be able to earn over
long periods of time, stocks have provided average annuals returns of
approximately ten percent; there have been periods, sometimes of con-
siderable length, when the return has been significantly less. For example,
large company stocks lost nearly half their value between 1972 and 1974
and did not regain their 1972 level until a decade later. The current down-
turn that began in the spring of 2000 has been even more severe, and no one
can predict when stocks may fully recover their value. Furthermore, even
aside from the familiar disclaimer that past results are no guarantee of
future performance,"I focusing solely on average returns to determine the
appropriate rate at which one can spend down her accumulated assets can
produce misleading predictions. Retired people who begin spending down
their stock portfolio at the beginning of a prolonged bear market in stocks
will not be heartened by the fact that five years later the stock market
recovers. They will have a significantly smaller remaining portfolio, due to
five years of withdrawals at low stock prices, on which to earn the higher
rates of return.
In the previous example, by investing the fund conservatively, with a
large proportion in fixed income securities rather than equities, she can
avoid extreme volatility in the investment returns, but she can do this only
at the expense of lowering expected overall return, thereby lowering the
withdrawals she can make.
Regardless of how she invests, in calculating how rapidly to spend her
assets, she cannot determine exactly how long she will live. She can con-
sult a standard mortality table' 2 to determine life expectancy, but a mor-
tality table is at best only accurate in the aggregate and cannot predict the
11. See PETER A. DIAMOND, CTR. FOR RETIREMENT RESEARCH AT BOSTON COLLEGE,
WHAT STOCK MARKET RETURNS TO EXPECT FOR THE FUTURE (1999) (analyzing probable future
stock market returns).
12. See infra Part III (discussing mortality tables). Her task is further complicated by the fact
that there are several mortality tables she could consult that will give her different estimates of her
life expectancy. Id.
2003]
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exact life span of any one individual. For example, if she determines from
a mortality table that her life expectancy is twenty years, the life expectancy
of sixty-five-year-old individuals covered by that table will, on average, be
twenty years. Even assuming the mortality table is accurate, only a relative-
ly few sixty-five-year-old individuals will live precisely twenty years.
About half of the individuals will die in less than twenty years while about
half will live longer than twenty years, some far longer than twenty years.
In fact, one currently used annuity mortality table' 3 predicts that a not insig-
nificant number of sixty-five-year-old persons will live past age 100. While
our hypothetical retiree's average life expectancy may be only another
twenty years, she has a very real possibility of living another thirty-five
years or more.
If she begins to spend her accumulated savings on the theory that she
will live exactly twenty years, she will exhaust her assets during her life-
time if she in fact outlives the average life expectancy. To illustrate, if she
can expect a return of six percent per year on her savings, she can withdraw
about $87,000 per year if she wants the fund to last twenty years, but she
would have to reduce the withdrawals to about $69,000 per year if she
wants it to last thirty-five years.
Relying on the advice of experts may also be hazardous. A recent
study has concluded that the rules of thumb used by many professional
financial advisors as to the appropriate rate at which retirees may spend
down their accumulated wealth without undue risk of outliving their assets
may in fact be much too optimistic. Instead of average rates of return, the
study uses Monte Carlo simulations, which consider numerous hypothetical
sequences of returns in determining maximum reasonably sustainable rates
of withdrawal. 14
On the other hand, an insurance company will accept the $1,000,000
accumulation as the premium on an annuity that will pay income each year
for the rest of her life, regardless of how long she lives.15 The key element
of a life annuity is that the benefit will be paid not just for the average life
expectancy of the population but for an individual's entire life, however
long that may be.16
13. THE COMMISSIONERS 1983 STANDARD ORDINARY ANNUITY MORTALITY TABLE. The
Society of Actuaries recently approved the use of an updated table projected from the 1983 table.
See infra note 109.
14. See John Ameriks et al., Making Retirement Income Last a Lifetime, J. FIN. PLAN.,
December 2001; Moshe Arye Milevsky & Chris Robinson, Self-Annuitization and Ruin in Retire-
ment, 4 N. AM. ACTUARIAL J. 112 (2001) (using Canadian mortality and capital market data).
15. This is the simplest kind of annuity-an immediate, single life annuity.
16. Assuming payments will end at the annuitant's death, payments may be made for a
period less than the average life expectancy of the population when the annuity payments begin.
[VOL. 79:439
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Individually purchased annuities will be of even greater significance to
future retirees. Social Security's projected long-term financial shortfall
could result in a reduction in benefits to future retirees. In addition, fewer
people now working are covered by "traditional" retirement plans, called
defined benefit plans, that provide life annuity benefits. The majority of
employment based retirement plans are now defined contribution plans that
promise no lifetime benefits and place both investment risk and longevity
risk on the employee.' 7 It is estimated that the average retiree's balance in
such plans will rise tenfold over the next thirty years and will rival Social
Security as the major source of retirement wealth.' 8 Furthermore, a majori-
ty of defined contribution plans do not even offer an option of annuitizing. 19
Finally, life expectancies have risen dramatically over the past fifty years
and may continue to do so in the future, increasing the risk that retirees may
outlive their assets.
Policymakers are concerned about the apparently inadequate levels of
household savings and the increasing possibility that retirees may outlive
their assets. A combination investment and insurance product, the deferred
variable annuity, would seem to be the optimal prescription. A deferred
variable annuity is a pre-retirement investment vehicle that permits any
savings to be invested during the working years in a menu of fund options
similar to mutual funds, defers income tax on any income or gain resulting
from the investments until payout, and obligates the insurance company to
permit the policyholder to use the amount accumulated in the policy to
purchase an annuity.
Variable annuities were first offered in the United States in 1952 by the
College Retirement Equities Fund (CREF), a non-profit insurer specializing
in the educational retirement market, and were offered only in qualified
retirement plans. It was not until the mid-1960s that nonqualified variable
17. Eric M. Engen & Andrea Lehnert, Mutual Funds and the U.S. Equity Market, FED. RES.
BULL. 797, Dec. 1, 2000, at 803. In 1989, 40 percent of working households, with at least one
employed adult, with a pension were covered by only a defined benefit plan, and another 31 per-
cent were covered by both types of plans; only 30 percent were covered solely by a defined contri-
bution plan. Id. By 1998, 57 percent of working households with a pension had only a defined
contribution plan, and another 25 percent were covered by both plans; only 18 percent were
covered solely by a defined benefit plan. Id. See generally Jack Vanderhei & Craig Copeland,
The Changing Face of Private Retirement Plans, EBRI Brief Number 232 (April 2001)
(discussing the shift in coverage).
18. James M. Poterba et al., Saver Behavior and 401(k) Retirement Wealth, 90 AM. ECON. R.
No. 21, 297-302 (2000).
19. JEFFREY R. BROWN & MARK J. WARSHAWSKY, LONGEVITY-INSURED RETIREMENT
DISTRIBUTIONS FROM PENSION PLANS: MARKET AND REGULATORY ISSUES 3 (Nat'l Bureau of
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 8064, 2001).
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annuities were first offered.20 Since then, they have experienced tremendous
growth. From 1989 to 1998, the number.of persons covered by these
annuities grew from 2.7 million to 14.6 million. Annual premium income
increased from $6.3 billion to $49.2 billion, and reserves increased from
$42 billion to $354 billion.21
This article began as a modest research project on a technical issue
involved in the taxation of nonqualified 22 deferred variable annuities, the
"investor control" issue.23 Preliminary to that research, I decided it would
be appropriate to first understand the basic economic and financial aspects
of annuities. What I discovered was a very complex subject that raises
some very interesting and complex tax policy issues. This article is a
modest attempt to outline those issues and possibly begin a dialogue about
the proper tax policy treatment of nonqualified deferred variable annuities.
II. INCOME TAX TREATMENT OF NONQUALIFIED ANNUITIES
A. DEFINITION
Remarkably, the Internal Revenue Code does not provide a comprehen-
sive definition of a nonqualified annuity. The legislative history is silent on
the issue,24 and the Treasury Regulations provide only the following:
20. JAMES M. POTERBA, THE HISTORY OF ANNUITIES IN THE UNITED STATES 25-30 (Nat'l
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 6001, 1997). The specific term, qualified plan, is
not used in the Internal Revenue Code. Qualified plans are pension, profit sharing, and stock
bonus plans that meet the specific requirements of sections 401 through 420 of the Internal
Revenue Code. They are subject to many restrictions, including limitations on the amount of
contributions, limitations on benefits, funding requirements, minimum participation requirements,
and minimum vesting standards. In most cases, contributions to qualified plans are either deducti-
ble or excludible from the employee's income. The employee does not pay income tax until he or
she actually receives distributions from the plan, even though he or she has a vested, non-
forfeitable interest in the plan. There may be penalties for withdrawals before age fifty-nine and a
half, and minimum distributions are ordinarily required beginning at age seventy and a half. On
the other hand, nonqualified plans in which an employee has a vested, non-forfeitable interest are
usually funded with after-tax dollars, but are not subject to many of the above-mentioned
restrictions on qualified plans.
21. BROWN & WARSHAWSKY, supra note 19, at 27-28 (citing statistics from the American
Council of Life Insurance Fact Book covering those years).
22. A nonqualified annuity is one that is not a tax-qualified plan, such as an individual retire-
ment annuity or tax sheltered annuity, and is not owned by such a tax-qualified plan. The termi-
nology is confusing because commercial annuities can be purchased outside of a qualified plan
and also in a qualified plan. This article deals only with those annuities that are available for
purchase outside of a qualified plan.
23. See infra Part II, Section B.3.
24. H.R. REP. NO. 83-1337, at 11 (1954); S. REP. NO. 83-1622, at 12 (1954). The only state-
ment in the legislative history is that the annuity provision (currently section 72 of the Code)
"applies to payments for a fixed number of years as well as to payments for life." H.R. REP. NO.
83-1337, at 11.
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The contracts under which amounts paid will be subject to the pro-
visions of section 72 include contracts, which are considered to be
life insurance, endowment, and annuity contracts in accordance
with the customary practice of life insurance companies. For the
purposes of section 72, however, it is immaterial whether such
contracts are entered into with an insurance company. 25
Because customary life insurance company practice controls with re-
spect to most aspects of annuities, the industry has been permitted to deter-
mine for itself what features should be offered on annuity products. Some
of the more salient "customary practices" of insurance companies with re-
spect to annuity contracts are described in the next two parts of this article.
There are two kinds of annuities-immediate annuities and deferred
annuities. An immediate annuity provides that payments will begin almost
immediately after payment of the premium. 26 A deferred annuity provides
for a longer period, referred to as the accumulation period, between the
payment of the premiums and the start of annuity payments; during this
time, the premiums are invested to produce an accumulation to support
payments to the policyholder during the pay out phase. Since this article
concerns deferred variable annuities, most of the discussion in this section
will also focus on them.
B. SPECIFIC INTERNAL REVENUE CODE REQUIREMENTS FOR
NONQUALIFIED ANNUITIES
In addition to qualifying as an annuity under the customary practices of
insurance companies, certain Internal Revenue Code provisions contain specific
requirements that must be met for a contract to be treated as an annuity for federal
income tax purposes.
1. Requirements on Death of a Holder of an Annuity
An annuity contract must provide for certain distributions in the event that a
holder of the contract dies. 27 The purpose of these distribution rules is to limit the
period of time that an annuity may remain in the accumulation phase. If a holder
25. Treas. Reg. § 1.72-2(a)(1) (1966).
26. It makes no economic sense to receive the first payment immediately upon paying the
premium, so an immediate annuity begins payments at the end of one payment period. Thus, if
the annuity is to make monthly payments, the first payment will be due one month after the
premium is paid.
27. I.R.C. § 72(s) (2002). Qualified annuities and structured settlement annuities are exempt
from this distribution rule. Id. § 72(s)(5). A holder is the person entitled to ownership rights under
a contract, who is typically the named owner of the contract. If there are multiple holders, then
the distribution rules apply on the death of any one of them. JOHN T. ADNEY ET AL., ANNUITIES
ANSWER BOOK Q 6:6 (2nd ed. 1999) [hereinafter ANNUrTIES ANSWER BOOK].
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dies on or after the annuity starting date but before the entire interest in the contract
has been distributed, the remaining portion must be distributed at least as rapidly as
under the method being used on the date of death.28 Thus, the post death payments
may be accelerated but not slowed down.
If a holder dies before the annuity starting date-during the accumulation
period with respect to a deferred annuity-then the entire interest in the contract
must be distributed within five years after the holder's death,29 with two
exceptions. First, if the holder designated his or her spouse as the beneficiary, then
the contract may continue after the death of the holder with the spouse treated as
the new owner. 30 Second, if the holder designated an individual other than his or
her spouse as the beneficiary, the distribution requirement will be met if
distributions start no later than one year after the holder's death and are payable
over the life of that beneficiary (or over a period not extending beyond the life
expectancy of that individual).
3 1
2. Annuities Held by Non-Natural Persons
An annuity contract held by a person that is not a natural person-a
corporation or certain trusts-will not be treated as an annuity contract for
federal income tax purposes. 32
3. Diversification and Investor Control Requirements for
Variable Annuities
Investment risk during the accumulation phase of a variable annuity is
borne by the policyholder rather than by the insurance company. 33 While
the original retirement variable annuity offered by CREF provided only one
diversified pool of assets and no choices, the typical deferred variable an-
nuity now offers a policyholder a choice of allocating and periodically re-
28. I.R.C. § 72(s)(l)(A). There are special rules where the holder is a corporation or other
nonindividual. Id. § 72(s)(6)-(7).
29. Id. § 72(s)(l)(B).
30. Id. § 72(s)(3).
31. Id. § 72(s)(2).
32. Id. § 72(u)(1). Thus, the annual income on such a contract will be treated as ordinary in-
come received currently by the contract owner. Id. § 72(u)(1)(B). A contract held by a non-
natural person is still treated as an annuity contract for purposes of subchapter L of the Code,
which governs the taxation of insurance companies. Id. § 72(u)(l)(A); see also ANNUITIES
ANSWER BOOK, supra note 27, at Q 6:9.
33. KENNETH BLACK, JR. & HAROLD D. SKIPPER, JR., LIFE AND HEALTH INSURANCE 879-
80 (13th ed. 2001). In life insurance parlance, the premiums paid under a variable contract are
placed in a separate account that supports the policy and not in the company's general account.
Id. at 880. The company promises no particular investment results during the accumulation phase
and no guaranteed level of benefits under the policy in the pay out period. Id. at 879-80. Rather,
the benefits paid depend upon the investment results in the separate account that supports the
contract. Id. The risk that the investment results will not be stellar is on the policyholder. Id.
[VOL. 79:439
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allocating both premiums and cash surrender value among several accounts,
referred to as subaccounts. 34 The number of subaccounts varies, but 15 to
30 are comion.35 The simplest product Sold by CREF offers seven invest-
ment choices, including a money market fund. At the other extreme, the
variable annuities sold by American Scandia Insurance Company offer over
sixty choices, including a money market fund. The number and kind of
investment choices available varies widely and may include general equity
funds, bond funds, balanced funds, and various specialty funds, such as
international funds.36 Many annuities now also offer sector funds that con-
centrate in a particular area such as technology, energy, or precious metals.
Some of the subaccounts are managed by affiliates of the insurer, others by
independent investment advisors, and either may be based on an external
index (e.g., the S&P 500) rather than being actively managed. 37 If the
contract allows the owner to allocate premiums or cash values to a sub-
account that invests directly in shares of a specific mutual fund, the mutual
fund must not be available for purchase by members of the public other
than through the purchase of an annuity contract.
38
A variable contract based on a segregated asset account is not treated as
an annuity for any period for which the investments made by that account
are not adequately diversified. 39 Under the regulations promulgated pursu-
ant to this code section, such an account is adequately diversified if no more
than 55 percent of the value of the total assets in the account is represented
by any one investment, no more than 70 percent by any two investments, no
more than 80 percent by any three investments, and no more than 90 per-
cent by any four investments. 40 The purpose of this rule is to preclude too




38. Rev. Rul. 81-225, 1981-2 C.B. 13. The IRS has issued private rulings involving subac-
counts that invest in a fund-of-funds, a fund that invests in other funds. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 98-39-034
(June 30, 1998); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 98-51-044 (Sept. 22, 1998). As long as the fund-of-funds is not
available for sale to the public except through the purchase of an annuity, then it may in invest in
other mutual funds that are sold to the public. ANNUITIES ANSWER BOOK, supra note 27, at Q
6:56.
39. I.R.C. § 817(h)(1) (2002).
40. Treas. Reg. § 1.817-5(b)(1)(i) (1989). All securities of the same issuer are treated as a
single investment, but in the case of government securities, each government agency or instrumen-
tality is treated as a separate issuer. Id. § 1.817-5(b)(ii)(A)-(B). Compliance is tested on a calen-
dar quarter basis, and an account must be adequately diversified on or within 30 days after the end
of each calendar quarter. Id. § 1.817-5(c); see also ANNUITIES ANSWER BOOK, supra note 27, at
Q 6:55. Diversification rules also apply to regulated investment companies (RICs), which include
mutual funds. Under the RIC rules, which are also applied quarterly, at least fifty percent of the
assets must be represented by cash and cash items, government securities, securities of other RICs,
and other securities subject to the following two limits. First, the RIC may not invest more than 5
20031
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much investor control over the underlying investments, but it is separate
and distinct from the non-statutory "investor control" requirement discussed
next.4 1 The diversification rule does not preclude a subaccount from
investing in companies solely in one market sector.
The non-statutory "investor control" requirement stems from various
administrative rulings and court cases.42 For a variable annuity to be treated
as an annuity for federal income tax purposes, the separate account assets
underlying the contract must be considered the assets of the insurer and not
of the owner of the annuity. 43 If the owner has too much investor control,
the assets will be treated as owned by her.44 Prohibited investor control is
present if the contract owner has the power to direct the custodian of the
assets underlying the annuity to sell, purchase, or exchange specific as-
sets. 45 Control may also be present if the owner has other means of influ-
encing investment decisions.46 There is an open question whether too large
a number of subaccounts from which to choose, in itself or perhaps in
combination with too little restriction on ability to shift between the various
subaccounts, may constitute prohibited investor control.47
C. INCOME TAX RULES APPLICABLE TO DEFERRED ANNUITIES THAT
MEET THE ABOVE REQUIREMENTS
While the details of the taxation of annuities are very complicated, the basic
principles are straightforward. For purposes of this article, only an understanding
percent of value of its total assets in the security of any one issuer, other than the government or
another RIC, or in more than 10 percent of the outstanding voting securities of any one issuer.
These limits only apply to securities falling in the 50 percent diversification portion of the RIC's
assets. However, in no event may a RIC invest more than 25 percent of the value of its total assets
in the securities of any one issuer, other than the government or another RIC. I.R.C. § 851 (b)(3)
(2002).
41. ANNUITIES ANSWER BOOK, supra note 27, at Q 6:55.




46. Id. Under IRS rulings, the contract owner may not select or identify particular invest-
ments, change the terms of the investment guidelines, or have any legal, equitable, direct, or
indirect interest in the underlying assets. Id. The contract owner may not select or communicate
with the investment advisor regarding the investments underlying the contract or otherwise have
any influence over the investment advisor's decisions. Id.
47. The problem may be even more acute if the various investment options are themselves
quite narrow in scope, even though adequately diversified. The Internal Revenue Service has in-
dicated that the non-statutory investor control doctrine has continuing vitality, separate and apart
from the diversification requirements, but it has not yet proposed any regulations to delineate its
scope. Id.
[VOL. 79:439
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of the basic tax principles is necessary and is provided here. 48 Separate rules apply
in the accumulation phase and in the pay out phase of a deferred variable annuity.
1. Accumulation Phase
Premiums paid for nonqualified deferred annuities are not excludible or
deductible from income. Thus, premiums are paid with after-tax dollars.
However, during the accumulation phase, the contract owner is not required
to include in gross income any of the investment income that may be build-
ing up inside of the contract, including any gain realized on exchanges
between subaccounts available as investment options in a deferred variable
annuity. 49
If the owner surrenders the contract during the accumulation period for
its cash surrender value, he or she will include in gross income the dif-
ference between the cash received and the total premiums paid.50 If a partial
withdrawal is made from a policy, it is includible in gross income to the
extent there is any yet untaxed income remaining in the contract.51 This in-
clusion establishes an "income first" rule for partial withdrawals. 52 If a loan
is received under an annuity contract or all or a part of the contract is
pledged or assigned, the policyholder is treated as having received a dis-
tribution that is subject to these same rules,53 as are lump sum death
benefits. 54
If an amount is included in gross income under these rules, it is treated
as ordinary income, not capital gain or dividend income, and a 10 percent
48. See generally id. (discussing taxation of nonqualified annuities); see also, A.B.A. Sec. Of
Taxation Comm. on Ins. Co., A Roadmap to the Federal Income Taxation of Nonqualified Annuity
Contracts, 45 TAx LAW. 123 (1991).
49. One major exception is that the inside build up in a deferred annuity not issued by a life
insurance company will be currently taxed on an accrual basis under the original issue discount
rules. I.R.C. § 1275(a)(l)(B) (2002). To be excepted from the current accrual rule, the annuity
contract must provide for life contingent annuity payments. Treas. Reg. § 1.1275-10) (2002).
Since, during the accumulation phase there is no requirement of such payments, and the contract
can be cashed in for its cash surrender value without ever providing for such payments, a deferred
annuity not issued by a life insurance company does not meet the statutory requirements for
deferral under the regulations. ANNUITIES ANSWER BOOK, supra note 27, at Q 6:2.
50. I.R.C. 88 72(e)(5)(A), (E)(ii) (2002). If owners receive less than their investment in the
contract, they are allowed an ordinary loss deduction. Rev. Rul. 61-201, 1961-2, I.R.B. 46. A
loss is only allowed when the annuity is cashed in. ANNUITIES ANSWER BOOK, supra note 27, at
Q 6:12. Losses on exchanges between subaccounts are not currently recognized. Id.
51. I.R.C. § 72 (e)(2)(B), (e)(3)(A) (2002).
52. ANNUITIES ANSWER BOOK, supra note 27, at Q 6:13.
53. I.R.C. § 72(e)(4)(A). The amount of the loan or the value of the portion assigned or
pledged is treated as a distribution of cash and under the "income first" rule will be included in
gross income to the extent of any income on the contract. ANNUITIES ANSWER BOOK, supra note
27, at Q 6:16.
54. ANNUITIES ANSWER BOOK, supra note 27, at Q 6:15; see also infra Part III (discussing
death benefits).
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penalty tax may also apply if the distribution is made before age 59 1/2.55
The penalty tax is applied to insure that annuities are used primarily as
retirement savings vehicles.
56
If the holder of the contract dies during the accumulation period, then
any death benefits payable to a beneficiary are not considered life insurance
proceeds excludible from the beneficiary's income, 57 and the beneficiary
receives no step-up in basis with respect to the contract. 58 During the
accumulation phase, an annuity contract may be exchanged for another
annuity contract without recognition of gain or loss. 59
Finally, if an annuity is transferred for less than adequate consideration,
then the holder is treated as receiving an amount equal to the cash surrender
value of the contract minus the investment in the contract. 60 A gift is
treated as a sale for the cash value of the contract and results in the
recognition of all income that has built up inside the contract at the date of
the transfer. 61
2. Pay Out Phase
An annuity in payout status 62 must provide for the systematic liquida-
tion of the investment in the contract and the earnings thereon.63 A deferred
55. I.R.C. § 72(q)(1) (2002).
56. ANNUITIES ANSWER BOOK, supra note 27, at Q 6:18. The penalty tax does not apply to
distributions that are made on or after the date the taxpayer attains age fifty-nine and one half
(I.R.C. § 72(q)(2)(A)), made on or after the death of the holder (I.R.C. § 72(q)(2)(B)), attributable
to the taxpayer becoming disabled (I.R.C. § 72(q)(2)(C)) that are part of a series of substantially
equal periodic payments made for the life of the taxpayer or the joint lives of the taxpayer and his
or her designated beneficiary (I.R.C. § 72(q)(2)(D) or under an immediate annuity contract (I.R.C.
§ 72(q)(2)(I)). In addition, amounts allocable to investment in the contract before August 14,
1982 are not subject to the penalty. Id. § 72(q)(2)(F).
57. Rev. Rul. 55-313, 1955-1 I.R.B. 219; ANNUITIES ANSWER BOOK, supra note 27, at Q
6:15.
58. Rev. Rul. 79-335, 1979-2 C.B. 292, revoking (for contributions made after October 21,
1979) Rev. Rul. 70-143, 1970-1 C.B. 167. Thus, the beneficiary receives a carry over basis,
which will be used to compute her exclusion ratio under section 72. ANNUITIES ANSWER BOOK,
supra note 27, at Q 6:15. Assets owned in non-retirement accounts at death generally receive a
basis in the beneficiary's hands equal to their fair market value on the date of death, so any
unrealized capital gains will never be subject to income tax. I.R.C. § 1014(a)(1) (2002).
59. I.R.C. § 1035(a)(3) (2002).
60. I.R.C. § 72(e)(4)(C)(i) (2002). There is an exception for certain transfers between
spouses or former spouses. I.R.C. § 72(e)(4)(C)(ii).
61. On the other hand, gifts of non-annuity assets generally are not treated as sales. I.R.C. §
1015 (2002). Any gain remains unrealized and shifts to the donee, who takes the donor's basis for
purposes of computing gain. Id.
62. I.R.C. § 72(c)(4). An annuity is in payout status on the annuity starting date, which is the
first day of the first period for which an amount is received as an annuity under the contract. Id.
Amounts received as an annuity are amounts received under an annuity contract on or after the
annuity starting date that are payable at regular intervals over a period of more than one full year
from the date on which they begin to be paid, provided the total amount so payable or the period
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variable annuity policyholder may choose either a fixed or variable annuity
at payout and may choose payments for a stated term of years or for a term
that depends on how long the annuitant lives-a life contingent annuity.
The payments under a fixed annuity, also referred to as a nominal
annuity, are computed at the start of the payout period and do not change
thereafter. Under a fixed annuity, the insurance company bears the entire
investment risk64 in addition to the mortality risk if the annuity is a life
contingent annuity.
The payments under a variable annuity are not fixed, but rather will
change according to the investment results of the assets that back the con-
tract. A variable annuity with life contingencies places the mortality risk on
the company and the investment risk on the policyholder. 65 A variable
annuity without life contingencies places both risks on the policyholder. 66
for which they are to be paid is determinable at that time. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.72-1(b), -2(b)(2)
(1963). The amounts are required to be determinable either directly from the terms of the contract
or based on mortality tables and compound interest projections in accordance with sound actuarial
theory. Treas. Reg. § 1.72-1(b)(2)(iii). They are typically paid over a single life or joint lives,
over a fixed period, in an amount certain, or in some combination of these options. ANNUITIES
ANSWER BOOK, supra note 27, at Q 6:19.
63. Ingleheart v. Commissioner, 174 F.2d 605 (7th Cir. 1949); Commissioner v. Myer, 139
F.2d 256 (6th Cir. 1943); Rev.Rul. 75-255, 1975-2 C.B. 22. If an amount is held under an agree-
ment to pay interest, the interest payments are fully included in gross income. I.R.C. § 720);
Treas. Reg. § 1.72-14(a) (1960); see also ANNUITIES ANSWER BOOK, supra note 27, at Q 6:2.
64. BLACK & SKIPPER, supra note 33, at 879-80. When the insurance company receives the
premium under a fixed annuity, the premium becomes part of its assets. Id. In life insurance
parlance, it goes into the company's general account. Id. The company will invest the premium,
after it has paid policy expenses, and attempt to earn a rate of return at least sufficient to pay the
benefits it promised under the contract. Id. Any return the company earns above the amount it
has agreed to pay the policyholder becomes part of the company's profits, but if it does not earn a
return sufficient to pay the promised benefits, the company must make up the shortfall out of its
other assets in the general account. Id. Thus, the company bears the investment risk and reaps
any investment rewards under a fixed annuity. Id.
65. The initial payments under a variable annuity are computed using an assumed rate of
return, and future payments are adjusted upward or downward based on the actual return on the
funds backing the contract. If the actual return exceeds the assumed return there is an upward
adjustment; if the actual return is less than the assumed rate of return, there is a downward adjust-
ment. The exact adjustment is computed under a precise mathematical formula that results in
adjustments that are actuarially fair to the annuitants. An assumed rate of four percent is normally
chosen because it provides a reasonable probability that there will be future increases in the
annuity payment if the assets backing the annuity are not invested too conservatively. There is no
guarantee that payments will not decrease in any given year or even over a very long period of
time.
66. See Thomas A. Campbell & Timothy J. Ruark, Remarks at the 1998 Valuation Actuary
Symposium Proceedings, Session 1OPD, Actuarial Guideline XXXIV/Minimum Guaranteed
Benefits for Variable Annuities (discussing guaranteed lifetime benefits, including the GPAF, and
guaranteed death benefits). A major risk of any variable annuity is that the payments can go down
with no limit. This risk may be lessened by a benefit provided by some insurers, the Guaranteed
Payout Annuity Floor (GPAF), which guarantees that the payment will not decrease below a
certain level.
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Regardless of which option is chosen, a portion of each amount
received as an annuity is included in gross income and the remainder is
excluded from gross income as a tax-free return of basis. The entire amount
included in gross income is treated as ordinary income; no portion of it is
treated as capital gain or dividend income. 67 The computation of the
amount excluded is governed by a statutory exclusion ratio.68 For any level
payment fixed annuity and for all variable annuities, the exclusion ratio
essentially permits policyholders to exclude their investments in the
contract ratably over the number of years that payments are expected to be
made.69 Once policyholders recover their entire investment in the contract,
all amounts thereafter received are included in their gross income.70
If amounts are received during the payout period that are not amounts
received as an annuity-policy dividends in excess of the guaranteed
67. ANNUMES ANSWER BOOK, supra note 27, at Q 6:3.
68. I.R.C. § 72(b) (2002). The exclusion ratio is a fraction the numerator of which is the
investment in the contract and the denominator of which is the expected return under the contract,
both computed as of the annuity starting date. The investment in the contract is the aggregate
amount of premiums paid less any amounts received prior to the annuity starting date that were
excluded from gross income. I.R.C. § 72(c)(1). If the annuity contract provides for payments to a
beneficiary on the death of the annuitant, in the nature of a refund of the consideration paid for the
contract, then the investment in the contract to be recovered by the annuitant tax free is reduced by
the value of the refund feature. I.R.C. § 72(c)(2). The value of the refund payments is determined
under actuarial tables provided in the regulations and without discounting for interest. Treas. Reg.
§ 1.72-7 (as amended in 1986). Presumably, the beneficiary may recover that amount tax-free.
The regulation provides that the beneficiary may also recover any portion of the remaining
investment in the contract that is not recovered by the annuitant during life by application of the
exclusion ratio. Treas. Reg. § 1.72-11 (c)(2), Example (1) (as amended in 1986). The expected
return is the sum of all payments expected to be received under the contract as an annuity. I.R.C.
§ 72(c)(3). If that amount depends on life expectancy, it is computed under actuarial tables of life
expectancy provided in the regulations. The actuarial tables in the regulations used in computing
the exclusion ratio are not the same actuarial tables used by the company in pricing the product.
Treas. Reg. § 1.72-9 (as amended in 1995). In general, the regulation tables assume a life
expectancy more appropriate to the general population than to the select group of annuity
purchasers. This assumption has the effect of permitting a faster tax-free recovery of investment
premiums than would the use of the longer life expectancies reflected in the annuity mortality
tables used by insurers. A more detailed discussion of annuity mortality tables is provided later in
this article.
69. In the case of a variable annuity payout, since the total expected return cannot be
computed, the regulations provide that the investment in the contract will be recovered ratably.
Treas. Reg. §§ 1.72-2(b)(3) (as amended in 1966), 1.72-4(d)(3) (as amended in 1987). Thus, if
annuity payments are expected to be received under a variable annuity for twenty-five years, then
the amount of each yearly payment to be excluded each year is 1/25 of the investment in the
contract. If that amount exceeds the total payment received in that year, the taxpayer is given an
election to recalculate the exclusion under a different method. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.72-4(d)(3)(ii),
(d)(3)(iv); ANNUITIES ANSWER BOOK, supra note 27, at Q 6:26.
70. I.R.C. § 72(b)(2). Prior to the Tax Reform Act of 1986, the exclusion ratio to all pay-
ments, resulting in total exclusions exceeding the investment in the contract, but if the policy-
holder died before recovering the entire investment, he or she was not allowed any loss deduction.
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interest with respect to a participating annuity-those amounts are fully
includible in gross income.71
In the case of either a fixed or variable annuity, if the annuitants die
before recovering their entire investment in the contract and payments cease
at death, they are allowed a loss deduction for the remaining unrecovered
portion of their investment in the contract on their final income tax return.72
D. COMPARISON OF TAXABLE MUTUAL FUNDS AND DEFERRED
VARIABLE ANNUITIES
One of the ongoing debates is whether variable annuities are merely
tax-advantaged mutual funds, so an investor who does not value their
annuity aspects could purchase them as an attractive substitute for mutual
funds because they would deliver a greater after-tax return. 73  While
deferred annuities are tax-advantaged in some respects as compared with
other investments, most notably because taxation of income and gain is
deferred until payout, in other respects they are not.
Several tax and non-tax factors favor investing outside of annuities.
Mutual funds have no early withdrawal tax penalties and most have no
surrender charges.74 Significant tax deferral is possible by investing in tax
efficient equity mutual funds, such as index funds, that do not have high
portfolio turnover and therefore do not realize capital gains that are
currently taxable, and much of the gains realized on equity mutual funds are
long-term capital gains or dividend income, which are taxed at preferential
income tax rates. Any capital losses realized by an investor on the sale or
exchange of mutual fund shares are currently recognized and provide
immediate potential tax benefits. Mutual funds also provide more
flexibility in personal financial planning: they may be transferred by gift
without recognition of gain; they may be pledged as security for loans
71. ANNUITIES ANSWER BOOK, supra note 27, at Q 6:25.
72. I.R.C. § 72(b)(3). If payments do not cease at her death, then the deduction (if any) is al-
lowed to the beneficiary who is entitled to receive the post death payments. I.R.C. §§ 72(b)(3),
(4); see also ANNUITIES ANSWER BOOK, supra note 27, at Q 6:32. Until the amendments to sec-
tion 72 in the Tax Reform Act of 1986, an annuitant could apply the exclusion ratio to all
payments received as an annuity (even if the payments extended beyond her life expectancy) and
therefore could exclude a total amount in excess of her investment in the contract. However,
under the pre-1986 law, if she died without recovering her entire investment, no loss deduction
was allowed.
73. See Moshe Arye Milevsky & Kamphol Panyagometh, Variable Annuities vs. Mutual
Funds: A Monte Carlo Analysis of the Options, IFID CENTRE RESEARCH REPORT #01-03 (The
Individual Fin. & Ins. Decision Centre, Toronto, Ontario, Canada), Dec. 31, 2001. The paper
compares investment returns in variable annuities with those in taxable mutual funds using Monte
Carlo simulations. Id. It also surveys the existing literature on the subject. Id.
74. Mutual funds do not in general have surrender fees, but some funds do levy exit fees to
discourage short-term trading.
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without causing recognition of gain; and if held at death, they receive a
step-up in basis to fair market value on the date of death, eliminating any
unrealized capital gains at death.75 Most deferred annuities also have
higher expense charges than mutual funds and insurance charges that most
mutual funds do not, and they levy surrender charges in the first several
years of ownership.
The major tax advantage that annuities have is that income or gains are
not taxed until payout, while any gains realized by a shareholder who sells
her shares in a mutual fund and any income or gain realized by a mutual
fund is immediately taxed even if it is reinvested in the fund. So a deferred
annuity is a very attractive vehicle for active traders or speculators who
make frequent transfers between subaccounts because of the deferral of
taxation of short-term gains on such exchanges that would otherwise be
currently taxed at high rates.
As an investment vehicle for long-term investors, deferred variable
annuities most resemble taxable mutual funds if held by someone over age
59 1/2 and after any surrender charge period on the variable annuity has
expired. However, it takes a number of years for a variable annuity to
overcome its higher expenses and the higher tax rate that is levied on
annuity gains to produce net returns comparable to a mutual fund if it is
cashed in. A recent study, based on Monte Carlo simulations, concluded
that the break-even point is at least ten years if the comparison is between
low-cost mutual funds and low-cost variable annuities, but the break-even
point is over thirty years in the case of a typical high cost variable annuity. 76
The study assumes that the purchaser is using the variable annuity only to
obtain tax-deferral and will eventually cash it in, pay the income tax due,
and consume the remainder. For the high cost scenario, the study assumes
that the average expenses on the variable annuity are 2.07 percent per year
with an annual contract charge of $30, and the management expenses on the
mutual fund are 1.41 percent; 77 while for the low cost scenario, it assumes
75. See supra note 58 (discussing transmission at death) and note 60 (discussing transmission
by gift).
76. Milevsky & Panyagometh, supra note 73. The study concludes that the basic error of
prior studies that showed a shorter break even point was that they assumed a constant rather than a
stochastic rate of return and that they ignored the ability of the mutual fund investor to obtain
current tax benefits by recognizing losses but not gains. Id. The study was based on tax rates in
effect prior to the enactment of the Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003, which
lowered all tax rates, including the preferential rate on long-term capital gains, and for the first
time, it applied the same preferential rate to dividends paid by most domestic corporations. It
would take even longer for a variable annuity to break even with a similar investment in a taxable
mutual fund if the new, lower rates are taken into account.
77. Id. These are based on average total expenses for variable annuities and mutual funds.
Id. at 11.
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total expenses of .3 percent for the annuity and .2 percent for the mutual
fund. 78 The results of the study imply that a typical high cost deferred
variable annuity is an inferior investment to taxable mutual funds for older
individuals who purchase the annuity solely or primarily for its investment
aspects and who do not intend to annuitize it, since they may well not
survive to the break even point.
Furthermore, regardless of where the break-even point may be for
someone who purchases an annuity primarily for investment purposes as a
substitute for a mutual fund, it is only one factor relevant to the comparison.
Whatever intention purchasers may initially have, the future is uncertain.
They may die before cashing in the policy, have a change of circumstances
that necessitates early withdrawals or a need to borrow, or later determine
that they wish to make a gift of their interest to other family members. The
negative tax attributes of annuities-lack of step-up in basis at death,
possible early withdrawal penalties, triggering of gain on gift transfers and
pledges-are significant and severely restrict financial planning flexibility.
They make a deferred annuity an inferior investment vehicle for almost
anyone who purchases it solely for investment purposes and who does not
value its annuity pay out options.
E. SHOULD NONQUALIFIED DEFERRED VARIABLE ANNUITIES BE
SPECIALLY TAXED?
The special tax status of deferred variable annuities is based on the
assumption that they provide significant welfare benefits not provided by
other nonqualified retirement savings and investment vehicles, but there has
never been any detailed analysis of whether that assumption is warranted.
The various aspects of the product complicate the analysis: it is designed
not only as a retirement payout vehicle, but also as a savings and
investment vehicle. Certain of its features are unique to deferred annuities
while others are similar to features of other nonqualified products, most
notably mutual funds. The investment and payout phases are also
intertwined because during the payout phase, the accumulated funds must
continue to be invested and managed to provide an adequate stream of
retirement income.
The next two parts of this article separately analyze in detail first the
payout phase and then the accumulation phase of deferred variable annuities
78. Id. at 11. In the low cost scenario, it was assumed that the low cost mutual fund was not
tax efficient-not managed to minimize shareholder tax liability. Id. If a low-cost, tax-efficient
fund, such as an index fund, were used for the simulation study, the time needed to break even
would be longer. Id. at 20.
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as they are currently designed to determine whether they provide significant
enough welfare benefits to clearly distinguish them from other nonqualified
retirement savings vehicles and justify their preferred tax status. Based on
these analyses, the final part suggests appropriate changes in the design and
taxation of deferred variable annuities.
III. ANNUITIZATION ASPECTS OF DEFERRED VARIABLE
ANNUITIES
A. INTRODUCTION
To qualify as an annuity, the contract must not be designed merely for
accumulation of assets, but rather for the eventual liquidation of the
accumulated funds through a payment or a series of payments over some
period of time. One major reason deferred variable annuities are tax-
advantaged is because of their annuity payout aspects. Indeed, it is those
payout aspects that most clearly distinguish deferred variable annuities from
other nonqualified retirement savings vehicles.
Specific terms of the contract determine when the annuity payments
begin under a deferred annuity. To insure that the policy is operating as an
annuity rather than a mere savings or investment account, the contract will
usually provide the date that annuity payments will begin, but the contract
will permit the annuitant to change that date with proper notice to the
company. The limit on how long an annuity may remain in the
accumulation stage varies with state law but most state laws permit deferral
until very advanced ages. 79
The series of payments may be for a fixed term80 or for a term that
depends on how long the annuitant lives. 81 While an annuity for a fixed
79. At one time, the annuity starting date used by commercial insurance companies was
usually no later than the annuitant's eighty-fifth birthday or ten years after purchase of the contract
if later. Recently, because of increased longevity, many deferred annuities have allowed later
starting dates, as late as the nineteenth birthday. Some states, such as New York, impose restric-
tions on how long the deferral may last. ANNUITIES ANSWER BOOK, supra note 27, at Q 1: 15.
80. An annuity without life contingencies provides for a series of payments that will last for a
specific period of time and will cease at the end of that period. There appears to be no limit on
how long a fixed period can be chosen, but many policies do not permit fixed periods in excess of
thirty years without the company's permission. An unduly long fixed period, one that far exceeds
the life expectancy of the annuitant, may present problems. After all, an annuity should be
designed to provide lifetime benefits to the annuitant, not used as a bequest device. There is no
definitive law on the issue.
81. A life annuity provides for payments over an indeterminate period of time measured by
the lifetime of one or more individuals. A single life annuity is paid for the life of one individual;
while a joint and last survivor annuity provides for payments for as long as any one of two or
more individuals is living. A joint and last survivor annuity may provide for a full benefit to the
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term is valuable because it provides some protection against dissipating
one's assets before the end of the fixed term, 82 it provides no protection
against outliving one's assets. Only a life annuity provides a guarantee that
payments will not cease until death.
A nonqualified deferred variable annuity gives the policyholder an
option to choose an annuity, either for a fixed period or life contingent, as
the pay out option. However, an important element of the analysis of the
welfare benefits the product provides is that no form of annuitization is
required: the policyholder may also choose to withdraw the funds in other
ways, including cashing the policy in for a single lump sum. Life
annuitization is entirely voluntary. Therefore, the magnitude of the welfare
benefits of the annuitization aspects of a deferred annuity can only be
measured by determining how many policyholders can reasonably be
expected to voluntarily choose to annuitize.
B. THE ECONOMIC VALUE OF LIFE CONTINGENT ANNUITIES
1. Introduction
Economic theory predicts that the insurance against outliving one's
assets provided by life contingent annuities is so valuable to a consumer
without bequest motives that he or she should choose to completely
annuitize his or her assets.83 A recent study highlights the value of
annuities in addressing the mortality uncertainty faced by individuals and
concludes that consumers should be prepared to give up substantial
amounts of their wealth to purchase life annuities. 84 For example, it was
computed that individuals should be willing to accept a reduction of
survivor(s) or some lesser amount-2/3, 3/4, etc. There is also a joint life annuity, under which
the payments cease on the death of the first covered life, but these are rare. BLACK & SKIPPER,
supra note 33, at 163.
82. An annuity for fixed term does not provide complete protection against dissipating assets
because the insurance company may permit the annuitant who chooses a fixed term annuity to
surrender the contract for a cash payment equal to the market adjusted value of the remaining
annuity payments. See generally Timothy C. Pfeifer et al., Session 138 PD, An Immediate An-
nuity With Cash-Out Rights?, Panel Discussion Before the Washington Annual Meeting of the
Society of Actuaries, (Oct. 26-29, 1997), in 23 RECORD No. 2 (discussing annuity cash out rights).
Life annuities are not generally cashable, since the vast majority of those who would seek to cash
out would be those who ascertained that their life expectancy had significantly decreased,
resulting in losses to the insurance company.
83. Menahem E. Yaari, Uncertain Lifetime, Life Insurance, and the Theory of the Consumer,
32 REv. OF ECON. STUD. 137, 145 (1965).
84. Olivia S. Mitchell et al., New Evidence on the Money's Worth of Individual Annuities, 89
AM. ECON. REv. 1299, 1300 (1999). The study uses actual annuity rates offered by life insurance
companies. Id. at 1304. It computes what is called the Annuity Equivalent Wealth (AEW), a
measure of how much wealth an individual would be willing to give up for access to an actuarially
fair annuity. Id. at 1313-14.
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between 30 and 38 percent of their wealth at age 65 if they are able to
purchase annuities rather than pursue an optimal consumption strategy
without annuity contracts; a hypothetical retiree with access to an annuity
would require approximately $700,000 at age 65 to finance his or her
retirement to produce the economic equivalent of pursuing the same
consumption strategy by trying to manage a $1,000,000 retirement fund
without access to an annuity. 85
Intuitively, individuals require a greater amount of wealth without an
annuity than with an annuity to support the same consumption stream
because without an annuity they must self-insure against the risk of
longevity. That requires more conservative spending and the possibility of
making unintended bequests if they do not outlive their life expectancy.
With a life annuity, each annuity payment may safely be spent on current
consumption without the risk of outliving one's assets.
2. Mortality Premium
One obvious risk of pure life annuities is that the annuity payments
cease at the death of the annuitant. To compensate the annuitant for taking
that risk, each payment in a life annuity stream contains a mortality
premium. Since one is less likely to survive to later ages, the mortality
premium on later payments in an annuity stream is greater than that on the
earlier payments. As discussed later, mortality tables are used to compute
the mortality premium factors.86 Because of the mortality premium, the
payments under a life annuity are greater than those under a fixed term
annuity payable over the actuarially computed life expectancy of the
annuitant. This economic enhancement, together with the assurance that
85. Id. at tbl. 6. There are a number of variables that affect any people's determination of
what portion of their wealth they are willing to give up in exchange for access to an actuarially
fair annuity, including their risk tolerance, inflation assumptions, the rate of return they could earn
on her own non-annuitized assets, whether taxes are taken into consideration, and whether people
are assumed to already have a preexisting real annuity, like Social Security benefits. Table six in
the study provides calculations of annuity equivalent wealth in varying scenarios. Id. In all
scenarios, the computations indicate that the insurance benefits of annuities have very substantial
value to the average individual. Id.; see also supra note 14 (noting studies detailing the difficulty
of self-managing one's assets so as to maximize consumption without unduly risking outliving
one's assets).
86. See BLACK & SKIPPER, supra note 33, at 730-32 (explaining the computation process).
The mortality premium in each payment is equal to the probability, computed at the date the
annuity is purchased, that the policyholder will not survive to receive that payment. Id. It ade-
quately compensates the policyholder for the risk taken only if the mortality table used to price the
annuity accurately reflects the survival probabilities. Id. An annuity priced to accurately reflect
the survival probabilities of the insured population is said to be priced actuarially fair to that
population. See infra Part III, section C.2 (discussing the accuracy of the annuity mortality
tables).
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life annuity payments will not cease until death, should make life annuities
a very attractive alternative to other pay out options.
3. Alleviating Risk of Loss
While a life annuity protects individuals against outliving their life
expectancy, there is also a risk that the annuitant will die prematurely. In
that event, the annuity will turn out to have been a poor investment choice.
The mortality premium, if it accurately reflects the annuitant's survival
probability, compensates an annuity purchaser for assuming this risk, but
some individuals also seek ways to reduce the magnitude of the risk.
Contractual guarantees are one method to lessen the risk. Instead of
being completely life contingent, an annuity can guarantee that at least a
certain number of payments will be made, either to the annuitant, or if he or
she dies within the guarantee period, to a beneficiary. For example, a life
annuity with a ten-year guarantee would provide for payments for a
minimum of ten years and for the remaining life of the annuitant if he or
lives longer than ten years. The annuity payments for a life annuity with a
guaranteed period will be lower than the annuity payments for a similar
annuity with no guarantee. 87
The risk of loss due to premature death can also be reduced through the
use of joint and survivor annuities and by "front loading" annuity
payments. 88 Joint and survivor annuities provide for payments to the
survivor in the event of death of one the annuitants. 89 The premature death
of one of the annuitants will not be as catastrophic as premature death of the
annuitant who purchases a single life annuity since payments will continue
to the survivor. However, the payments under a joint and survivor annuity
will be less than those under a single life annuity. Front loaded annuities
provide for higher payments in the earlier years when mortality risk is
lower.
87. BLACK & SKIPPER, supra note 33, at 730-31. The payments are lower because there is
no mortality premium on the annuity payments during the guaranteed period since there is no risk
that those payments will cease due to death. Id. The guarantee can also be in the form of insuring
that the total payments made will at least equal the premium paid. That guarantee can either
require a lump sum payment of the difference to the beneficiary or continuing payments to the
beneficiary until the total payments at least equal the premium.
88. See JEFFREY R. BROWN, CTR. FOR RETIREMENT RESEARCH AT BOSTON COLLEGE, HOW
SHOULD WE INSURE LONGEVITY RISK IN PENSIONS AND SOCIAL SECURITY? 16 (2000). The
paper discusses the possible negative effects of mandatory annuitization of pension benefits and
Social Security, but similar negative effects may result from voluntary annuitization of other
retirement assets, such as deferred variable annuity accumulations. Id.
89. There are a variety of joint and survivor annuities. See supra note 81.
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4. Unique Value of Variable Annuity Payments
While a variable annuity payout does place annuitants at risk of market
fluctuations, the risk is different from that faced by a person drawing down
his or her own wealth without an annuity. Unlike that person, who cannot
rely upon average rates of return, the variable annuitant can. Non-annuitant
retirees take the risk that they will have exhausted too great a percentage of
their assets during a prolonged market downturn and might entirely deplete
their assets before they had planned. That risk is not present for annuitants
with guaranteed payments for their lifetime. A prolonged bear market may
significantly lower their income, but the income will never cease until
death, and if they survive until the market fully recovers, then so will the
level of annuity income. This is one of the more attractive aspects of a
variable annuity: it permits annuitants to maintain exposure to the volatile
equity markets and benefit from their probable higher rates of return over
long periods of time without the risk of outliving their assets.
C. RESISTANCE TO ANNUITIZATION
1. Introduction
Contrary to economic theory, individuals do not voluntarily annuitize
their assets at anywhere near the predicted level. In fact, historically the
market for individual life annuities in the United States has been extremely
small.90 Likewise, annuitization rates of deferred annuities have been
extremely low. From 1971 to 1996, the percentage of policyholders
receiving payments has ranged from .6 percent to 1.9 percent, with the most
recent rate at 1.1 percent.91 Since most of these policies were still owned
by policyholders who are still working, these figures probably understate
the likely annuitization rates in the future, but by how much is not
ascertainable. More than half of the owners were retired as of 2001, and
there is no evidence that annuitization rates have changed.92
90. Mitchell, et.al., supra note 84. The authors cite statistics, provided by LIMRA Inter-
national, that single premium immediate annuities accounted for only $6.2 billion of premium
payments in 1995. Id. at 1301.
91. See BROWN & WARSHAWSKY, supra note 19, at 28.
92. The Committee of Annuity Insurers has sponsored an annual Gallup survey of owners of
nonqualified annuity contracts since 1991. According to the 2001 Gallup survey, fifty-six percent
were retired and another seven percent were employed only part time. GALLUP ORG., 2002
SURVEY OF OWNERS OF NONQUALIFIED ANNUITY CONTRACTS 8 (2001), available at
www.annuity-insurers.org/srvyol.5html (last visited Oct. 27, 2003) [hereinafter 2001 GALLUP
SURVEY]. Only thirty-one percent were still employed full time. Id. In addition, sixty-nine
percent of variable contract owners, versus fifty-three percent for other owners, have not
withdrawn money or received a regular payout from their policies. Id. at 16.
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A recent study 93 identified a number of factors that may explain the
general reluctance of individuals to annuitize their retirement wealth. These
factors include the following: the fact that individual annuity markets do
not offer actuarially fair prices; the lack of inflation protection in com-
mercially available annuities; health uncertainty and the irreversibility of
annuitization; the presence of other sources of annuity income, for example,
Social Security; bequest motives and risk sharing within families; and
general lack of consumer understanding of annuitization. There are also
specific factors that may inhibit the annuitization of deferred variable
annuities, including psychological resistance, the incentives of insurers with
respect annuitization of deferred variable annuities, and the probable
behavioral effects of deferred annuity death benefits.
2. Lack of Fair Prices for Individuals with Average Life
Expectancy: Adverse Selection
With regard to the pricing of annuities, the above study concluded that
payouts on immediate annuities offered by commercial insurers in 1999
were approximately eight to ten percent lower than the actuarially correct
payout for a purchaser with mortality rates like those of the general
population.94 The adverse selection problem arises with respect to all
insurance products. 95 It is the tendency of persons who have reason to
expect they will receive greater benefits than average to be more likely to
purchase an insurance product that is priced for a person of average risk.
For example, if an insurance company accepts all applicants and prices
its life and health policies based on the mortality and morbidity rates in the
general population, without underwriting, its price will not be adequate to
compensate for the risks assumed because very likely an inordinate number
of prospective policyholders would be those who had already developed
serious illnesses or disease. If universal coverage of the entire population is
not somehow mandated, the presence of free choice among prospective
purchasers of life and health insurance as to whether or not to purchase a
policy almost guarantees that there will be adverse selection.96
93. BROWN & WARSHAWSKY, supra note 19. The paper discusses the reluctance of indi-
viduals to fully annuitize assets in qualified retirement plans, but many of the identified factors
may also explain the reluctance of individuals to annuitize accumulated assets that are not in
qualified plans. Id.
94. Id. at 7 (citing JEFFREY BROWN ET AL., MORTALITY RISKS, INFLATION RISKS, AND
ANNUITY PRODUCTS, (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 7812, 2000).
95. BLACK & SKIPPER, supra note 33, at 636-39 (discussing adverse selection).
96. Id. Adverse selection also applies to already existing policyholders by affecting the per-
sistency of existing polices. Id. While all policyholders have the option of discontinuing, healthy
policyholders are much more likely than sick individuals to terminate their existing life or health
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In the health and life insurance area, an insurance company attempts to
lessen the consequences of adverse selection through underwriting, by
asking specific questions of prospective purchasers, and in some cases re-
quiring medical tests. The company may have several categories of policies
that have different premium rates. The company may also deny coverage to
individuals who are substandard. Underwriting is a highly sophisticated and
complicated process,97 but it is not totally effective, since applicants will
not be completely candid and it would be too costly to acquire all possible
information about an applicant. Underwriting does serve to detect and deter
adverse selection in the life and health insurance area and permits insurers
to offer competitive insurance rates.
Adverse selection is also a problem with respect to annuities in the op-
posite sense: the company is concerned with applicants who have a longer
than average life expectancy. Individuals who are already sick with a
chronic or terminal disease do not purchase annuities;98 therefore the uni-
verse of annuity purchasers, especially at higher ages, tends to have better
mortality experience than the population in general and even than the popu-
lation of preferred risk life insurance purchasers.99 Unlike in the health and
life insurance area, where the company may deny coverage entirely to an
applicant who is too substandard, no company will deny annuity coverage
to an applicant who has too long a life expectancy. Instead, a company will
assume that a prospective annuity purchaser has self-selected himself or
herself and has a higher than average life expectancy. A company will use
mortality tables in connection with pricing its annuity business that will
show more conservative mortality rates than those used in connection with
its life insurance business and more much more conservative than those of
the population at large. 100
Instead of underwriting the mortality risks of prospective annuity pur-
chasers and having different premiums for different identifiable risk groups,
almost all insurance companies assume that annuity purchasers are a homo-
policies, leaving the insurer with a higher than anticipated proportion of high risk policyholders.
Id. at 637.
97. See BLACK & SKIPPER, supra note 33 at 633-92 (discussing underwriting).
98. BLACK & SKIPPER, supra note 33, at 173. An exception is the structured settlement
annuity, which is separately underwritten by insurance- companies. Id. A structured settlement is
an annuity paid to an injured person as the result of a personal injury claim. Id. Since such
persons clearly exhibit substandard mortality experience and because of competitive factors, the
companies have underwritten and specially priced this line of business. Id.
99. Id. at 704.
100. In the annuity context, a more conservative mortality table shows lower rates of
mortality.
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geneous group with low mortality rates.101 An insurance company will
generally use only two annuity mortality tables, one for males and one for
females.102
The differences in life expectancy in the population as a whole, in the
life insurance purchaser population, and in the annuity purchaser population
can be significant. A sixty-five-year-old male in the general population has
a life expectancy of approximately 15.5 years. 103 For life insurance pur-
poses, typical insurance mortality tables use a life expectancy of 18 yearsl04
and for annuity purposes at least twenty-four years. To illustrate the differ-
ence, with a 6 percent rate of return, a person could invest the sum of
$100,000 and withdraw about $10,100 per year if he or she wished the fund
to last exactly 15.5 years, about $9,200 per year if she wished the fund to
last exactly 18 years, and only about $8,000 per year if she wished the fund
to last 24 years.
If an insurance company's annuity rates are not actuarially fair to a pur-
chaser who has a life expectancy commensurate with that of the general
population, they are even less fairly priced for persons whose mortality
rates can be predicted to be even higher than the rates in the general popu-
lation. Recent studies have investigated how life expectancy varies with
race, ethnicity, and education and suggest that some minorities and those
101. Separate tables have been developed for smokers and non-smokers, but only one com-
pany has offered an annuity to smokers based on that table. BLACK & SKIPPER, supra note 33, at
705. Some believe that this raises moral hazard issues, since in some sense the smoker is being
"rewarded" for smoking by being able to purchase an annuity with higher payout rates due to the
lower life expectancy caused by smoking. Also, since such a policy would require the prospective
policyholder to adhere to a certain level of smoking to get the preferred rates, it might be thought
of as discouraging quitting smoking.
102. Two Supreme Court decisions mandate equal benefits for men and women under quail-
fied defined benefit retirement plans. City of Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart,
435 U.S. 702 (1978); Arizona Governing Comm. for Tax Deferred Annuity and Deferred Comp.
Plans v. Norris, 463 U.S. 1073 (1983). In Manhart, the Court held that employer provided pen-
sion plans may not require female employees to make larger contributions than males to receive
the same monthly benefits. Manhart, 435 U.S. at 709. The Court compared the practice of
pricing annuities differently for men and women to classifying employees by race or national
origin and basing compensation on the differential life expectancies of those groups. Id. In
Norris, the Court held that equality between the sexes was also required in deferred compensation
plans sponsored by the employer but administered by an outside company. Norris, 463 U.S. at
1081. The Court's decision requires that if an employer contracts with an insurance company to
administer its plan through annuity purchases, the plan must provide equal annuity benefits to
male and female participants. Id. There is no similar unisex requirement for nonqualified
annuities.
103. This is based on the 2000 Period Life Table published by the Social Security
Administration.
104. Life insurance companies also do not use the lower life expectancies predicted by the
Social Security Administration's tables in pricing life insurance because many individuals in the
population with the lowest life expectancies do not purchase life insurance. Thus, since life insur-
ance mortality tables are based on the population of likely purchasers, they tend to exclude those
in the general population at the lowest end of the life expectancy scale.
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with low levels of education may have lower than average life expec-
tancies. 105 There is also evidence that persons in a higher socioeconomic
group tend to live longer, but the issue is complicated because there is no
definitive way to measure the effects. 106
This problem may become more acute in the future if medical science
develops new methods of predicting susceptibility to certain diseases. The
better members of the general population are able to objectively judge their
own particular mortality characteristics, the more pronounced the adverse
selection problem will be for insurers, which will be forced to become even
105. JEFFREY R. BROWN, DIFFERENTIAL MORTALITY AND THE VALUE OF INDIVIDUAL
ACCOUNT RETIREMENT ANNUITIES, 4-6 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No.
7560, 2000). Professor Brown cites evidence that mortality rates of African Americans are higher
than those of Caucasians at all ages below seventy-five, but there is also conflicting evidence that
at older ages there may be a crossover-African American life expectancy higher than Caucasian.
Id. at 4-5. He also sites available evidence that Hispanics have lower life expectancies than Cau-
casians, despite a greater proportion of Hispanics living in poverty, lacking health insurance, and
having limited access to health care, but he indicates that there is some controversy over those
studies. Id. Some studies suggest that mortality rates for Hispanic women are significantly lower
than rates of Caucasian women at all ages; while mortality rates for Hispanic men tend to be
slightly higher than for Caucasian men at most ages. Id. There is also substantial heterogeneity
within the Hispanic population. Id. at 5. Foreign-born persons tend to have a lower mortality risk
than United States born persons. Id. at 5-6; see also JEFFREY R. BROWN, REDISTRIBUTION AND
INSURANCE: MANDATORY ANNUITIZATION WITH MORTALITY HETEROGENEITY (Nat'l Bureau of
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 9256, 2001) [hereinafter BROWN No. 9256] (discussing the
distributional implications of mandatory annuitization). Professor Brown used data from the
National Longitudinal Mortality Study (NLMS), a survey of individuals who were originally
included in the Current Population Survey (CPS) and/or the Census in the late 1970s and early
1980s to construct cohort mortality tables for specific racial and ethnic groups. Id. at 7-8. The
tables indicate how the life expectancy of a 22-year old in the year 2000 varies by gender, race,
ethnicity, and education. Id. at 10. The average 22 year-old male can expect to live to age 77.4,
while the average 22-year old female can expect to live to age 83.4. Id. Caucasian, African
American, and Hispanic 22-year old males can expect to live to age 78.1, 71.4, and 77.5
respectively; while the comparable life expectancies for 22-year old females are 83.8, 79.7 and
85.6 respectively. Id. A 22-year old Caucasian male with a college education can expect to live
to age 80.5, compared to age 77.8 for one with at least a high school education and 75.3 for one
without a high school education. Id. The comparable numbers for African American males are
75.7 years, 71.6 years, and 68.1 years respectively. Id. Life expectancies at age 67 for the same
cohort also varied but the difference in years was not as large as at age 22. Id. For example, a 67-
year old Caucasian male can expect to live 16 months longer than a 67-year old African
American, and a college educated Caucasian male can expect to live 3.4 years longer than a
African American male with less than a high school education. Id. It is not clear whether these
differences would also be present in the self-selected population of annuity purchasers in the
various groups.
106. BROWN No. 9256, supra note 105, at 6. Three measures of status are used in the litera-
ture: education, income and wealth. Id. at 5. A significant negative correlation between education
and mortality is nearly always found, but education could merely be a proxy for income rather
than an independent factor. Id. at 7. There is a significant negative correlation between current
income and mortality, but it is unclear whether this is a cause or effect; individuals in poor health
may simply be unable to earn high incomes. Id. at 6. Finally, there is compelling evidence that
wealth and mortality are also negatively correlated. Id. Again, it isn't clear to what extent low
wealth accumulation is the cause of increased mortality as opposed to increased rates of mortality
being the cause of low wealth accumulation. Id.
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more conservative in their annuity mortality assumptions used in setting
premium rates. 107
While nonqualified annuity payouts do vary with the sex of the an-
nuitant, insurance companies do not take the other factors just discussed
into account. The problem of determining whether those factors predictably
affect annuitant longevity may be the principal reason most insurers do not
attempt to underwrite annuity policies to the same extent they underwrite
life insurance, but the increasingly competitive nature of the annuity market
may eventually lead some companies to attempt to gain market share by
offering such differentiated products. 108
To take adverse selection into account, the mortality tables used by
insurance companies to price their annuities are based on very conservative
mortality rates.109 The annuity mortality tables that have been developed to
price immediate annuities are not even based on the mortality experience of
persons who voluntarily purchase annuities. Because the voluntary annuity
market is so thin, it has not been possible to obtain good data with respect
to the mortality of voluntary purchasers. Most of the data used to construct
the annuity mortality tables concerns mortality in the retirement annuity
market, where in many cases annuitization is required rather than voluntary,
lessening any adverse selection effects. The individual annuity tables
107. If medical science permits more objective individualized assessments of mortality risk,
this may permit insurers to become more willing to underwrite annuity risks and offer varying
premium rates to various risk groups. However, that is probably a long way off since companies
will want solid evidence based on long-term studies before they will be willing to underwrite
annuity risks in that manner.
108. There are potential regulatory hurdles to such underwriting. For example, state insur-
ance regulators probably prohibit racially discriminatory rates.
109. Mortality risk is quantified by using a mortality table, which has been constructed to
provide a mathematical method to compute the probability that a person of a given age will
survive to another age. BLACK & SKIPPER, supra note 33, at 696-97. A mortality table is usually
based on mortality observed in a population in the past. Id. It shows a hypothetical group of
individuals beginning with a certain age and traces the mortality history of that group year by year
until all have died, and it permits the computation of the probability that a person of a given age
will survive to any later age-the mortality premium factor used in pricing annuities. Id. The
construction of a mortality table is a complicated process, and there are several different types of
mortality tables used for different purposes. Id. at 696-709. Recently, the Society of Actuaries
endorsed the Annuity 2000 Basic Mortality table, which was projected from the 1983 table, as
suitable for the valuation of individual annuity business. Id. at 707.
No mortality table can accurately predict the probability of survival of any given individual in
an insured population. Id. at 702. There is a mathematical concept called the law of large num-
bers that permits an insurer to rely on the probabilities predicted by an accurate mortality table in
setting the premiums it charges on its policies. Id. at 695. The law of large numbers, as applied to
insurance, states that the greater the number of insured persons, the less the actual mortality
experience in the insured population will deviate from the predicted mortality. Id. Uncertainty
and risk of deviation diminish as the insured population increases in size. Id. at 26-27, 694-96.
Insurers may also transfer all or part of a risk to another insurance company through reinsurance.
Id. at 683. The primary purpose of reinsurance is to avoid too large a risk concentration within
one company. Id. at 683-91.
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constructed from this data were deliberately made more conservative to take
into account the voluntary nature of the individual annuity market and the
probability of adverse selection by purchasers. Some companies use these
annuity tables to price their products on the assumption that the tables
reflect more conservative mortality assumptions than the actual past mor-
tality experience of their own annuity policyholders. These mortality tables
are clearly not actuarially fair to someone with only an average life expec-
tancy, and because any mortality data on voluntary purchasers of annuities
compiled by individual companies is not available to the public, there is no
easy way to verify whether the tables used to price them even reflect a
reasonably accurate estimate of the life expectancy of the self-selected
group of actual annuity purchasers. 1' 0
Mortality guarantees on deferred annuities are even more conservative
since they are determined when the contract is purchased, which may be
decades before annuity payments actually begin. The company must make
a rational determination of what mortality rates are likely to be at the time
in the future when annuity payments are to begin to properly price its
guaranteed annuitization rates. There is no guarantee that those rates, even
if they can be accurately determined today, will be constant in the future. In
fact, it would be remarkable if they were, given past experience.111
Whether we can reasonably expect to see a continuation of past
declines in mortality and if how we can accurately predict the future
mortality trends is subject to considerable debate."l 2 Insurance companies
110. Armand M. DePalo et. al., Remarks at the 2000 Valuation Actuary Symposium, 10PD,
Updating Valuation Mortality Standard (Sept. 14-15, 2000). Esther H. Milnes stated that there is
very little data on payout annuities that are subject to self-selection and that there was a need to
gather that data for the benefit of both the insurance companies and the public. Id. at 29. The
companies that are relying on the past mortality experience of their own policyholders are taking a
risk that new customers will have better mortality experience than past customers, better than the
mortality tables predict.
111. Robert B. Friedland, Life expectancy and the Future: A Summary of a Discussion
Among Experts, 2 N. AM. ACTUARIAL J. 48, 49 (1997). Mortality rates have consistently declined
in the past century. Id. For example, "For most of the time humans have existed, life expectancy
at birth was about 18 years." Id. "Throughout the Middle Ages, life expectancy at birth was less
than 25 years, and before the 1700s, it was less than 40 years." Id. Now, life expectancy at birth
exceeds seventy-five years in North America and is about eighty-two years in Japan. Id. "Prior to
the twentieth century, survival to a very old age meant living 50 or 60 years; at the end of the
twentieth century, it meant living beyond age 95." Id.
112. In October 1997, the Society of Actuaries organized a daylong seminar to bring together
experts on mortality rates from different disciplines to examine factors affecting mortality change
and mortality assumptions throughout North America and to provide advice about forecasting
mortality rates in the future. Robert B. Friedland, PhD., the Director of the National Academy on
an Aging Society in Washington, D.C. published a paper summarizing the seminar. Friedland,
supra note 111. Two major background documents cited in the summary were also published in
the same volume. See Shripad Tuijapurkar & Carl Boe, Mortality Changes and Forecasting: How
Much and How Little Do We Know?, 2 N. AM. ACTUARIAL J. 13 (1997); Shripad Tuljapurkar,
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tend to err on the side of prudence. To take into account possible future
increases in life expectancy, an insurance company will use a mortality
table that projects lower expected future mortality rates.1 13 Projecting
essentially means estimating, and often estimates are little more than
educated guesses.1' 4 All commercial deferred annuities provide extremely
conservative mortality guarantees. 1l5 A recent study has concluded that the
Forecasting Mortality Change: Questions and Assumptions, 2 N. AM. ACTUARIAL J. 127 (1997).
A recent book discusses the possible effects of the human genome project on future life expec-
tancy. NICOLAS WADE, How THE HUMAN GENOME DISCOVERIES WILL TRANSFORM MEDICINE
AND ENHANCE YOUR HEALTH (Simon & Schuster 2001).
A critical question is whether improvements in life expectancy are merely bringing us closer
to the edge of the human life span or whether the life span is also increasing. Friedland, supra note
11, at 52. If there is a limit to human longevity, as life expectancy approaches that limit, the rate
of decline in mortality rates will eventually slow down. Id. If there is no upper limit to human
longevity, the rate of decline in mortality rates could accelerate indefinitely. Id.
113. BLACK & SKIPPER, supra note 33, at 704-05. Such a mortality table is called a table
with projections. Id.
114. As a pricing actuary with considerable experience aptly stated:
There is no underlying physical law that mortality follows (or at least we don't know
what it is yet) that would allow us to predict with scientific accuracy future trends in
mortality. We subconsciously recognize that we don't have this ability when we use
words like "assumption" and "projection" to describe what it is we're doing. There are
other words that could be used to describe this process, and these words better
emphasize the unreliability of what we do when we make mortality assumptions....
These words were suggested to me by the Microsoft Word Thesaurus, my primary
source for alternative words: "forecast," "prediction," "supposition," "conjecture,"
"opinion," "hypothesis," "belief," "guess," and "shot in the dark."
Ronald L. Klein et al., Session 83D Pricing With Mortality Improvements, Discussion Before the
Montreal Spring Meeting of the Society of Actuaries (June 19-20, 1997), in 23 RECORD No.2, at
6. Companies generally act conservatively, which means that they do assume mortality
improvements in pricing their annuity products but not in pricing their life insurance products. Id.
at 19.
115. An insurer selling a deferred variable annuity normally separately charges for any guar-
antees it makes (referred to as "unbundling"), and these are normally collected in the form of fees
charged against the investment funds in the subaccounts backing the contract. The annual charge
for the mortality guarantee is about one half of one percent. Robert J. Johansen, Review of
Adequacy of 1983 Individual Annuity Mortality Table, 47 TRANSACTIONS OF SOC'Y OF
ACTUARIES 211, 223 (1995). As a matter of deferred variable annuity design, there are a number
of possibilities with respect to mortality guarantees. At one extreme, it is theoretically possible for
the insurer to make no mortality guarantees, other than to guarantee that the policyholder will be
able to purchase an annuity with the accumulated value at whatever rates the insurer is using at
that time. Since this guarantee would present no risk to the insurer, it could provide this guarantee
with no charge. CREF currently adopts this alternative for its qualified retirement annuities. In
fact, those annuitants are given no mortality guarantees even after annuity payments begin. This
is a pure variable annuity, under which the annuitants bear both the investment and mortality risks,
and future payments will vary if investment and mortality results vary. No nonqualified annuity
similarly lacks any mortality guarantees. It may be that such a nonqualified annuity would not
qualify for current income tax favored treatment if it were offered because such an annuity must
be one that is considered to be an annuity contract "in accordance with the customary practice of
life insurance companies." See supra Part II, Section A. The IRS has ruled that an annuity must
provide permanent purchase rate guarantees. Rev. Rul. 77-286, 1977-2 CB 228. Legislative
history also indicates that some form of annuity guarantees are required. See GENERAL
EXPLANATION OF THE REVENUE PROVISIONS OF THE DEFICIT REDUCTION ACT OF 1984 ("Blue
Book" prepared by the Staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation) at 584; see also John H. Biggs,
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mortality guarantees under a typical deferred variable annuity are so
conservative that they are of very little value. 16
3. Other Cost Factors
The adverse selection issue is not the only pricing factor that may deter
the purchase of an annuity. Since the computation of annuity payments is
mathematically precise, one might conclude that it should not matter, aside
from considerations of financial stability of the company, from which
Alternatives in Variable Annuity Design, 21 TRANSACTIONS OF SOC'Y OF ACTUARIES, 61, 495-
517 (1969) (discussing variable annuity design).
116. Moshe Milevsky & Steven E. Posner, The Titanic Option: Valuation of the Guaranteed
Minimum Death Benefit in Variable Annuities and Mutual Funds, 68 J. OF RISK AND INS. 91, 97
(2001) (stating that the mortality guarantee "has little value-and is not a significant component of
the M&E charge-since it is ignored by pricing actuaries, valuation actuaries, regulators, and the
reinsurer." The study concludes that the charge made for the typical return of premium minimum
death benefit is overpriced by five to ten times its value. Nancy M. Kenneally et al., Session
I 1PD Variable Products-Pricing Issues, Panel Discussion Before the Washington Annual Meeting
of the Society of Actuaries Washington Annual Meeting, (Oct. 26-29, 1997), in 23 RECORD No.3,
at 6. Mr. Ruark, a fellow of the Society of Actuaries employed by CIGNA Corp., stated that when
a policyholder annuitizes at the guaranteed rate, the company has "the potential to gain from
annuitization. Of course, anyone who has spent some time with purchase rates, immediate
annuities, guaranteed purchase rates, and VA [variable annuity] knows they tend to be
conservative." Id.
At a session of the spring 1999 meeting of the Society of Actuaries concerning the actuarial
assessment of the risks of guarantees on variable products, it was emphasized that the guaranteed
rates on deferred annuities are very rarely "in the money," running about 70-75 percent of current
rates, which are themselves extremely conservative most of the time. Nancy M. Kenneally et al.,
Session 90PD Guarantees on Variable Products: How Are Companies Assessing the Risks?,
Panel Discussion Before the Atlanta Spring Meeting of the Society of Actuaries (May 24-25,
1999), in 25 RECORD No. 1, at 14 (statement by Mr. Sakoulas). At the 1999 Valuation Actuary
Symposium, it was bluntly stated that the guaranteed mortality rates on deferred variable annuities
are so conservative that it is assumed they are never going to be actually used. James W. Lamson
& Timothy E. Hill, Remarks at the 1999 Valuation Actuary Symposium, Session 25, Minimum
Guaranteed Benefits for Variable Annuities: Implementing Guidelines, at 21. A paper submitted
to the Actuarial Society concluded that the cumulative charges made for the mortality guarantees
on a typical policy based on the 1983 annuity table were sufficient to protect the companies from
any loss due to annuitization at those rates, which the report concluded were too generous as of
1996, due to mortality improvements. Johansen, supra note 115, at 221, 223. The study assumed
a contract was issued in 1983 and was in the accumulation phase until the owner reached age
sixty-five in 1986 and annuitized it. Id. It concluded that even if the annuitant exhibited the
improved mortality found in the study, the company would not have a loss under any reasonable
assumption as to investment returns over the accumulation period. Id. at 223. Since many
policyholders will not annuitize, the companies will likely realize significant profits from these
fees. Id.
These conservatively computed mortality rates are only the guaranteed rates, and if mortality
experience does not continuously improve or improves at a slower rate than assumed in the mor-
tality table used to compute the guarantees, then at the time the policyholder begins to receive
annuity payments under the contract, the company's current mortality guarantees for guaranteed
immediate annuities purchased at that time will be more favorable. Typically, a deferred annuity
contract will guarantee that if this occurs, the policyholder will be provided the higher benefit.
ANNUITIES ANSWER BOOK, supra note 27, at Q 1:14. If the contract did not have such a provi-
sion, the policyholder could merely exchange the old annuity policy for a new annuity policy with
the more favorable rates without recognition of gain. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
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company a policy is purchased. However, expenses and profit margins can
vary greatly from company to company. A recent study concerning the
money's worth of commercial annuities found that monthly annuity
payments varied substantially. For example, in 1995, a 65-year old male
might receive from $725 to $872 monthly depending on the company. "17
4. Optimal Planning of Timing of Annuitization
Since there is risk of loss due to premature death after annuitization,
optimal financial planning is to delay annuitization as long as reasonably
possible since waiting can provide additional valuable information about
one's survival probabilities. The additional information gained by delay is
particularly important in the commercial annuity market because indi-
viduals who do not have well above average life expectancies are finan-
cially penalized by the conservative annuity mortality tables used to price
commercial annuities.
A recent article concluded that given the high costs of annuities, a 65-
year old female (male) has a 90 percent (85 percent) chance of beating the
rate of return from a life annuity until age 80.118 The study is based on a
"do-it-yourself' scheme: a person makes systematic withdrawals from
one's accumulated funds of the age 65 annuity payment amount each year
from age 65 until age 80 and then uses the remaining funds to purchase a
life annuity at age 80.119 Actual annuity rates offered by Canadian
companies were used in making the calculations. 120
Another analysis based on United States annuity mortality rates con-
cludes that by delaying the start of an annuity from age 65 to age 70, a per-
son at age 70 would be able to fund up to 95 percent of the annuity income
that he or she would have had if the annuity had been started at age 65 and
up to 85 percent by delaying to age 75.121
117. Mitchell, et al., supra note 84, at 1305-17. The authors could find no correlation
between risk and the price of commercial annuities. Id. at 1300. Insurers with higher financial
ratings did not in general charge substantially higher prices. Id.
118. Moshe Arye Milevsky, Optimal Asset Allocation Towards the End of the Life Cycle: To
Annuitize or Not toAnnuitize? 65 J. OFRISK AND INS. 401, 418 (1998).
119. Id. at 414.
120. Id. at 410.
121. John Ameriks, The Retirement Patterns and Annuitization Decisions of a Cohort of
TIAA-CREF Participants, 60 RES. DIALOGUES (TIAA-CREF Inst., New York, N.Y.), Aug. 1999,
at 10-12. The computations are based on a do-it-yourself scheme similar to the one described in
the text describing the Canadian study: a person makes systematic withdrawals from one's
accumulated funds of the age 65 annuity payment amount each year from age 65 to age 70 or 75
and uses the remaining funds to purchase a life annuity at age 70 or 75. Id. These calculations are
not based on actual annuity rates offered by insurance companies but rather only on annuity rates
under certain mortality and interest rate assumptions. Id. Since the assumed annuity rates do not
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Based on the results of these studies, optimal financial planning is to
delay annuitization for some considerable period after the normal retirement
age of 65. In general, the cost of delay increases as an individual ages
because the benefits of delay decrease with age; as one ages, the likely
length of one's future and therefore any uncertainty about it inevitably
decreases. The cost of delaying at least 5 years is not that significant and
would probably be attractive to most individuals. While the cost of
delaying 10 years is more than twice as great, it may well be acceptable to a
risk-averse individual.
5. Other Non-Pricing Factors
The pricing issue alone does not explain the almost complete lack of
annuity demand in the United States.122 However, several other factors in
combination may lessen or even eliminate the economic value of annuities,
and these factors will affect the decision by owners of deferred variable
annuities whether or not to annuitize.
To the extent that lack of inflation protection on most commercial
annuities is a factor that inhibits annuitization, 123 variable annuities do
provide some measure of inflation protection since the payments vary with
the investment results of the underlying investment fund or funds that back
include other annuity expense charges, it is likely that the costs of waiting to annuitize are
somewhat overstated and are in fact closer to those found in the Canadian study.
122. BROWN & WARSHAWSKY, supra note 19, at 7-8. Evidence of low annuitization rates in
the Federal Thrift Savings Plan, which provides more attractive annuitization rates than does the
commercial annuity market, also supports this conclusion. See JAMES M. POTERBA & MARK J.
WARSHAWSKY, THE COSTS OF ANNUITIZING RETIREMENT PAYOUTS FROM INDIVIDUAL
ACCOUNTS, (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 6918, 1999). The Federal Thrift
Savings Plan (TSP) is a relatively new supplemental defined contribution plan for federal govern-
ment employees. That plan is a 401(k) defined contribution plan for federal employees estab-
lished in 1986. Upon leaving government service, an employee may withdraw assets in three
ways: a life annuity, a lump sum, or a series of monthly payments. Annuities are purchased from
a commercial annuity seller after a competitive bidding process. The process is handled through a
request for proposal (RFP) inviting bids. The RFP details the mortality assumptions and interest
rate assumptions that must be used in pricing the annuity. Id. at 14-17. The annuitization rates
resulting from the process were more favorable than rates generally available to the public. Id. at
18-19. Approximately 1.2 percent of the eligible participants were choosing to annuitize. Id. at
26 (citing information received from Metropolitan Life Insurance Co.).
123. JEFFREY R. BROWN ET AL., THE ROLE OF REAL ANNUITIES AND INDEXED BONDS IN AN
INDIVIDUAL ACCOUNTS RETIREMENT SYSTEM, (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper
No. 7005, 1999) at 10. While the Social Security system provides annuities that are indexed to the
consumer price index, nearly all commercial annuities available in the United States are fixed or
nominal annuities. Id. However, this alone cannot explain the lack of demand for annuities. In
an inflation-linked annuity, the company guarantees that annuity payments will increase each year
based on inflation measured by some external index. Irish Life, PLC, an international insurance
firm headquartered in Dublin, Ireland, offers index-linked annuities in the United States through
Interstate Insurance Company, a division of Irish Life of North America (ILONA). Id. As of
1999, there were no United States sales of the product. Id.
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the contract. While there is no necessary correlation between inflation and
the returns on any investment fund, and while empirical results indicate that
the inflation hedging properties of both equities and long-term bonds are
limited,124 over the long term, a diversified equity fund has a good
probability of providing returns that outpace inflation, at the price of
volatility. One economic study concluded that an investor with a
reasonable level of risk aversion would prefer an equity backed variable
annuity to a completely inflation protected non-variable annuity.125 Since
deferred variable annuities do provide the option of choosing a variable
annuity payout, they may be more likely to be annuitized than deferred
fixed annuities.
However, the remaining factors that contribute to resistance to annuity-
zation in general will likely also contribute to resistance to annuitizing
deferred variable annuities. These factors include (1) the irreversibility of
annuitizing with the attendant lack of ability to access the assets used to
purchase the annuity if the annuitant's financial circumstances change;126
124. Id. at 19-24. The study concludes that there is a negative correlation between equity or
bond returns and unexpected inflation. Id. at 24.
125. Id. at 35-36. The variable annuity is even more attractive to investors who already have
a substantial portion of their net worth invested in an inflation-adjusted annuity, such as Social
Security. Id. at 37-38.
126. BROWN & WARSHAWSKY, supra note 19, at 12. The most significant problems faced
by some retirees are the possibility of incurring large uninsured medical expenses and long-term
care expenses. Id. Medicare, together with Medigap policies and in some cases retiree health
benefits, adequately insures a very large portion of the medical expenses of most elderly persons.
Id. Even retired persons covered by Medicare are not adequately covered for long-term care.
Medicare covers only 100 days of long-term care and only in certain limited circumstances. Id.
Medicaid imposes strict income and asset eligibility tests that generally require that individuals
exhaust substantially all of their personal assets and apply all but a minor amount of their income
to cover nursing home costs. Id. Among those aged 65 and over, 60 percent will need some long-
term care in their lifetime. Id. at 13. While the escalating cost of long-term care services is a
substantial financial risk to individuals, very few are insured against it. Id. at 14. Less than 8
percent of the elderly own such a policy, and group employer sponsored coverage is rare. Id.
Individuals may be reluctant to annuitize because they wish to retain financial assets to pay such
expenses. Id.
One reason many retirees do not purchase long-term care insurance is that, due to adverse
selection with respect to that product, the cost of coverage is quite high. Christopher M, Murtaugh
et al., In Sickness and in Health: An Annuity Approach to Financing Long-Term Care and
Retirement Income, 68 J. OF RISK AND INS. 225, 228-29 (2001). Recently it has been suggested
that combining a long-term care policy with an immediate annuity would substantially reduce the
cost of both contracts by reducing adverse selection. Id. at 229. The specific form proposed is a
fixed immediate annuity with payments that increase upon the determination of a chronic
disability. Id. Such a combination policy would greatly reduce, without costly underwriting, the
adverse selection problem with respect to both the annuity and the long-term care aspects of the
policy. Id. at 229-30. The policy pools two opposing risks-long life versus short life with
disability. Id. at 231. The product could be priced more cheaply than separately purchased
products and thus be attractive to more people. Id. at 227. Such creative payout methods can
address the reluctance to annuitize to the extent it is based on legitimate liquidity concerns.
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(2) the presence of other sources of annuity income;127 (3) bequest
motives128and risk sharing in families;129 and (4) lack of understanding of
annuities. 130
127. BROWN & WARSHAWSKY, supra note 19, at 6. Economists agree that the value of
annuitization decreases at the margin. Id. In other words, if people already have a reasonable
level of available annuity income, the value of additional annuitization decreases. Id. The more
sources of annuity income they have, the less likely they are to voluntarily annuitize their
remaining wealth. Id. Since most individuals are eligible for Social Security, which provides an
inflation-adjusted rather than a nominal annuity, the value of any additional voluntary
annuitization is lessened. Id. at 10. The study concludes the value of additional annuitization is
still substantial. Id. at 6. Thus, the existence of preexisting annuity wealth cannot by itself
explain the extreme aversion of individuals to voluntarily annuitize their assets. Id.
A large percentage of non-retired owners of nonqualified annuities said that money they put
into a retirement plan at work (48 percent) or money their employer put into a retirement plan (43
percent) would be a major source of their retirement income. GALLUP SURVEY, supra note 92, at
28. The survey did not provide separate responses for fixed and variable annuity owners. Id. The
survey also disclosed that 75 percent of non-retired variable annuity owners had individual
retirement accounts (IRAs). Id. at 21.
128. See BROWN & WARSHAWSKY, supra note 19, at 8 (citing the literature on the subject).
Wealth an individual intends to bequeath is no longer optimal to be used to purchase a life
annuity; a pure life annuity ends at the death of the annuitant and nothing will pass to any
beneficiaries. Id. Unfortunately, there is little consensus on whether bequest motives have an
important effect on consumption decisions. Id. at 8-10.
129. Id. at 9-10. Married couples may engage in risk sharing between them. Id. at 9. Two
individuals sharing a common budget can obtain significant utility gains through this type of self-
insurance. Id. at 9-10 (citing studies quantifying the utility gains obtained as a result of risk
sharing between two individuals who share a common budget). A large percentage of purchasers
of deferred variable annuities are married individuals who therefore are less likely to value
annuitization. GALLUP SURVEY, supra note 92, at 6. According to the 2001 Gallup survey, 63
percent of nonqualified annuity owners were married. Id. at 7.
130. BROWN & WARSHAWSKY, supra note 19, at 14-16. There is evidence that consumers
have very little knowledge about annuities or understanding of how they work. Id. at 14 (citing a
Task Force report by the American Council of Life Insurance). The least understood aspect of
annuities is how risk shifting allows insurers to offer life annuities. Id. at 15. Consumers tend to
focus on the risk of dying early rather than the risk of outliving their assets. Id. Some consumer
focus group participants viewed lifetime annuity payments as gambling on their lives and believed
the odds favored the insurance company. Id. They viewed annuities as a source of risk rather
than as insurance against risk. Id.
Income options available for annuity payouts may also be a source of difficulty, including
whether to purchase a fixed or variable annuity, whether to purchase a single life annuity or a joint
annuity with a spouse or other person, and whether to purchase a pure life annuity or one with a
refund feature such as a ten year guarantee. All of these choices require some knowledge of likely
future rates of inflation and the likely life expectancy of both oneself and one's spouse. In short,
choosing how to annuitize requires complex predictions about an inherently unpredictable future.
George Loewenstein, Is More Choice Always Better?, SOCIAL SECURITY BRIEF No. 7 at 6
(National Academy of Social Insurance October 1999). Id. The Brief is a very good discussion of
issues that must be addressed if the Social Security system is amended to permit individual
accounts. The principles discussed are equally applicable to any system that permits choice as to
whether to purchase an annuity. Id.
To the extent these difficulties are due to lack of basic knowledge or lack of understanding of
annuities, focused educational efforts may be effective in increasing willingness to annuitize.
There is currently very little such education provided by insurance companies to purchasers of
deferred variable annuities.
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6. Psychological Factors
Psychological factors may also play a role in reluctance to annuitize.
Many people can be shortsighted when weighing short-term sacrifices
against long-term benefits or gains. They might tend to focus more on the
chance of premature death than on the possibility of longevity. When
buying an annuity, the sacrifices-giving up control of one's assets and the
possibility of loss due to premature death-are proximate; while the pri-
mary gains- protection against longevity-are remote and speculative. 131
Even though the potential gains equal the potential losses if the annuity
price is actuarially fair to the purchaser, losses have a much larger psycho-
logical effect on individuals than do gains; people experience much more
pain from a loss than they experience pleasure from an equal amount of
gain.132 So even if the two are equal, the loss is more immediate and the
prospect of the loss may psychologically far outweigh the possibility of
gain. Even worse, because of adverse selection in commercial annuities,
the potential gains do not even equal the potential losses for a person with
average life expectancy.
In theory, loss aversion should not be a factor in the purchase of an
actuarially fair annuity by one with no bequest motives or need for
precautionary savings. Since the cost of an annuity is the fact that future
payments are cancelled at death, to an individual who is only concerned
with smoothing lifetime consumption and has no need for accumulated
assets, there is no cost to the annuity.133 Thus, the individual should always
choose the annuity because it offers a greater return due to the mortality
premium.
There is clear evidence that loss aversion of some kind is involved in
the annuitization decision. Those who do annuitize overwhelmingly choose
an option with a guaranteed period, very non-optimal behavior from an
131. Loewenstein, supra note 130, at 5. The mortality premium included in each annuity
payment is a more immediate benefit, but it is a relatively small part of each payment, particularly
the earlier payments in the annuity stream.
There is evidence that individuals have a tendency to favor a lump sum over a series of
payments, even if the two are actuarially equivalent, which is sometimes referred to as "wealth
illusion." David Fetherstonhaugh & Lee Ross, Framing Effects and Income Flow Preferences in
Decisions about Social Security, in BEHAVIORAL DIMENSIONS OF RETIREMENT ECONOMICS,
supra note 2, at 194-96. Wealth illusion may "bias intuitive beliefs about the mathematics of
annuities in a direction that favors the lump payment." Id. at 213 (comment by Daniel Kahneman).
132. See infra Part IV (discussing loss aversion).
133. JEFFREY R. BROWN, PRIVATE PENSIONS, MORTALITY RISK, AND THE DECISION TO
ANNUITIZE, (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 7191, 1999) at 6. Even a
person with a bequest motive would presumably invest the wealth he or she wishes to bequeath
outside of the annuity and purchase an annuity with the remainder. Id.
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economic standpoint.134 This behavior indicates that an individual may not
analyze the decision whether to purchase an annuity in purely economic
terms.
If people learn shortly after the purchase that their life span is likely to
be shorter than anticipated, they are likely to experience serious regret;135
while if they decide not to purchase an annuity and outlives their assets,
they will also experience serious regret as well as serious financial
hardship.136 For these reasons, just focusing on the decision whether or not
to purchase an annuity is psychologically difficult and may be avoided by
some people for that reason alone. The decision is even more complicated
when other factors are considered, such as whether to purchase inflation
protection or whether to purchase a joint annuity to protect a spouse. Such
decisions require making even more predictions about an uncertain and
unpredictable future, further increasing the psychological costs. 137 In the
case of a variable annuity with a large number of investment choices, the
annuitization decision is further complicated by having to choose which of
the subaccounts to annuitize in, if a variable pay out is chosen.
Studies based on annuitization decisions by participants in the TIAA-
CREF retirement system, one of the largest retirement systems in the world,
indicate that the number of alternative options available may accentuate the
psychological resistance to voluntary annuitization.
Prior to 1988, all TIAA-CREF basic pension plans allowed for distri-
butions only through life annuities or death benefits, but since then, a num-
ber of other distribution methods have become available.138 The annuity
rates offered by the TIAA-CREF annuities are generally higher than those
commercially available.139 Nearly 60 percent of individuals age 65 and
134. See Jeffrey R. Brown, Redistribution and Insurance: Mandatory Annuitization With
Mortality Heterogeneity, CRP WP 2001-02 (Center for Retirement Research at Boston College,
Chestnut Hill, MA) April 2001, at 27 (citing research showing that annuities with "period certain"
options-life with ten years certain-are extremely popular in the United States). In the TIAA-
CREF retirement system, a large majority of purchasers of two-life annuities choose twenty-year
guarantees while a majority of purchasers of one-life annuities choose either no guarantee or a ten-
year guarantee, with more women than men choosing no guarantee. Francis P. King, Trends in
the Selection of TIAA-CREF Life-Annuity Income Options, 1978-1994, 48 RES. DIALOGUES 1
(TIAA-CREF Inst., New York, N.Y.), July 1996, at 4-5.
Professor Brown shows that the optimal economic solution for one who desires to make a
bequest is to keep the wealth to be bequeathed in non-annuitized form and annuitize the rest.
Brown, Redistribution and Insurance, supra at 29.
135. Loewenstein, supra note 130, at 5-6. Professor Brown refers to this as "a form of ex
ante regret." Brown, supra note 134, at 29.
136. Lowenstein, supra note 130, at 6.
137. Id.
138. See Ameriks, supra note 121, at 4. The report examined a cohort of participants over a
period of time. Id.
139. POTERBA & WARSHAWSKY, supra note 122, at 25.
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over retiring from 1994 through 1996 started their first life annuity within
one year of retiring, but the frequency of that choice has declined steadily as
the number of alternative options available to participants has expanded. 40
Since the owner of a deferred variable annuity can choose any method of
payout, including cashing the policy in for a lump sum, and may delay any
payout until a very advanced age, there is little reason to conclude that the
current very low rate of annuitization will increase.
Experience with the TIAA-CREF retirement system also indicates that
another factor contributing 'to reluctance to annuitize may be increasing
wealth. Individuals who find themselves wealthier than they expected have
less fear of outliving their assets, and they may feel that annuitization is too
costly in terms of preventing the use of their wealth for other purposes, such
as emergencies or bequests.' 4 ' A very large percentage of variable annuity
owners also own other financial assets. 4 2 Since they are likely more
wealthy than average, voluntary annuitization by them is less likely.
If reluctance to annuitize is due to lack of understanding of annuities,
then educational efforts might be effective to increase annutization rates.
Employers in the TIAA-CREF system and the federal government provide
educational programs to their employees to explain the savings program
and the payout options. However, there is less opportunity to provide
organized educational programs to variable annuity owners, and there is no
evidence that insurance companies or sellers of deferred variable annuities
are making any significant efforts to educate policyholders about the
benefits of annuitization. In fact, as discussed in the next part of this article,
there is almost complete lack of any emphasis on the annuity aspects of
deferred annuities by the sellers of the product.
Insurance company actuaries are aware of the psychological barriers to
annuitization, and they take it into account in estimating reserve funding
requirements for certain guaranteed benefits on deferred annuities. Instead
140. Ameriks, supra note 121, at 5-7. The data shows a decline in annuitization rates at all
ages, but the decline is slightly larger for older individuals. Id. For men aged 70, the rate fell
form 83.4 percent in 1987-90 to 57 percent in 1994-96; while at age 62, the decline was from 66.3
percent to 52.1 percent. Id. The drop was greatest from the 1991-93 period to the 1994-96 period.
Id. at 5.
141. Ameriks, supra note 121, at 10. In general, the decline in annuitization rates was
slightly larger among individuals with greater equity allocations. Id. It is also possible that
increased equity allocations indicate a greater likelihood to take risks, so that they are less worried
about longevity risks and more willing to take financial risks in self-managing their assets rather
than annuitizing. Id.
142. GALLUP SURVEY, supra note 92, at 21. According to the 2001 Gallup survey, large
percentages of variable annuity owners also owned mutual funds (eighty percent), individual
retirement accounts (seventy-five percent), and individual stocks or bonds (sixty-eight percent).
Id. The survey does not inquire into wealth levels.
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of providing educational programs to address the fact that policyholders
may not act in their best economic interests in deciding whether to
annuitize, insurance companies are in part relying on the strong aversion to
annuitization to protect themselves from any losses on annuity guarantees
that require annuitization. 143 One actuary stated, "As we all know, annuiti-
zation is still probably the longest four-letter word that we see out there in
the annuity business today."144
One additional source of evidence concerning the likelihood that own-
ers of deferred annuities will voluntarily annuitize is the current legislative
proposal supported by the insurance industry to provide significant
additional tax benefits to policyholders who choose a life contingent
payout-the Lifetime Annuity Payout Act.145 Under that proposal, the
income element in a lifetime annuity payment would be taxed at capital
gain rates, rather than at ordinary income rates as it is under current law.
The provision would apply to both.immediate nonqualified annuities and
annuitization of a deferred nonqualified annuity. If a significant number of
owners of deferred variable annuities are likely to voluntarily annuitize
without the additional tax benefit, then providing additional expensive tax
incentives for doing so is unnecessary and difficult to justify when other
needed government programs are being cut due to expected federal deficits.
The proposal seems to be a tacit admission by the industry that the level of
voluntary annuitization of deferred annuity contracts will not be significant.
7. Incentives of Insurance Companies and Financial Planners
Concerning Annuitization of Deferred Variable Annuities
While insurance companies have incentives to induce individuals to
purchase immediate or deferred annuities, they do not have a strong
economic incentive to encourage owners of deferred annuities to begin to
receive payments. The purchase of an immediate or deferred annuity means
new money coming into the company, but the conversion of an
accumulating deferred annuity into payout phase means money going out of
143. See, e.g., Lamson & Hill, supra note 116, at 23; Kenneally, Session 90 PD, note 116, at
14. Both sessions concerned assessing the risks of various annuity guarantees. At both sessions, it
was noted that even when a guarantee was "in the money," the policyholder still might not do so
because of psychological resistance. John M. O'Sullivan et al., Remarks at the 2000 Valuation
Actuary Symposium, Session 17PD, Minimum Guaranteed Death Benefits on Variable Annuities,
at 5.
144. O'Sullivan, supra note 143, at 5.
145. In November 2001, Representatives Phil English (R-PA), Nancy Johnson (R-CT), and
Karen Thurman (D-FL) introduced the Lifetime Annuity Payout Act, H.R. 3320, into the House of
Representatives. H.R. 3320 107th Cong. (2001). Since then, other members have joined as co-
sponsors. Id. The legislation would only apply to nonqualified annuities, not those purchased
with funds in qualified plans. Id.
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the company. While agents receive additional compensation for selling
new policies, they do not generally receive additional compensation if one
of the policies they previously sold is annuitized.146 Annuitization also
creates risk for the company: if the mortality assumptions used in pricing
the annuity payouts are not accurate, the company could suffer a loss on
annuitized policies. Non-annuitized policies do not present that risk. In
addition, if the guaranteed mortality rates on payouts for a group of policies
should turn out to be favorable to the policyholders, the company will have
no incentive to encourage their annuitization. 47 Some companies are now
moving toward changing the compensation scheme to provide incentives to
agents to encourage policyholders to annuitize a policy rather than
surrender it for cash or exchange it for another company's annuity, but there
is still little incentive for agents or companies to encourage annuitization of
a policy that would otherwise remain in the accumulation phase. 148
Likewise, financial planners may have little incentive to recommend
annuitization to their clients. Simply stated, how likely is it that a planner
will give a client the only advice that will insure he or she needs little or no
future financial planning?
8. Deferred Variable Annuity Design: Guaranteed Death
Benefits
While deferred variable annuities place the entire investment risk on
the policyholder during the accumulation phase, a variety of benefits are
provided under deferred variable annuity policies that operate to shift part
of the risk back to the company.1 49 If a contract owner dies during the
146. Timothy C. Pfeifer et al., Session 138PD An Immediate Annuity with Casho-Out
Rights?, Panel Discussion Before the Washington Annual Meeting of the Society of Actuaries
(October 26-29, 1997), in 23 RECORD No.3, at 3-4. Sales agents generally prefer to sell deferred
annuities rather than immediate annuities because of the difference in compensation. Id. at 3.
Agents typically receive 1-5 percent commissions on immediate annuities and 5-7 percent
commissions on deferred annuities. The moderator states: "Agents might not tell you publicly,
but they might tell you privately about their belief that once they put their clients into an
immediate annuity, there's no opportunity for them to earn any more commission from that
business." Id. at 3-4. Thus, they encourage the purchase of deferred annuities "from which they
intend to encourage systematic withdrawals." Id. at 3.
147. There are very likely some policyholders who purchased deferred annuities decades
ago, before companies became very conservative in their mortality guarantees, who hold accumu-
lating policies that would be very attractive to annuitize but do not realize that and continue to let
them accumulate.
148. See generally Deanne L. Osgood et al., Session 95PD Variable Annuity Product Design,
Panel Discussion Before the Maui I Spring Meeting of the Society of Actuaries (June 15-17,
1998), in 24 RECORD No. 1 (discussing fee structures in variable annuities).
149. While these benefits are called guarantees, it is really somewhat of a misnomer. The
concept of a guarantee usually contemplates a third party with assets who can be called upon to
pay a liability if the primary obligor defaults. Here, there is no third party that guarantees these
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accumulation period of a deferred annuity, state law generally requires the
company to pay all or a portion of the contract's cash value to the owner's
beneficiary as a death benefit.150 The policy itself often provides for death
benefits in excess of those required by state law. There are four types of
such guaranteed minimum death benefits (GMDBs) currently provided
under deferred variable annuities:
1. Return of Premium: This benefit pays the greater of (a) the sum
of all premiums paid for the contract less any withdrawals and (b)
the contract's cash value on the date of death.
2. Periodic Step-Up:'15 This benefit pays the greatest of (a) the
sum of all premiums paid for the contract less any withdrawals; (b)
the contract's cash value on the date of death; and (c) the con-
tract's cash value on a specified date, referred to as the anniversary
date, less any withdrawals. 152
3. Guaranteed Return: This benefit pays the greater of (a) the
contract's cash value on the date of death and (b) the sum of all
premiums paid for the contract less any withdrawals plus interest
at a specified rate.153
4. Percentage of Gain: This benefit pays the beneficiary a
specified percentage of any gain in a contract, excess of cash value
over premiums paid minus withdrawals, in addition to the contract
value on the date of death. 154
In some cases, policies offer combinations of these benefits, for
example, the greater of a one-year step up and a 5 percent guaranteed
benefits. Rather, it is the insurance company itself, the primary obligor of all benefits under the
annuity policy, that is providing these additional benefits. It would be more accurate to call them
additional contractual benefits than guarantees.
150. BLACK & SKIPPER, supra note 33, at 165-66.
151. This benefit is often referred to as a "maximum anniversary value" or "ratchet" death
benefit.
152. Usually, the benefit is pegged to an annual anniversary date (a one year ratchet), but
sometimes the benefit ratchets less frequently on the anniversary date (e.g., a two year ratchet
would change every two years). If the benefit is pegged to the maximum value on any anniver-
sary date, then it can never go down. If the benefit is merely reset to the value on each anniver-
sary date (referred to as a "reset"), then the benefit can decrease. See Campbell & Ruark, supra
note 66 (discussing the various guaranteed lifetime and death benefits on deferred variable
annuities).
153. This benefit is called a premium "roll up." Initially, the rate was in the I to 3 percent
range to approximate inflation, but it is now more common to see rates of up to 7 percent.
154. The benefit is usually subject to a cap. The benefit is designed to compensate, at least
in part, for the fact that an annuity does not receive a step up in basis on death under section 1014
of the Code as do most other nonqualified investment assets. I.R.C. § 1014 (2002); see also supra
note 54 and related text.
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annual return. These benefits are provided for two principal reasons. First,
since a deferred variable annuity places all of the investment risk on the
contract owner, this may cause some risk-averse individuals to invest less
aggressively than they perhaps should. The guaranteed minimum death
benefits provide some protection against the risk of losing money during a
market downturn, at least in the event of the death of the policyholder. This
guarantee may provide an incentive for someone saving for retirement to
invest more aggressively and accumulate a larger retirement fund. Since
the death benefit only pays off to a beneficiary if the policyholder dies
during the accumulation period, it doesn't protect the policyholder against
the risk of investment losses that will reduce the level of annuity payments
in retirement.
Second, companies offer these benefits to improve the persistency of
their annuity policies. During the first several years a deferred annuity is in
force, there is usually a surrender charge that applies. Typically, the
surrender charge is 7 to 10 percent of the cash value in the first year and
decreases by one percentage point per year until it vanishes. The periodic
step-up death benefits were originally linked to the end of the surrender
charge period on the theory that it might have some affect on a
policyholder's decision whether or not to surrender the annuity or exchange
it for an annuity with another company when the surrender charges were no
longer applicable. 155
Companies also offer such benefits to differentiate their products and
gain a competitive edge. Benefits are perceived by insurance companies to
be important to prospective purchasers of variable annuities; therefore, in a
very competitive marketplace, companies routinely offer them. A few
companies offer only the basic return of premium benefit but most offer
enhanced death benefits. However, any competitive edge rarely lasts long
since rival companies quickly adopt and offer any new benefits that are
attractive to customers. Competitive pressure may explain why such
benefits typically start out modest-a five year reset and a 2 percent roll
up-but become more substantial-a one year ratchet and a 7 percent roll
up-as competing companies continue to attempt to gain a competitive
edge. A recent Wall Street Journal article cited a study that indicated that in
2001, 61 percent of gross annuity sales came from exchanges from one
155. BLACK & SKIPPER, supra note 33, at 169-70; ANNUITIES ANSWER BOOK, supra note
27, at Q 1:28, Q 2:42. A few deferred variable annuities do not have any surrender charges, but
the vast majority of them do. BLACK & SKIPPER, supra note 33, at 170.
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product to another instead of new money coming into the industry, up from
52 percent in 2000 and 20 percent in 1996.156
Guaranteed death benefits are an additional factor that may discourage
ultimate annuitization by the purchasers of those policies. Since the death
benefit pays off only if the contract owner dies before annuitizing, any
contract with a death benefit that is "in the money," the death benefit
exceeds the current cash value of the policy, will likely not be annnuitized
until required under state law.
Since the risk of loss from investing over a long period of time in a
broadly diversified fund is not substantial, one might also ask to whom
these death benefits are being marketed. It is speculators and short-term
traders who face the most risk from equity markets and who would likely
purchase the product for its death benefits and tax deferral benefits with no
intention of annuitizing it. If some of the funds supporting the annuity are
overly risky even for long-term investors, the appropriate response is not to
provide expensive insurance coverage to encourage investing in them but to
eliminate the unsuitable fund choices.
The death benefits also provide non-optimal incentives to policy-
holders. Purchasers who have invested money in an annuity with poorly
performing funds will find that their death benefit is "in the money." While
they might otherwise rationally decide to exchange the annuity for another
with better fund options, if they do, they will forfeit the accrued death
benefit on the old annuity. Alternatively, they may decide to move the
accumulation to a less risky account than they would otherwise choose and
maintain the life insurance benefit, or they may be inclined to invest in the
most aggressive fund choices within the investment menu options on the
annuity they own in an attempt to get even, for any further losses will also
be covered (at least at death) by the death benefit. Thus, they may be
induced to continue investing in poorly performing funds or to invest either
less or more aggressively than is consistent with their risk tolerance. 57
In particular, the percentage of gain benefit is very troublesome. Its
only function is to partially compensate for the fact that annuity accumula-
tions do not receive a step-up in basis at death and make a deferred variable
annuity a closer substitute for other non-annuity investment vehicles. What
legitimate need do purchasers who are primarily concerned with providing
156. Bridget O'Brian, In Annuities, A Quest for Basics, WALL ST. J, April 8, 2002, at R-23.
Financial Research Corp., a Boston consulting firm, conducted the study. Id.
157. Ari J. Lindner et al., Session 23PD Risk Management Behind Variable Annuities, Panel
Discussion Before the Sand Diego Spring Meeting of the Society of Actuaries (June 22-23, 2000)
in 26 RECORD No.2, at 3. Actuaries assessing the risks of guaranteed death benefits assume that
some policyholders will react in these ways. Id.
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for their own retirement income have for insurance that will only be
beneficial if they invest profitably during the accumulation phase but then
never annuitize the contract? Having paid for this insurance during the
accumulation phase and having invested profitably, how likely are they to
annuitize and forfeit the value of the insurance benefit?
The death benefit is also likely to have the greatest negative impact on
annuitization rates because, assuming most deferred annuities offer sound
investment choices, the vast majority of contracts can be expected to be
profitable at least over the long-term. Unlike the other death benefits, the
percentage of gain death benefit will be "in the money" and discourage
annuitization precisely when it has been effective in accomplishing its
purpose of encouraging the policyholder to invest more aggressively.
The death benefits provided on variable annuities are also irrationally
priced and nearly impossible to value. While they have some value in
volatile equity markets, it is impossible to determine whether they are being
reasonably priced; assessing and quantifying the risks and benefits requires
complicated Monte Carlo simulations of financial market movements,
policyholder mortality, and assumptions about likely policyholder behavior
in the face of market volatility, tasks that are extremely difficult even for
seasoned actuaries. 1 58
The charges levied for these benefits vary. Even though they are not
structured as separate life insurance benefits, they are a form of life insur-
ance and logically the fee should vary with the age and sex of the policy-
holder, but it does not. Because the death benefits on deferred variable
annuities are not structured as separate term life insurance, the beneficiaries
who receive them may not exclude them from gross income as the bene-
ficiaries of mutual fund death benefits do. 159 There are currently four
mutual fund companies that offer a minimum guaranteed death benefit on
some of their funds, and those benefits are structured as separate term life
insurance benefits for which the premiums do vary by age and sex. 160
158. See generally Lindner et al., supra note 157 (discussing management of the risks of
financial market volatility); Stephen J. Preston et al., Session 127PD Variable Annuities and
Segregated Funds-Guaranteed Benefits Valuation Issues, Panel Discussion Before the San Fran-
cisco Annual Meeting of the Society of Actuaries (Oct. 17-20, 1999), in 25 RECORD No.3;
Kenneally et al., Session 90 PD, supra note 116, at 4-8. See also Campbell & Ruark, supra note
66 (discussing computing statutory reserves for guaranteed benefits).
159. I.R.C. § 101 (West 2002). Life insurance benefits paid by reason of the death of the
insured are excludible from the gross income of the beneficiary under section 101 of the Internal
Revenue Code. Id.
160. Milevsky & Posner, supra note 116, at 98. The four mutual fund companies are
Prudential Investments, SunAmerica, American Skandia, and Putnam Investments. Id. at 96.
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In addition, one would expect that the fee charged for the death benefit
would vary with the riskiness of the underlying investment funds, but it
does not. 161 Insurance company actuaries are also unsure of what mortality
assumptions to use in pricing and computing reserves for the guaranteed
minimum death benefits.162 Because mortality rates were not considered a
key element in variable annuity profitability, companies did not collect data
and perform detailed mortality studies and have not done so even after they
began offering enhanced death benefits that substantially increased their
risk exposure. 163
A recently published study has concluded that the typical variable
annuity mortality charge for the simple return of premium death benefit is
likely five to ten times the economic value of the benefit. 164 In May 2000,
Sidney and Johanna Olmsted, holders of Prudential variable annuities,
brought a class action suit against the insurance company under certain
provisions of the Investment Company Act, alleging that the contracts
charged unreasonable mortality and expense risk fees. 165  One of the
allegations was that the fees for the minimum death benefit were excessive
because the benefit was virtually worthless.1 66 While that case was
161. Id. at 98. Canadian mutual funds that offer such death benefits do impose fees that vary
with the volatility of the assets in the fund. Id. For example, growth funds, compared to balanced
or bond funds, are charged three to four times as much in fees. Id. The death benefits in deferred
variable annuities do not insure any particular subaccount but rather the entire accumulation in the
policy, which may be allocated and reallocated among several subaccounts. This policyholder
choice makes it more difficult to assess the risks of the guarantee. Kenneth P. Mungan et al.,
Session 1 13PD, The Impact of Policyholder Behavior on Variable Annuities, Panel Discussion
Before the Toronto Spring Meeting of the Society of Actuaries (June 20-22, 2001), in 27 RECORD
No. 2, at 3.
162. There is a work group studying the issue. Darin C. Zimmerman et al., Session 118TS
Guaranteed Death Benefits (GMDB) Reserving Modeling and Investment Implications, Panel
Discussion Before the Washington Annual Meeting of the Society of Actuaries (Oct. 26-29,
1997), in RECORD No.3, at 19-20. It recommends the use of a group table-the 1994 Group
Annuity Mortality basic table-increased by 10 percent for margins as the valuation table for
reserve purposes for the time being. Id. at 19. The group sent out a series of questionnaires to
participating companies concerning mortality experience to obtain data to possibly construct
another table to use for those benefits. Id. at 20. The study was supposed to come out in 1997,
but it hasn't yet been completed. Id.
163. Kenneth P. Mungan et al., Session 113PD The Impact of Policyholder Behavior on
Variable Annuities, Panel Discussion Before the Toronto Spring Meeting of the Society of
Actuaries (June 20-22, 2001), in 27 RECORD No. 2, at 17.
164. Milevsky & Posner, supra note 116, at 99-101. The study concludes that a typical fifty-
year-old male should be charged no more than 3.5 basis points per year for the return of premium
death benefit and no more than 20 basis points per year for a 5 percent annual roll up. Id. at 122.
The comparable figures for a typical fifty-year-old female are 2 basis points and 11 basis points
respectively. Id. The authors admit that they do not take into account reserving requirements,
regulatory costs, agent commissions, and reasonable profits. Id.
165. Olmsted v. Pruco Life Ins. Co., 134 F.Supp.2d 508, 510 (E.D.N.Y. 2000).
166. Id.
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dismissed by the district court on procedural grounds167 and the dismissal
was affirmed on appeal,168 further litigation of the issue is likely.
Several other cases have been filed against insurers alleging inflated
fees for death benefits on deferred variable annuities make the annuities
unsuitable investments for tax-qualified plans. A deferred variable annuity
is an unsuitable investment for a qualified retirement plan unless the death
benefits or guaranteed annuitization rates are worth the additional expense
charges levied on the variable annuity. The other major benefit of a de-
ferred variable annuity, tax deferral of investment earnings, is unnecessary
in a qualified plan since investment earnings from any source in such a plan
are generally tax deferred. In pretrial discovery in one of those cases,
Hartford Life claimed that it had paid only a single death benefit totaling
$119 from 1983 through 1999.169 Due to the recent market downturn,
Hartford Life has paid significantly greater death benefits in the past two
years, and John Waters, an executive vice president, was quoted as saying:
"For years, people said you overpaid for the death benefit, it wasn't real,
nobody needs it." He went on to say that in the current market
environment, death benefits "really do have value." 7 0 Whether their value
bears any rational relationship to the price being charged for them is still a
matter in dispute. The fact that some death benefits have been paid out in
two of the close to twenty years that the company has been offering the
benefits provides no persuasive evidence that they were worth the
substantial fees the company has collected over that time.
In summary, there is no rational basis for concluding that the fees
charged for these benefits are reasonable even in the aggregate-to the
entire pool of annuity purchasers. Even if they are reasonable, the current
pricing structure implies that younger policyholders and policyholders who
invest more conservatively are being forced to subsidize older policyholders
167. Id. at 517. The district court dismissed the case on the ground that there was no implied
private cause of action for damages under the statutory provisions relied upon. Id.
168. Olmsted v. Pruco Life Ins. Co., 283 F.3d 429, 436 (2nd Cir. 2002). Plaintiffs appealed
and the SEC, at the invitation of the appellate court, filed an amicus brief. Id. at n.5. In the brief,
it declined to address the issue presented by the plaintiffs because it argued that other provisions
of the Investment Company Act provided potential relief and that it was therefore unnecessary to
imply a private cause of action for damages under the sections relied on by the plaintiffs. Id. The
appellate court affirmed the district court's dismissal but declined to reach the issue raised by the
SEC because the plaintiff had not raised it in the lower court. Id.
169. Ron Panko, Can Annuities Pass Muster? BEST'S REVIEW 103, 108 (July 2000). From
1982 to 1995, the mortality and expense charge on its annuities was 125 basis points, but the
charge was reduced in 1995. Id.
170. Bridget O'Brian, Annuity Sellers Make Grim Pitch, WALL ST. J., July 8, 2002, at R23.
In 2000 and 2001, Hartford Life paid death benefits of $30 million and $101.5 million, but in prior
years the number was negligible. Id.
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and policyholders who invest more aggressively. Such anomalous pricing
of benefits in a tax-advantaged product is a serious tax policy concern.
D. SUMMARY
Annuitization provides significant benefits and should be encouraged.
Factors favoring the probability of annuitization of deferred variable an-
nuities include the fact that the annuity payout is an option in the deferred
annuity contract itself, the availability of a variable payout option to address
the inflation issue, and the possibility of educational efforts by insurance
companies to better explain the benefits of annuitization and encourage its
use. Unfortunately, to date there has been very little effort on the part of
insurance companies to encourage annuitization, and there is little economic
incentive for them to do so. Unattractive payout pricing due to adverse
selection, strong psychological resistance to annuitization, and the likely
behavioral effects of annuity death benefits are major factors that are likely
to discourage voluntary annuitization. In short, since annuitization of
deferred variable annuities is voluntary and since there is no evidence that
any large percentage of owners will voluntarily annuitize, the annuitization
aspects of deferred variable annuities do not provide any persuasive reason
to grant them special tax status.
IV. THE ACCUMULATION PHASE: SAVINGS AND INVESTMENT
A. INTRODUCTION
Policymakers are interested in identifying strategies to stimulate in-
creased levels of individual savings, particularly in the United States, which
has very low savings rates both by historical standards and by comparison
to other developed countries. Policymakers are also interested in encourag-
ing optimal investment methods so that whatever amounts are saved will
produce accumulations sufficient to provide adequate levels of consumption
in retirement. If nonqualified deferred variable annuities are effective in
increasing savings or in encouraging optimal investment, then those welfare
benefits might be sufficient justification for their special tax status. This
section will discuss the current theory and evidence with respect to the
likely impact of targeted tax advantages on savings and investment in
general and through nonqualified deferred variable annuities in particular.
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B. EFFECTS OF TARGETED TAX INCENTIVES ON SAVINGS
1. Introduction
Whether the economic benefits of income tax incentives have any
effect on the level of private savings is unclear, even with respect to the
most favored savings plans: qualified retirement plans. Tax benefits on
savings lower the cost of future consumption, which may cause an indi-
vidual to spend less on consumption today and save more to take advantage
of the cheaper future consumption. But tax benefits also raise the rate of
return on the investment, which makes it possible to reach one's goal by
saving less. Economists refer to saving's sensitivity to the after tax rate of
return as the "interest elasticity of saving." It can be positive, neutral, or
negative; theoretically saving could rise, remain the same, or fall in
response to an increase in the after tax rate of return caused by favorable tax
provisions, depending upon the relative magnitudes of the two opposing
effects. There is no theoretical presumption that either effect will
dominate. 171
Because economic theory alone cannot provide a persuasive rationale
for most savings tax incentives, proponents have suggested a number of
behavioral rationales to support them. Behavioral economists argue that it
is clear that something besides pure mathematical calculation is involved in
savings decisions. The clearest evidence of this is the fact that pension
wealth in the form of a defined benefit plan that cannot be accessed before
retirement and gives the employee no choice as to participation or level of
benefits has an anomalous effect on savings behavior. Standard economic
theory would predict that an individual with such a benefit would take it
into account in making other savings decisions and would reduce other
savings by the value of the benefit. However, contrary to that prediction,
the existence of such a benefit seems to have either no effect or a positive
effect on the level of other savings. In other words, contrary to the
predictions of standard theory, the presence of such wealth may actually be
accompanied by an increase in other savings rather than a decrease.172
171. BERNHEIM, supra note 1, at 5.
172. See Richard H. Thaler & H.M. Shefrin, An Economic Theory of Self-Control, 89 J. OF
POLITICAL ECON. 392, 399-400 (citing studies conducted in the 1960s and 1970s); Richard H.
Thaler, Anomalies: Saving, Fungibility, and Mental Accounts, 4 J. OF ECON. PERSP. 193, 199
(1990). While the tax benefits accorded qualified pension plans are substantial, there are also
substantial non-tax reasons why employers set up pension plans. They may reduce voluntary job
turnover, make union activity less necessary and less likely, and induce a desired pattern of
retirement. Thus a private pension system might well exist without tax incentives. BERNHEIM,
supra note 1, at 81.
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Individuals simply do not treat such wealth the same as other forms of
wealth. Furthermore, even if such retirement plans did not have clear
positive effects on savings, the other substantial benefits provided by them,
including placing investment risks and longevity risks on the employer
might well justify granting them tax-advantaged status.
Unfortunately, such plans are now offered by relatively few employers,
and the majority of qualified plans are now of the defined contribution type,
which are somewhat more liquid and are voluntary rather than
mandatory. 173 Behavioral economists have analyzed such plans with a view
toward ascertaining what features might best induce employees to partici-
pate in these plans. Unlike traditional economists, who focus solely on
economic features, behavioral economists analyze such plans from a
psychological point of view.
It is important to distinguish whether behavioral rather than purely eco-
nomic incentives motivate individuals to save because that will affect the
optimal design of incentive savings plans. If individuals respond positively
to features of a plan other than the tax benefits, then the plan should be
designed to strengthen the behavioral features rather than merely provide
additional costly tax benefits. For example, while a savings plan may not
result in new saving, its commitment aspects may discourage backsliding
and thereby result in a greater level of savings in the long run. Such
behaviorally sensitive plans may be more effective in increasing saving and
yet be less costly from a revenue loss standpoint than other tax-advantaged
plans.
In particular, the choice between broad-based and narrowly focused tax
reforms to encourage savings will be strongly influenced by whether
behavioral affects are determined to be important. If only economic effects
are considered important, then a pure consumption tax would be expected
to be most effective: it raises the marginal after tax rate of return on all
savings and avoids the considerable administrative complexities of targeted
plans. If behavioral effects are more important than merely raising the after
tax rate of return, then narrowly focused savings policies that are designed
to accomplish targeted behavioral objectives have the greatest likelihood of
173. Engen & Lehnert, supra note 17, at 803. As defined contribution plans became more
common, the percentage that were 401(k) plans rose and reached 78 percent in 1998. Id. Unlike
IRAs, 401(k) plans are available only to employees of firms that choose to set up a plan, and
employers may make contributions to employees' accounts in the plan. Id. Similar kinds of
defined benefit plans are available to employees of nonprofit institutions (403(b) plans) and state
and local governments (457 plans). Id. at 803 n.23. Employers select the investment options
available in 40 1(k) plans, and the number of options is typically modest. Id. at 803; see also Eric
M. Engen et al., Do Savings Incentives Work?, 1 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 85-150
(1994) (discussing 401(k) plans).
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successfully modifying behavior. Narrow measures can focus attention on
a particular issue such as retirement savings, stimulate the provision of
information concerning the importance of saving, provide a natural context
for the development of commitment devices, and promote the growth of
pro-saving institutions. 174 As a political matter, it is unlikely that we will
see a wholesale shift to a consumption tax in the near future in this country.
Therefore, normative analysis of tax-advantaged savings plans in this article
will proceed from the assumption that the general rule is taxation of income
from capital, and that exceptions must be justified on policy grounds.
Behavioral economics principles have important and provocative sug-
gestions for optimal design of savings incentives systems. The naYve as-
sumption that the economic benefits provided by tax advantages are the sole
or even primary determinant of the success of the plan in stimulating saving
or investment does not withstand careful analysis. Much of the revenue
loss resulting from many targeted savings incentives might simply be
wasted if the plans are not required to be designed and implemented in a
manner that takes into account behavioral and psychological principles with
respect to savings and investment decisions.
Behavioral economists have identified a number of possible errors in
the underlying assumptions about behavior used in standard economic
models that are used to simulate the life cycle savings behavior of
individuals and suggest that those erroneous assumptions result in flawed
predictions about the likely effect of tax-advantaged savings plans on
behavior. They argue that tax-advantaged plans designed with the correct
behavioral assumptions will be more effective and perhaps less costly.
While systematic study of these issues is relatively recent and the field is
still unsettled, some useful principles have been developed. 175
2. Needless Complexity and Conflict Among Experts
Two of the hallmarks of any effective savings incentive plan intended
for use by large numbers of participants with varying degrees of sophisti-
cation are that it be simple to use and understand and that it be judged to be
174. BERNHEIM, supra note 1, at 45.
175. BERNHEIM, supra note 1, at 39-40; see also HERSH SHEFRIN, BEYOND GREED AND
FEAR: UNDERSTANDING BEHAVIORAL FINANCE AND THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INVESTING 7-10
(Harvard Business School Press 2000) [hereinafter GREED & FEAR] (explaining the history of the
development of behavioral finance). While behavioral economics principles are not yet fully
developed, their importance was recognized by the award of the 2002 Nobel Prize in economics to
two behavioral economists, Daniel Kahneman, a professor of psychology and public affairs at
Princeton University, and Vernon L. Smith, a professor of economics and law at George Mason
University.
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a sound program by most experts.176 Needless complexity increases
deliberation time and greatly increases the possibility of costly error.
The authorities are split on whether a deferred variable annuity is an
appropriate vehicle to use to accumulate needed additional retirement sav-
ings. It is difficult to provide an example of a tax-advantaged savings plan
that has engendered such a diverse array of expert opinion. While IRAs and
401(k)s are overwhelmingly considered sound and desirable vehicles for
almost all households, the same cannot be said of deferred variable
annuities. In fact, the debate often rises to the level of invective. Even
mainstream financial sources routinely provide material highly critical of
deferred variable annuities, with provocative titles like "The great annuity
rip-off' 177 and "Just Say No To Annuities."178
The current design of the typical deferred variable annuity is
completely at odds with sound behavioral economic principles. Investment
risk and responsibility for investment choice is borne by the policyholder,
and there is a need to monitor the investments over time, particularly if the
accumulation phase is lengthy. The bewildering array of choices offered by
many companies often makes the task particularly difficult. It is impossible
for any prospective purchasers, no matter how sophisticated and
knowledgeable they may be, to determine whether the fees charged for the
various benefits are reasonable. One of the supposed major benefits of a
deferred annuity, the guaranteed mortality rates, are of dubious value; they
are generally ignored by valuation actuaries, the experts relied upon by
insurance companies in pricing the product. The other major insurance
benefits provided under a deferred variable annuity, the guaranteed
minimum death benefits, are irrationally priced, extremely difficult to value
to determine whether they are even reasonably priced in the aggregate, and
are provided in such a way that they are denied one of the major tax
benefits otherwise accorded to life insurance benefits, excludability from
the beneficiary's gross income. It can hardly be said that the product is
suitable for widespread adoption by large numbers of individuals with
varying degrees of sophistication. 179
176. Richard H. Thaler, Psychology and Savings Policies, 84(2) AM. EcON. REV. 186, 189
(1994).
177. Carolyn T. Geer, The Great Annuity Rip-Off, FORBES, Feb. 9, 1998, at 106.
178. David Franceki, Just Say No To Annuities, BARRONS, March 27, 2000, at R12.
179. The NASD has cautioned that for some customers, annuities might be unsuitable
investments. NASD Regulation Reminds Members And Associated Persons That Sales Of
Variable Products Are Subject to NASD Suitability Requirements, NASD NOTICE TO MEMBERS
98-86, (Nat'l Ass'n of Sec. Dealers Inc.) Dec. 1996, at 705-06. It mentioned factors, including the
customer's inability to fully appreciate how much of the purchase price or premium is allocated to
cover insurance or other costs, the customer's ability to understand the complexity of variable
[VOL. 79:439
NONQUALIFIED DEFERRED VARIABLE ANNUITIES
The SEC was so concerned that it issued a publication available on its
web site entitled Variable Annuities: What You Should Know to alert inves-
tors to several salient issues, including the various charges levied on annui-
ties, the wisdom of purchasing an annuity in a qualified retirement account,
evaluating the benefits and costs of exchanging one annuity for another, and
evaluating investment subaccount options. The SEC has expressed concern
over "how to insure that useful, and not merely overwhelming, disclosure
reaches investors when products may have 25 or 30 investment options"80
The best advice the SEC can offer in that regard in its pamphlet is to refer
the annuity purchaser to SEC publications on mutual funds.
Much of the costs of annuities are selling costs, and much of the selling
costs are attributable to the fact that it is sold in a highly competitive
environment as one option in competition with other investments. The SEC
is perennially concerned with insuring that the vigorous competition works
to the benefit of investors and is particularly concerned that the recent
market downturn may intensify the competitive environment and spur a
"race to the bottom."8I The fact that over half of deferred variable annuity
sales are now merely exchanges from already existing contracts is strong
evidence that the competition is extremely fierce.
This competitive frenzy has been fueled in large part by the very amor-
phous definition of a nonqualified annuity that permits companies to
continue to reinvent the wheel, adding various bells and whistles to gain a
competitive edge. These constant redesigns are expensive, and the com-
panies seek to recover those costs through charges that make the product
more expensive than it otherwise would be. With the exception of some of
the newer guaranteed minimum income benefits, the competition has
focused in the past almost exclusively on death benefits and investments
choices.
Competition with mutual funds and with other variable annuities has
substantially driven the number and kinds of investment choices. It is no
coincidence that specialized accounts like asset allocation accounts and
sector accounts (e.g., technology, precious metals, energy, etc.) first
appeared in variable annuities at about the same time they appeared in the
products generally, the customer's investment sophistication, and whether he or she is able to
monitor the investment experience in the separate account, as factors to consider in determining
whether a variable annuity is a suitable investment. Id.
180. Paul F. Roye, Remarks at the ALI-ABA Conference on Life Insurance Products:
Current Securities, Tax, ERISA, and State Regulatory Issues (Nov. 11, 1999) (transcript available
at hhtp://www.sec.gov/news/speech/speecharchive/1 999/spch.317.htm).
181. Paul F. Roye, Remarks Before the National Association of Variable Annuities 2001
Regulatory Affairs Conference (June 25, 2001) (transcript available at http://www.sec.gov/news/
speech/spch501.htm).
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mutual fund universe. Once one annuity insurer expands its investment
choices, most others are quick to follow. With no meaningful tax law
restrictions on investment choices, this expansion has resulted in the typical
annuity offering 15 to 30 subaccounts, and some offer even more. Whether
this additional choice has benefited annuity purchasers is not clear;
although behavioral principles suggest it probably hasn't. 182
Competitive pressures in the variable annuity market have produced an
extremely complicated product that is hard to sell, for reasons aside from
the general problem of selling retirement savings vehicles to a consuming
society. It is the needlessly complicated, often irrational, and costly aspects
of variable annuities that make the product the subject of so much
difference of opinion among financial experts. Whenever the mainstream
financial press produces another article castigating variable annuities, the
industry responds with costly and time consuming counter-advertising. The
conflicting expert opinions not only confuse the public but add significantly
to the costs of the product, making it an even harder sell.
While complexity may sometimes be unavoidable, needless and costly
complexity is counterproductive. John H. Biggs, Chairman and CEO of
TIAA-CREF, who was in the vanguard of the development of deferred
variable annuities, summed it up succinctly in 1969 before the explosive
growth of the product. He stated: "It is the author's view that strenuous
efforts should be made to purge variable annuity contracts of unnecessary
complications, particularly in those aspects that must be communicated to
the public."183 Unfortunately, the industry did not heed his warnings.
Those selling deferred variable annuities also do not do a good job of
explaining the complexities of the product to prospective purchasers. A
recent Wall street Journal article discussed the advice given by Annuity
University, a two-day seminar for sales people on how to sell annuities to
senior citizens.184 A key piece of advice given by Tyrone Clark, the
182. One thing this additional choice has contributed to is the prevalence of annuity
purchasers who adopt market timing strategies or sector rotation strategies in an attempt to beat
the broad market averages. Such activities impose additional costs on the subaccounts that are
borne by all investors in those funds, whether they are engaged in those activities or not. Deferred
annuities are particularly attractive to account holders pursuing such strategies because of the de-
ferral of tax on any gains realized on transfers between subaccounts. Companies have responded
with policies to discourage such tactics, such as imposing redemption fees for account holders
who transfer amounts among subaccounts on a short term basis according to market timing
strategies and requiring account holders who make frequent transfers to conduct exchanges by
mail; the SEC has looked favorably on such responses. See Paul F. Roye, Keynote Address
Before the National Association of Variable Annuities, 2002 Regulatory Affairs Conference (June
24, 2002) (transcript available at http://www.sec.gov/news/ speech/spch572.htm).
183. Biggs, supra note 115, at 517.
184. Ellen E. Schultz & Jeff D. Opdyke, Annuities 101: How to Sell to Senior Citizens,
WALL ST. J., July 2, 2002 at C1, C10.
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president of the company that runs Annuity University, was the following:
"Treat them like they're blind 12-year-olds."1 85 While maintaining that his
techniques were not designed to belittle seniors or to help agents persuade
seniors to make unsuitable investments, he stated, "It's just that agents can
come across as too technical [when pitching an annuity] and people don't
understand them . . . I use metaphors to show them they have to
oversimplify the information."186 Trainees also learn that educational
seminars can be used to generate fear among the seniors attending. Mr.
Clark tells the trainees to "[toss hand grenades into the advice to disturb
the seniors. They thrive on fear, anger and greed;" whatever the retiree's
particular concern-taxes, investment returns, or asset protection-the
solution is almost always the same: an annuity. 87 Unfortunately, many of
the complexities that are often glossed over or simplified are undoubtedly
those that would tend to indicate that an annuity is not particularly suitable
for that person: the negative tax attributes, the illiquidity of the investment
due to surrender charges, large insurance costs for very weak mortality
guarantees, and irrationally priced death benefits.
This is not just a problem with one company providing training
sessions for sales agents. Similar sales tactics are commonplace. Most
annuities are sold through independent agents, banks, and wirehouses and
brokerage firms, often on a commission basis. Annuities are sold primarily,
if not solely, as an attractive tax advantaged substitute for other investment
options such as mutual funds. 88 Since the tax deferral benefit is more
185. Id. at C1.
186. Id.
187. Id. at CI0.
188. Mark A. Milton et al., Session 152PD How Annuities Are Really Sold, Panel
Discussion Before the Washington Annual Meeting of the Society of Actuaries (Oct. 26-29,
1997), in 23 RECORD No.3, 15-24. Linda Need, a vice president and national sales director for
Northbrook Life Insurance Company, summed it up well in a presentation in 1997 at the annual
meeting of the Society of Actuaries. Id. In discussing sales through wirehouses and brokerage
firms, she stated:
When you're selling in a representative dealer, and you're selling VAs [variable
annuities], there are five simple things that drive that sales [sic]. First, upside potential
of being in equity mutual funds. Second, downside protection. That's our euphemism
for the death benefit. You can't say death benefit in a representative dealer. That's
bad news. If you really think about it, what's good about dying? Third, tax deferral is
obviously one of the drivers. Fourth and fifth, probate avoidance is one of the drivers,
and liquidity can be a driver, although it's a fifth runner. What you will find is that
any good sales idea that works and is compliance approved is one of these five things
or a combination of them, but when you dig deep into any sales ideas you will find
these sitting right behind them. What are some sales ideas that work? Sales idea
number one-VAs are just a better mutual fund. A typical question a representative
will ask their client is do you own any mutual funds? Oh, you do. Do you own the
old or new kind? What do you mean? They always ask what do you mean? Well do
you have the kind that you pay taxes on every year or the kind that you don't have to
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proximate and the negative tax and non-tax aspects of the product are more
remote, it is easy to downplay the latter and stress the former, even though
this often results in purchases of annuities by persons for whom they are
very likely unsuitable investments. 189
There is also a serious problem of marketing deferred annuities to tax
qualified plans. One of the main benefits of a deferred annuity, the tax
deferral of any investment gains, is unnecessary in tax-qualified plans
because all investment gains are deferred anyway. Since distributions from
qualified plans are taxed as ordinary income, receive no step-up in basis at
death, and are subject to early withdrawal penalties, those negative tax
attributes of annuities will not deter purchases of deferred annuities in
qualified plans. However, deferred variable annuities have much higher
expenses than most other alternative investments, and the only possible
benefits of purchasing a deferred annuity rather than mutual funds in a
qualified plan are the mortality payout guarantees, the death benefits, and
the guarantee that the administrative fees charged under the contract will
not increase during the life of the contract. 190 Given the weakness of the
payout guarantees and the fact that the death benefits are irrationally priced,
it is hard to imagine that the large volume of purchases of deferred annuities
in qualified plans-over 50 percent of salesl 91-is suitable in most cases.
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the National
Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) have issued cautions warning
pay taxes on until you take the money out? I didn't know you had that kind. Sale
closed. It's that simple. Many clients have the same mutual fund choices inside and
outside the VA. If you're not going to spend the money, why pay taxes? This is one
of my favorite lines, and it is not a compliance approvable line, by the way. When
compliance got to this it turned into about [ten] sentences. Wise people don't pay
taxes on their interest. They earn interest on their taxes. Compliance has you add a
whole bunch of other words, but it's really kind of nice ....
Id. at 24-25.
Ms. Need went on to say while her number one sales idea for getting clients to commit assets was
"stealing money from mutual funds," her number two idea was emphasizing the death benefit as a
form of insurance of investment that she characterized as getting clients' assets by "stealing them
from any place they came." Id. Her third idea was to induce clients to shift funds from an
existing variable annuity at another company by offering better death benefits or other features "to
steal them [assets] from old annuities." Id. at 25.
189. The Massachusetts Department of Securities recently announced that it was taking
action against two firms some of whose agents had been trained at Annuity University. Bruce
Mohl, State to Accuse Two Firms of Preying on the Elderly, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 25, 2002, at
Cl, C5. Many of the complaints involved selling deferred annuities to elderly individuals, one of
whom was a 103-year old woman. Id.
190. This last guarantee is standard on all variable annuities. An insurance company's
obligations under a deferred annuity may extend over many decades, and the company guarantees
that the costs of administering the contract and maintaining the separate account will not increase
over that time. ANNUITIES ANSWER BOOK, supra note 27, at Q 1:23. Since the fee for this
guarantee is not separately stated, it is difficult to assess its reasonableness.
191. Milevsky & Posner, supra note 116, at 92.
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that deferred variable annuities may often be unsuitable investments in a
tax-sheltered account. 92 Lawsuits were instituted against five insurers
alleging inappropriate sales of variable annuities for qualified retirement
plans, one of which has been settled.193
3. Other Behavioral Aspects of Deferred Variable Annuities
An incentive plan can have a positive effect on savings in a number of
ways, including the following: (1) by changing perceptions concerning the
costs and benefits of savings; 94 (2) by providing the opinion of experts on
the need for greater savings;195 (3) by providing explicit commitment
devices, such as penalties for early withdrawal;196 (4) by encouraging the
development of private commitment devices, such as "private rules" to
192. Variable Annuities: What You Should Know, United States Securities and Exchange
Commission (available at www.sec.gov/investors/alerts.html) (last visited Aug. 8, 2003); The
NASD Reminds Members of Their Responsibilities Regarding the Sales of Variable Annuities,
NASD NOTICE TO MEMBERS 99-35 (Nat'l Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, Inc.) May 1999.
193. Panko, supra note 169, at 104.
194. BERNHEIM, supra note 1, at 41. When a savings incentive is in place, individuals may
be more likely to learn that others regard savings as important, and these effects are most likely to
be present in the case of an employment based savings plan. Id. There is considerable evidence
that economic decisions in general are strongly affected by peer group effects involving both
demonstration and competition. Id. at n.32. A savings plan would be most effective if it also
reinforced a strong social norm favoring saving. See John Elster, Social Norms and Economic
Theory, 3 J. OF ECON. PERSP. 99 (1989) (discussing social norms in general); Assar Lindbeck,
Incentives and Social Norms in Household Behavior, 87 AM. ECON. R. 370 (1997) (discussing
saving and consumption norms).
In addition, a savings incentive that includes a reduction of current tax liability, a "front loaded"
incentive, may even be attractive to one who does not value the less immediate welfare benefits of
wealth accumulation. BERNHEIM, supra note 1, at 42; see also Leonard E. Burnham et al., The
Taxation of Retirement Saving: Choosing Between Front-Loaded and Back Loaded Options, 54
NAT'L TAX J. 689, 700-01 (2001).
195. BERNHEIM, supra note 1, at 88-89. Educational and promotional activities by
employers and sellers of financial products would communicate the advice of the experts. Id. If
there are contribution limits in the plan, these may be perceived to reflect the judgment of experts
as to the proper level of savings. Id. at 41.
196. See Thaler, supra note 172, at 200 (explaining that in the case of retirement savings, the
wealth once saved may be regarded as not available for consumption because the account
becomes less liquid and because of restrictions on withdrawals and penalties for early
withdrawal.) In other words, illiquid assets may actually be preferred over liquid assets by those
who have self-control problems. Id. Savers who are aware of their self-control problems place
significant value on external control mechanisms such as penalties for early withdrawal. Id.
Commitment devices are most valuable to consumers with self-control problems due to time
inconsistent preferences (hyperbolic discounters). A recent paper concluded that the commitment
features of 401(k) plans, including automatic contributions through wage withholding, penalties
for early withdrawal, and the fact that any withdrawn funds cannot be paid back into the account
substantially increases the savings of such individuals. See generally David I. Laibson et al., Self-
Control and Saving for Retirement, 1 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY 91
(1998) (quantifying the effect of commitment devices on savings behavior).
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overcome lack of self-control;] 97 (5) by encouraging broad based
participation through plan requirements;198 and (6) indirectly by influencing
197. Private rules are internal rules designed to overcome problems of self-control. Matthew
Rabin, Psychology and Economics, 36 J. OF EcON. LITERATURE 11, at 40 (1998); George Ainslie,
Derivation of "Rational" Economic Behavior from Hyperbolic Discount Curves, 81 AM. ECON.
R. 334, 336-337 (1991). Individuals may overcome impulsive tendencies by attaching global
significance to small transgressions of these rules. Stephen J. Hoch & George F. Lowenstein,
Time Inconsistent Preferences and Consumer Self-Control, 17(4) J. OF CONSUMER RES. 492, 502-
03 (1991). Savings incentives may facilitate the formation of private rules on saving by providing
a natural context for developing rules concerning the level of savings, such as an incentive plan
that has a maximum allowable contribution that could facilitate a rule to contribute the maximum.
BERNHEIM, supra note 1, at 43. The plan may provide limited commitment devices to implement
savings decisions such as 401(k) plans that permit employees to have amounts automatically
deducted from their every pay period. Id. The effectiveness of these private rules will be
reinforced by "mental accounting" whereby the individual treats the account as off limits to
current spending except in emergencies, by the existence of penalties for early withdrawal, and by
the ability to monitor progress toward a long-term savings goal. Thaler, supra note 172, at 194;
see also Thaler & Shefrin, supra note 172, at 397 (stating that just keeping track of savings seems
to deter diverting it to consumption). The fact that assets may be placed in separate mental
accounts from which there is a lower propensity to consume does not necessarily mean that these
accounts comprise new savings. Even if the tax advantaged account does not represent new
savings but rather amounts transferred from other savings accounts, the transfer could result in
higher wealth accumulation in the long run for the individual because the propensity to consume
from the tax advantaged account is smaller than the propensity to consume from the other savings
account. See Richard H. Thaler, supra note 172, at 230.
198. BERNHEIM, supra note 1, at 44. The best example is the non-discrimination
requirements of qualified pension plans. Id. Since they may not discriminate in favor of the
highly compensated, either in design or in operation, employers have an interest in encouraging
participation by non-highly compensated employees. Id. If these employees do not participate
because they do not understand the necessity of forming and executing a long-term savings plan,
then educational efforts by the employer may be successful in getting them to participate or
increase the level of their participation. Id.
Recently, employers have used behavioral economics principles to design their plans to en-
courage more participation by low and moderate income employees and employees who have
difficulty saving because of self-control problems. See Richard H. Thaler & Schlomo Benartzi,
Save More Tomorrow: Using Behavioral Economics to Increase Employee Savings, (University
of California-Los Angeles Working Paper, August 2001) (describing a program that offered expert
advice to employees to help them approximate the optimal savings rate in a simple,
straightforward way and permitted employees who expressed no willingness to begin saving right
away to increase savings periodically in the future, starting with the due date of the next pay raise
and increasing with each subsequent pay raise). Since the increased savings occurs in the future,
there is no perceived loss through lowering of take home pay and usual consumption levels. Id.
In the retirement plan in which it was tested, it was extremely popular with participants, who
saved significantly more than they previously had. Id. Even though such programs seem to have
a very positive affect on savings rates, that conclusion may not be entirely accurate. If the
increased qualified plan contributions rates are offset by other spending, such as high interest
credit card debt or the additional contributions are later reduced by withdrawals or plan loans, then
the net effect of such programs on personal saving may be neutral or even negative. JAMES J.
CHOI ET AL., DEFINED CONTRIBUTION PENSIONS: PLAN RULES, PARTICIPANT DECISIONS, AND
THE PATH OF LEAST RESISTANCE 18 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 8655,
2001).
Ironically, participation by low and middle-income employees may not always be in their
best interests. See JAGADEESH GOKHALE ET AL., DOES PARTICIPATION IN A 40 1(K) RAISE YOUR
LIFETIME TAXES (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 8341, 2001). A recent
study has concluded that a sizable number of moderate income households do not even
economically benefit from deferring income during their working years to their retirement years,
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the actions of third parties, such as employers and sellers of tax advantaged
plans, who can provide education and other incentives to participate in the
plan.199 Deferred variable annuities are not designed with these principles in
mind.
While the existence of an employment related, tax-advantaged plan can
affect perceptions about saving and investment by stimulating useful con-
versations among employees about the importance of savings and invest-
ment, there is no easy mechanism whereby such peer group interactions can
be provided to purchasers of annuities. Similarly, employers can more easi-
ly provide educational seminars on saving and investment to their em-
ployees than insurance companies can provide to purchasers of annuities.
Because of the non-discrimination rules that apply to qualified retirement
plans, employers also have an incentive to encourage broad participation
among employees, and some of them have begun to utilize behavioral
economics principles to do sO.200 Unlike qualified retirement plans, de-
ferred variable annuities are not subject to any non-discrimination require-
ments. As a result, insurance companies have little incentive to target
deferred annuities to individuals with lesser amounts of wealth to invest,
who would gain the greatest incremental welfare benefits from them. In
fact, it is likely that insurance companies prefer a smaller number of large
polices to a large number of small policies.
Tax advantaged plans can have the effect of enhancing a saver's per-
ception of the short-term effects of savings, but the example usually given
even in the case of the most tax advantaged deferral mechanisms-qualified 401(k) plans. Id. at
25. Some moderate income individuals lose some of the current tax benefits on itemized
deductions by deferring otherwise high taxed income, and the deferred income may result in
increased taxes on Social Security benefits in the retirement years under current Code provisions.
Id. at 26. The combined effects of reducing the value of current itemized deductions and
increasing later income tax on social security benefits results in a somewhat greater total tax
burden than foregoing the deferral and saving in a non-tax advantaged vehicle. This would most
likely occur only in a plan with no employer match. Id. at 28.
199. BERNHEIM, supra note 1, at 43-45. The sellers of tax-advantaged plans and the sellers
of financial publications have an incentive to provide education through advertising and other pro-
motional activities to increase their sales. Id. The example usually given is the advertising and
media fanfare that accompanied the expansion of eligibility for deductible IRAs in 1981. Id.
An important aspect of education is getting employees to focus on planning for retirement.
Numerous studies document the importance of planning for retirement. Those who plan for
retirement are significantly more likely to enter retirement with sufficient assets to avoid a drop in
their accustomed standard of living. See John Ameriks et.al., Wealth Accumulation and the
Propensity to Plan (TIAA-CREF Inst. New York, N.Y. Working Paper Preliminary Draft), April
2002. The paper concludes that a propensity to plan increases wealth by being associated with
monitoring of spending, resulting in increased saving and more sophisticated investment decisions
resulting in higher returns on savings. See LUSARDI, supra note 4 at 103 (concluding, based on
data from the Household and Retirement Study (HRS), that lack of retirement planning is strongly
associated with meager wealth accumulation).
200. See Thaler & Benartzi, supra note 199.
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is that of a plan that provides an immediate tax benefit that lowers current
tax liability, a "front-loaded" plan. 201 For example, an individual may be
more inclined to make a contribution to an IRA if it is tax deductible and
therefore will immediately result in a lower income tax liability. This argu-
ment has no application to a contribution to a nonqualified annuity because
contributions are not tax deductible. Lesser tax benefits, like those ac-
corded to nonqualified deferred annuities, are unlikely to stimulate signi-
ficant new savings but rather merely provide an incentive to do whatever
savings is done through the tax advantaged vehicle.202
Like any other tax-advantaged savings accumulation plan, deferred
annuities provide an easy means of monitoring progress by segregating the
savings account and providing periodic reports. How annuities facilitate the
formation of private rules is more difficult to see. Private rules are best
facilitated by plans that have design requirements, such as annual limits on
contributions, which facilitate the formation of such rules. There are no
such design requirements for deferred variable annuities, nor have the
insurance companies chosen to voluntarily implement any design features
that might strengthen the behavioral aspects of the product. Since deferred
variable annuities are heavily marketed as merely alternatives to other
investments, it is difficult to see how they could have any different or more
positive psychological effects on savings and investment than the marketing
and availability of those other non-tax favored investments.
Nonqualified annuities also lack the strong commitment aspects of
many qualified plans, in particular annual limits on contributions, automatic
withholding of contributions from the employee's pay, and prohibition of
withdrawals until termination of employment. 203 Annuitization is an
201. See Burnham et al., supra note 194 (discussing the varying incentive effects of "front-
loaded" as opposed to "back-loaded" plans). In a front-loaded plan, contributions are tax-
deductible, account balances accrue tax free, and qualified withdrawals are taxed as ordinary
income, while in a back-loaded plan, contributions are not deductible. Id. at 689. Some back-
loaded plans, like the Roth IRA, do not tax withdrawals. Id. Nonqualified annuities are weaker
versions of back-loaded plans since income that accrues during accumulation is taxed on pay out.
Id.
202. Id.
203. Lack of limits on contributions to annuities makes them less valuable as commitment
devices, which are important to many individuals, particularly those with self-control problems.
One virtue of contribution limits is that they increase the cost of delay or backsliding. For
example, if there is a limit of $2,000 per year on contributions to a tax advantaged plan, with no
catch up provisions, then a contribution not made in any year cannot thereafter be placed in the
tax- advantaged plan. With no annual contribution limits, missed contributions can always be
made up later, lowering the cost of backsliding and withdrawing money from the tax-advantaged
plan. While there are penalties on early withdrawals from annuities for some policyholders, these
penalties are muted by the fact that withdrawn amounts may be recontributed later.
The lack of any limits on contributions to deferred annuities may also provide an incentive to
procrastinate in saving for retirement through nondeductible traditional IRAs. A nonqualified
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important and valuable commitment device providing valuable protection
against overspending due to lack of self-control. However, the
annuitization rates of deferred variable annuities as currently designed are
very low and are unlikely to substantially increase for the reasons already
discussed in part III of this article. The lack of any penalties on
withdrawals after age 59 1/2 provides no incentive to encourage pay out
options that protect policyholders against outliving their assets.
Any beneficial third-party effects of the special tax status of
nonqualified annuities are muted at best. The tax benefits accorded to
annuities are an important factor in successfully marketing them.204 The
demand created by the tax benefits provides an incentive to insurance
companies to promote the product, 205 and nonqualified annuities are also
very heavily advertised and promoted by insurance companies. Tax
qualification is most likely to have positive incentive effects on the actions
of providers when the plan is simple and focused, therefore easy to
promote. The basic concept of a deferred variable annuity is difficult
enough without the added complexity of a bewildering array of guaranteed
benefits and often an even more bewildering array of investment choices.
The lack of any comprehensive tax law definition of a deferred variable
annuity has permitted insurers to provide features more designed to gain a
competitive advantage for their product than to enhance the savings,
investment, and annuitization aspects of the product.
deferred annuity is an almost perfect substitute for a nondeductible traditional IRA, except that it
does not require any consistent periodic saving. The contribution to a nondeductible traditional
IRA produces no immediate tax benefit, but income earned on the contribution is deferred from
taxation until distributed. This is the identical treatment of a nonqualified annuity-premiums are
nondeductible but earnings are deferred. The only difference is that there are mortality charges
levied on the deferred annuity and higher expenses. There is psychological evidence that the
existence of such a choice may indeed induce procrastination. The ideal savings plan from a
behavioral standpoint has strong commitment devices, not easy future alternatives that may induce
procrastination. Behavioral economics suggests that sound policy to encourage early and
consistent participation in a tax advantaged savings plan dictates making the costs of delay loom
larger, not reducing the economic sting of procrastination. See TED O'DONOGHUE & MATTHEW
RABIN, Procrastination in Preparing for Retirement, in BEHAVIORAL DIMENSIONS OF
RETIREMENT ECONOMICS, supra note 2, at 151-52 (suggesting making any "catch up" alternative
plan should be a non tax-advantaged plan).
204. GALLUP SURVEY, supra note 92, at 23 (indicating that a very large percentage of
annuity purchasers mention the tax benefits as an important factor in making the decision to
purchase an annuity).
205. The evidence with respect to IRAs is instructive. Starting in 1982, eligibility for
deductible traditional IRAs was extended to all taxpayers. Between 1982 and 1986, the number of
households contributing to a traditional IRA rose substantially. After 1986, eligibility for
deductible traditional IRAs was significantly limited, and the number of households contributing
to traditional IRAs fell dramatically. The increase in participation during 1982 and 1986 could
have been due at least in part to strong promotional activities by the financial institutions during
the period of universal eligibility for deductible IRAs. BERNHEIM, supra note 1, at 66.
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4. Likely Effect of Deferred Variable Annuities on Savings
Whether targeted tax benefits increase saving is an empirical issue, and
the evidence is equivocal with respect to qualified retirement plans. 206
There is some evidence that simple and easy to understand savings plans
like 401(k)s, which are judged to be sound by experts, provide immediate
tax benefits, strong commitment aspects like automatic payroll contribu-
tions, restrictions on withdrawals, and penalties for early withdrawals, may
have a positive effect on the savings levels of individuals who lack self-
control.207 Unfortunately, deferred variable annuities are not designed with
those behavioral factors in mind.
While there have been no definitive studies addressing whether savings
used to purchase deferred annuities represent new savings, it is likely they
do not. Many owners of nonqualified deferred annuities use proceeds from
existing savings or from "one-time" events rather than new savings to buy
their policies. Unlike all other tax-advantaged retirement savings plans,
there is no requirement that the purchaser of a nonqualified annuity have
any earned income, making it much more likely that annuity purchases are
funded with existing assets rather than with new savings from reduced
consumption. While more than half of annuity owners use some of their209
current income to purchase an annuity, it is not possible to determinewhether these amounts would have been saved even if the annuity had not
206. BERNHEIM, supra note 1, at 47-80. Compare JAMES M. POTERBA ET AL., PERSONAL
RETIREMENT SAVING PROGRAMS AND ASSET ACCUMULATION: RECONCILING THE EVIDENCE,
(Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 5599, 1996) (suggesting a positive effect of
tax incentives on savings) with ERIC M. ENGEN ET AL., THE EFFECTS OF TAX-BASED SAVING
INCENTIVES ON SAVING AND WEALTH, (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No.
5759, 1996) (criticizing the economic models used in studies that find a positive effect of tax
incentives on savings). Furthermore, even if tax incentives do increase savings, there are no
studies on whether they do so at an acceptable cost. Even if they do not increase savings at all,
providing access to tax advantaged savings plans may be justified on equity grounds for certain
groups who cannot take advantage of tax advantages provided to others-households that do not
have employer pension coverage. ENGEN ET AL., supra, at 48.
207. See Laibson et al., supra note 196 (describing an economic model developed to simulate
the effect of savings incentives on hyperbolic consumers (those who inordinately value instant
gratification)).
208. GALLUP SURVEY, supra note 92, at 25-26 (indicating 55 percent of owners of
nonqualified annuity contracts used existing savings to purchase the annuity). In addition, 21
percent used an inheritance, 13 percent used proceeds from the sale of a home, farm or business,
thirteen percent used a death benefit from a life insurance policy, 11 percent used a gift from a
relative, and 10 percent used a bonus from their employer. Id. at 25. However, the proportion of
owners citing existing savings and proceeds of other investments as the source of funds to
purchase an annuity has decreased from prior surveys. Id: The 1992 survey reported 62 percent
of owners using existing savings and 44 percent using proceeds of other investments. Id.
209. Id. at 26.
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been available. 2  As with qualified plans, since there is no tax penalty for
withdrawal of funds from a deferred annuity after age 59 _, savings in
deferred annuities for older individuals is a better substitute for other
nonqualified saving and thus less likely to represent new savings. Annuity
owners age sixty-four or over are more likely to use existing funds and less
likely to use money from their current income to fund the purchase, making
it even less likely that those purchases represent new savings.21 Thus, it is
highly unlikely that the deferred variable annuities have spurred any
significant new savings.
C. INVESTMENT ASPECTS OF DEFERRED VARIABLE ANNUITIES
1. Introduction
Even if deferred variable annuities do not increase the level of savings,
their preferred tax status might be warranted if they encourage optimal
retirement investment. This section discusses the theory and evidence with
respect to optimal investment.
2. Behavioral Investment Principles
Behavioral economics has one clear and unambiguous conclusion with
respect to individual investment decisions: too much choice often produces
less than optimal results and is not beneficial, particularly if the choices
require expertise that most people do not possess. While traditional eco-
nomic principles assume that an individual can never be worse off by
having additional choices, one key and pervasive principle of behavioral
economics is that choice is a two edged sword. While choice can provide
major benefits, there are also costs associated with it.
Expanded choice can provide benefits in two ways. First, when
individuals have highly differentiated tastes or needs, more choices permit
210. While premiums paid on immediate annuities or on single premium deferred annuities
do not represent new savings since they are paid with accumulated funds, premiums paid on
flexible premium deferred variable annuities may represent new savings. However, the initial
premium payments on such polices, which likely represent already accumulated funds, are much
greater than the later payments that are more likely to represent new savings. For example, in
1995 and 1996, initial premium payments on flexible premium polices totaled $28.9 billion and
$32.9 billion, respectively; while later premium payments totaled $17.7 billion and $15.5 billion,
respectively. Mark J. Warshawsky, The Market for Individual Annuities and the Reform of Social
Security, BENEFITS Q. 66 (Third Quarter 1997) at 71, tbl. I.
211. BERNHEIM, supra note 1, at 35. Only 44 percent of owners age 64 or over use money
from their or their spouse's current income versus 64 percent for those under age 64, and 61
percent of owners age 64 and over use existing savings versus 48 percent for those under age 64.
GALLUP SURVEY, supra note 92, at 26.
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more people to satisfy their own particular wants or needs. 212 Second, even
when people have similar wants or needs, more choices promote com-
petition among providers and leads to lower prices or improved quality.2 13
However, for the competitive benefits to be realized, consumers must be
reasonably well informed about price and quality.2 14 If consumers can be
easily misled, competition might focus on marketing rather than price and
quality. 215
Expanded choices can impose three kinds of costs: time costs, error
costs, and psychic costs. 216 Since time is a scarce commodity for most
people, deliberation time is a cost; the more time one spends on
deliberation, the less time one has for other desired pursuits. 217 Additional
choices that require additional deliberation time impose additional cost,
often including psychic costs, such as anxiety over not devoting sufficient
time to complex tasks or over having to neglect other tasks in order to
devote sufficient time to the more complex tasks.218 Expert advice is not
always a viable alternative because experts are prone to be overconfident,
particularly when dealing with complex and uncertain matters. 219
Furthermore, if the task is complex, as retirement savings and investment
decisions often are, then judging the qualification of the experts will be
difficult and costly, the advice itself likely will be costly and there may be
no agreement among the experts, necessitating further costly deliberation
over which expert advice to accept. 220
Error costs result from a variety of factors. If there are too many
choices, an individual may suffer from decision-overload; as the number of
choices expands, people consider a progressively smaller number of them,
212. See Loewenstein, supra note 130, at 1. The brief discusses the pros and cons of per-
mitting more choice within the Social Security system and provides an excellent discussion of the
benefits and costs of more choice in general. Id. at 1-6.
213. Id. at 1.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 1-2.
216. Id. at 2.
217. Id.; see also John Conlisk, Why Bounded Rationality, 34 J. OF ECON. LITERATURE 669
(1996) (arguing that deliberation costs may be one reason why individuals do not always solve the
difficult mathematical problems that economists assume they do to maximize utility but rather
develop less costly rules of thumb that only approximate optimal behavior).
218. Loewenstein, supra note 130, at 2 (citing the specific example of anxiety over not
having devoted enough time to financial planning).
219. Rabin, supra note 197, at 32. The illustrations given include the likely movement of the
stock market, which cannot be reliably predicted from present data. Id. Expert analysts who have
developed elaborate models to predict the future course of the market are more likely to be
confident of their predictions than are nonexperts. Id. The fact that experts are able to articulate
reasons for their predictions tends to increase their level of confidence in their judgments, even
though their judgments are in fact no more accurate than those of nonexperts. Id.
220. Loewenstein, supra note 130, at 2.
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and as decisions become more complex, people use simpler decision rules,
such as choosing the cheapest or the most expensive. 221 In addition, as
decisions become more difficult, people may respond to additional choices
by procrastinating 222 or by adopting a rule that requires no decision among
the available choices. 223 For example, when given choices of investment
options, people may merely allocate their savings ratably over all
options. 224 These problems are exacerbated for those who lack self-control
and are even more driven by short-term costs than future benefits. 225
221. Id.
222. Id. A person who procrastinates due to an inordinate preference for immediate gratif-
ication may put off investigating or implementing superior investment choices. O'DONOGHUE &
RABIN, supra note 203, at 125. Introducing more options to a person who would not otherwise
procrastinate can actually induce procrastination that would not otherwise occur. Given a small
number of easy to understand choices, a person may have no difficulty choosing the optimal one.
The addition of more choices, particularly if they are more difficult to assess, increases the
deliberation costs of making an optimal decision. If the individual perceives one or more of those
additional choices as possibly superior, but is currently unwilling or unable to invest the resources
to make the determination of which is optimal, he or she may do nothing. In a sense, the better is
the enemy of the good: given one other good choice, he or she might well move savings. TED
O'DONOGHUE & MATrHEW RABIN, CHOICE AND PROCRASTINATION 18 (Institute of Business
and Economic Research, University of California-Berkley, Economics Dep't Working Paper No.
EOO-281, April 25, 2000).
223. Loewenstein, supra note 130, at 2.
224. GREED & FEAR, supra note 175, at 135-36 (citing Shlomo Benartzi & Richard Thaler,
Nai've Diversification Strategies in Defined Contribution Savings Plans, 91 AM. ECON. R. 79
(2001)); see also JAMES J. CHOI ET AL., DEFINED CONTRIBUTION PLANS: PLAN RULES,
PARTICIPANT DECISIONS, AND THE PATH OF LEAST RESISTANCE 26-27 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ.
Research, Working Paper No. 8655, at 26-27, 2001). Using a database of 170 retirement plans,
they found that approximately 62 percent of the funds offered in the plans were equity funds, and
the fraction of total assets held in equity funds was very close to 62 percent. Id. They also found
a positive relationship at the plan level between the fraction of equity funds offered by the plan
and the fraction of individual portfolios invested in equities. Id.
225. Loewenstein, supra note 130, at 2-3. Psychologists have modeled the self-control issue
in various ways. Some propose a model that treats an individual as two selves: a patient planner
and an impatient doer. Thaler & Shefrin, supra note 172, at 392. Others posit that self-control
problems in some contexts arise from time-inconsistent preferences, termed "hyperbolic
discounting." Laibson et al., supra note 196, at 97. This model can be derived from the Thaler-
Shefrin model by assuming that the "planner" and the "doer" strike an efficient bargain in every
period. BERNHEIM, supra note 1 at 39; see also Ainslie, supra note 197; R.H. Strotz, Myopia and
Inconsistency in Dynamic Utility Maximization, 23(3) R. OF ECON. STUDIES 165 (1955-56). It is
not clear how much of the population is prone to hyperbolic discounting, but behavioral scientists
believe it is a significant number. The evidence supports a finding of varying degrees of
hyperbolic discounting in a very large number of test subjects. See Ainslie, supra note 197, at
335; see also Strotz, supra, at 177 (stating that most of us are "born" with hyperbolic discount rate
functions). There is also some evidence that the phenomenon may be bred in us by nature since it
has also been observed in other animals See Ainslie, supra note 197, at 334 (citing studies on
animals choosing between two amounts of food at different delays). To further complicate the
analysis, some people are aware of the problem while others may not be. See Rabin, supra note
197, at 40. Those aware of the problem are called sophisticated and those unaware are called
naive. Id. It is generally assumed that most people are at least partially naive. Id.
Lack of self-control makes retirement savings more difficult because it causes an individual
to especially value current consumption over future consumption. It is one of the prime reasons
people procrastinate in starting a retirement savings plan. See generally O'DONOGHUE & RABIN,
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Error may also result from loss aversion 226 or, at the opposite extreme,
overconfidence. 227 In particular, investors under the age of 55 seem to have
an overly optimistic view of likely investment returns over the next ten
years, and many investors are convinced they can time the stock market
even though those who trade the most realize the worst performance.
228
supra note 222 (discussing the general problem of procrastination). Procrastination may also
affect how wisely a person who does save invests savings. See O'DONOGHUE & RABIN, supra
note 203.
226. Daniel Kahneman et al., Anomalies: The Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion, and Status
Quo Bias, 5 J. OF ECON. PERSP. 193 (1991). Loss aversion describes the phenomenon that losses
have a larger psychological impact on individuals than gains. Id. For small or moderate gains and
losses of money, the ratio is about 2 to 1; a loss causes twice as much psychological pain as the
psychological pleasure provided by an equal gain. Id. Loss aversion affects savings decisions
because once a household gets used to a particular level of consumption, they tend to view
reductions in that level as a loss. Thaler & Benartzi, supra note 189.
In addition to making saving difficult, loss aversion also affects investment decisions in a
number of ways. Individuals have great difficulty coming to terms with investment losses. They
are very reluctant to admit they have made an investment mistake, sell the investment at a loss,
and move on. GREED & FEAR, supra note 175, at Chapter 9: "Get-Evenitis": Riding Losers Too
Long. They also have a tendency to sell investments in which they have a gain too early. See
Hersh Shefrin & Meir Statman, The Disposition to Sell Winners Too Early and Ride Losers Too
Long, 40 J. OF FIN. 777, 782 (1985) (suggesting that the quest for pride leads to the disposition to
realize gains, but that anticipated regret may also cause investors to be reluctant to realize gains; if
they monitor the stock sold and it rises in value, they will regret having sold it, and therefore if
regret is much stronger than pride, inaction may be preferred over action for gains as well as
losses).
Loss aversion coupled with a short planning horizon, myopic loss aversion, can result in the
choice of a less than optimal portfolio allocation. In making investment decisions under
uncertainty, individuals tend to be too conservative in their allocations to risky assets such as
stocks when they focus on likely short rather than long-term results. For example, when shown
the likely one year results from stock investments, indicating about a one-third chance of under-
performing bonds, they evidence less willingness to invest in stocks than when shown likely
thirty-year stock results, indicating about a five percent chance of under-performing bonds.
Shlomo Benartzi & Richard H. Thaler, Risk Aversion or Myopia: Choices in Repeated Gambles
and Retirement Investments, 45 MANAGEMENT SCIENCE 364 (1999); see also Shlomo Benartzi &
Richard H. Thaler, Myopic Loss Aversion and the Equity Premium Puzzle, 110(1) Q. J. OF ECON.
73 (1995) (discussing the equity premium and arguing that it is a function of the planning horizon
of investors); Daniel Read et al., Choice Bracketing, 19 J. OF RISK & UNCERTAINTY 171 (1999)
(discussing investors' tendency to make risky decisions one at a time instead of taking a portfolio
perspective that puts each risk in a lifetime perspective).
227. GREED & FEAR, supra note 175, at 131-33. Individual investors are overconfident and
overly optimistic about the probable future performance of investments they own. Id. (citing a
1998 survey of individual investors).
228. Loewenstein, supra note 130, at 3; GREED & FEAR, supra note 175, at 134-36 (citing
BARBARA O'NEILL, How PEOPLE HANDLE THEIR MONEY (1990)). A recent study conducted by
the Financial Research Corporation found a growing tendency by mutual fund investors,
particularly those that do not use an advisor, to trade too frequently and to make unwise timing
decisions. INVESTORS BEHAVING BADLY, AN ANALYSIS OF INVESTOR TRADING PATTERNS IN
MUTUAL, FUNDS FINANCIAL RESEARCH CORPORATION 2002. Another study by the financial
services firm Dalbar, Inc. looked at mutual fund performance during seventeen years and
concluded that while the average stock fund gained an average 14 percent per year (an the S&P
500 gained an average 16.3 percent), the typical mutual fund investor gained only an average 5.3
percent, largely due to buying the wrong funds at the wrong time by consistently seeking out the
hot funds, the best performers from the previous year. MORE PROOF THAT MARKET TIMING
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Although individuals seem to understand the stock market better today than
they used to, in many cases the understanding is superficial and does not
seem to have made them better investors. Instead, because they think they
are better investors, they have less fear, take undue risks, gamble, speculate,
and often lose. Error also results from status quo bias, 229 failure to consider
inflation, 230 and bias toward familiar investments.
231
The psychological costs of additional choice include anxiety and regret.
Anxiety occurs when a decision requires expertise the person does not have
or requires difficult trade offs, such as choices between investment options
that are safe but offer a low and relatively certain rate of return and ones
that are riskier but offer a higher but uncertain expected return.232
Regret occurs when a person's choice turns out badly. It is the sense of
feeling responsibility for a loss. 233 The more choices a person has, the more
DOESN'T WORK FOR THE MAJORITY OF INVESTORS, UPDATE, DALBAR, (June 21, 2001)
(available at http://www.profisys.com/dalbar.htm) (last visited Dec. 1, 2003).
229. Kahneman et al., supra note 217, at 197-98. Status quo bias or inertia is the strong
tendency of individuals to remain at the status quo. It is thought to result from loss aversion, for
the disadvantages of deviating from the status quo loom larger than the advantages. Id.
230. GREED & FEAR, supra note 175, at 31-32. While individuals are capable of adjusting
for inflation, it is not the natural way most of us think. Id. (citing Eldan Shafir et al., Money
Illusion, 112 Q. J. OF ECON. 341 (1997)). For example, most people would not consider
themselves as losing money if they invested $10,000 in a stock that was still worth $10,000 one
year later. Since inflation has eroded the buying power of the $10,000, there has been an
economic loss, but since most people consider only the nominal value of money, they tend to
ignore the effects of inflation. Over very long periods of time, inflation can seriously erode
buying power, so ignoring inflation when making investment decisions will result in less than
optimal portfolio choices.
231. Investors have a bias toward investing in stocks of companies based in one's own
country, which may be due to what is called the home bias: in unfamiliar situations, we tend to
concentrate on what we are familiar with, even though that may be risky and is not optimal
investment behavior. GREED & FEAR, supra note 175, at 136. It appears that if the employer's
stock is one of the investment choices, participants put a large fraction of their contributions into
the employer's stock even if they are not required to. See Sarah Holden et al., 401(k) Plan Asset
Allocation, Account Balances, and Loan Activity in 1998, 6(1) PERSPECTIVE (Investment
Company Institute, Washington, D.C.), Jan. 2000, at 9 (finding that for firms that offer company
stock as an option, 33 percent of plan assets are held in company stock); see also NELLIE LIANG &
SCOTT J. WEISBENNER, INVESTOR BEHAVIOR AND THE PURCHASE OF COMPANY STOCK IN
40 1(K) PLANS - THE IMPORTANCE OF PLAN DESIGN, (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working
Paper No. 9131, 2002) (concluding that the number of investment alternatives offered and whether
the company requires some of the match to be in company stock are key factors of the share of
total contributions in company stock, that participants do not offset an employer match in
company stock with a smaller share of their own contributions to company stock, and that workers
appear to view other plan restrictions as providing cues about the desirability of purchasing
company stock). This bias toward company stock may be a form of home bias. GREED & FEAR,
supra note 175, at 136.
232. Loewenstein, supra note 130, at 3.
233. GREED & FEAR, supra note 175, at 30. The simplest and most effective way to avoid
regret is to relinquish freedom of choice, for without choice there can be no regret about having
made poor choices. The current Social Security system and traditional defined benefit retirement
plans are typical examples of retirement savings plans that provide little if any choice. A way to
lessen but not eliminate the possibility of regret without eliminating choice is to take action based
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possibility there is for bad outcomes and regret. Feelings of regret are an
important source of personal misery. 234
Expanded choice is not beneficial when it requires expertise people
don't possess since in that case, the benefits from competition are likely
minimal, required deliberation time for optimal choice is likely to be
substantial, people are more likely to make bad decisions, and the decision
making process is likely to be a considerable source of anxiety and
anticipated regret. 235
Under the Life Cycle Hypothesis (LCH) and under modern portfolio
theory, 236 an individual must solve complex mathematical problems to
determine optimal savings and investment strategies, yet most of the United
States population is not able to make even basic economic calculations.
237
on the advice of experts rather than based on one's own analysis: if the investment turns out badly,
the advisor can be blamed. Id. at 129-30; see also Hersh Shefrin & Meir Statman, How Not to
Make Money in the Stock Market, PSYCHOLOGY TODAY 52, Feb. 1986.
234. Loewenstein, supra note 130, at 3. Remarkably, Harry Markowitz, the Nobel Laureate
recognized for having developed modem portfolio theory, did not choose the most efficient
retirement investment portfolio called for by his theory, but he rather chose a less aggressive one
so as "to minimize my future regret." GREED & FEAR, supra note 175, at 31.
235. Loewenstein, supra note 130, at 3-4.
236. Modem Portfolio Theory (MPT), a broad theory of portfolio selection and corporate
finance, explains how risk-averse investors should structure their portfolios to optimize expected
returns taking into account market risks. Harry Markowitz introduced it in a paper in the 1952
Journal of Finance. Harry Markowitz, Portfolio Selection VII J. OF FIN. 77 (1952); see also Harry
M. Markowitz, Foundations of Portfolio Theory, 46 J. OF FIN. 469 (1991). In 1990, he shared a
Nobel Prize with Merton Miller and William Sharpe for what developed into a broad theory of
portfolio selection and corporate finance. The theory explains how risk-averse individuals should
construct investment portfolios to optimize expected returns for desired levels of market risk. Out
of a universe of risky assets, an efficient frontier of optimal portfolios is constructed that offer the
maximum expected return for given levels of risk. See PETER L. BERNSTEIN, CAPITAL IDEAS
(Free Press Reprint Ed. 1993) (discussing the history of MPT).
Many individuals do not seem to assemble the investment portfolios predicted by standard
economic theory but rather ones they find more attractive for psychological reasons. See GREED
& FEAR, supra note 175, at Chapter 10, "Portfolios, Pyramids, Emotions and Biases;" see also
Hersh Shefrin & Meir Statman, Behavioral Portfolio Theory, 35 J. OF FIN. & QUANTITATIVE
ANALYSIS 127 (2000). They prefer portfolios that are a combination of very conservative and
very risky components, reflecting a philosophy of absolute safety first before investing for
potential. GREED & FEAR, supra note 175, at 126. The optimal security design for such an
investor consists of a combination of secure bonds and lottery tickets. Such a security is available
in Great Britain and in Sweden, both of which issue lottery bonds. Shefrin & Statman, supra, at
148. Lottery bonds are bonds issued by the government that pay no interest but rather give the
holders lottery tickets in place of interest coupons. Id. In this country, a variety of securities have
been developed to provide security with some upside potential. GREED & FEAR, supra note 175,
at 127-28 n.ll.
237. BERNHEIM supra note 1, at 37; see also B. DOUGLAS BERNHEIM & DANIEL M.
GARRETT, THE DETERMINANT OF CONSEQUENCES OF FINANCIAL EDUCATION IN THE
WORKPLACE: EVIDENCE FROM A SURVEY OF EMPLOYERS, (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. 5667, 1996) (finding that financial illiteracy is correlated with under
preparation for retirement). This is the issue generally referred to as "bounded rationality." The
standard life cycle hypothesis assumes that an individual has unlimited mental faculties and is able
to formulate and solve even very difficult problems using sophisticated mathematical techniques.
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Thus, there is some doubt whether the typical person can even formulate a
reasonable plan, let alone execute it.
Experience, expertise, and learning can moderate the effect of biases
and lack of knowledge, but the research does not strongly support the
assumptions made by many economists that real world learning experiences
substantially eliminate biases in nonexperts. 238 While many people do learn
general principles, they still do not accurately apply those principles in
individual cases. 239 In general, the conditions that best promote learning are
rewards, small deliberation costs, good feedback, unchanging circum-
stances, and simple context, 240 which are not present with respect to long-
term retirement investment decisions. 24'
Relying on the advice of experts may not be a satisfactory alternative.
Much of the advice provided by third parties is often not very sophisticated,
consisting of crude rules of thumb that may not be very useful.
Psychologists have documented that people tend to rely on rules of thumb
to make complex tasks simpler, and that while such rules are often quite
useful, sometimes they lead to severe and systematic errors caused by
biases in judgment. 242 There is evidence that experts are more prone to
overconfidence than laypersons.
243
See John Conlisk, Why Bounded Rationality, 34 J. OF ECON. LITERATURE 669 (1996) (discussing
and criticizing that assumption and an argument for incorporating bounded rationality into
economic models).
238. Rabin, supra note 197, at 31.
239. Id. Such people may even see their errors when confronted with them yet continue to
make the same errors in the future. Id. Surprisingly, learning or expertise can sometimes actually
exacerbate judgment errors. When dealing with highly predictable possibilities, experts' opinions
tend to be very accurate. However, as previously noted, when predictability is low, which is when
accurate guidance is most important, experts are often even more susceptible to overconfidence
than laypersons. See supra note 219 and accompanying text.
240. Conlisk, supra note 237, at 683.
241. BERNHEtM, supra note 1, at 37. Individuals retire only once; they do not have frequent
opportunities to observe the retirement decisions and results of those decisions made by others.
Unsophisticated individuals may not recognize the need for expert advice or have the ability to
evaluate its quality if they get it. Id.
242. Rabin, supra note 197, at 24. Such errors include exaggerating how closely a small
sample will resemble the larger population from which it is drawn, becoming wedded to an
existing hypothesis, and ignoring or misinterpreting or misreading new information contradicting
their hypothesis. Id. at 24-29.
243. Id. at 32. As previously noted, a recent study examined the advice given by
professional financial planners concerning what withdrawal rate from an accumulated investment
portfolio should be recommended during the retirement years, consistent with making the cash
flows last as long as possible. Ameriks et al., supra note 14. Using Monte Carlo simulations of
the likely outcomes of the advice given by various experts, the study concluded that clients who
followed the advice were at substantial risk of outliving their assets. Id. at 60-61. This means that
the experts were likely giving incorrect advice to their clients during their non-retirement years
concerning what level of accumulated assets they needed at retirement. Id. at 60.
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3. Investment Choices in Deferred Variable Annuities
The typical deferred variable annuity, which offers fifteen to thirty
investment subaccounts to choose among, does not differ significantly from
a family of mutual funds. The equity funds run the gamut from broadly
diversified funds to funds that focus on a particular industry or market
sector. Both the SEC and the NASD have cautioned that the product may be
an unsuitable investment for many individuals because of the complexity of
the investment choices. 244
Those approaching retirement age with insufficient assets are of par-
ticular concern. Many of those households probably arrived there for
reasons related to inability to plan and lack of investment expertise. Left to
their own devices they might either invest too conservatively or, at the other
extreme, take unreasonable risks by failing to adequately diversify,
overestimating their own expertise or trying to time the market to enhance
returns. The generous array of investment choices available in the typical
deferred variable annuity makes such potentially costly actions much more
likely. Unfortunately, such errors will be particularly costly for those
households because they do not have sufficient time to recover from them.
The only nonqualified, tax-advantaged retirement savings plan is unsuitable
for those who probably need it the most.
It is also not likely that the unsophisticated will heed the SEC's and the
NASD's warnings that deferred variable annuities are unsuitable for un-
sophisticated investors. The government has bestowed its imprimatur on
them by making them tax-advantaged, and that is likely to outweigh the
effect of any precautionary statements about suitability that may or may not
be stressed by brokers or financial planners making a living selling the
product.
Behavioral biases make investment decisions difficult for many indi-
viduals, particularly those who are unsophisticated and lack self-control.
Their behavior is often at odds with the predictions of standard economic
theory and therefore is not likely to be affected by standard economic
incentives. However, behavioral prescriptions may be effective and less
costly.
Since the United States economic system is largely based on free
choice, it is hard to justify using governmental incentives merely to alter
individual preferences, and it is not clear that incentives are at all effective
in doing so. If an individual invests unwisely because of some remediable
behavioral problem, such as behavioral biases compounded by bounded
244. See supra notes 179-80 and accompanying text.
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rationality and lack of self-control, then governmental policies aimed at
remedying these deficiencies, even if they restrict free choice, are not
contrary to laissez faire economic principles, and they also have a greater
chance of being effective.245
While investors seem to require some degree of choice before they are
willing to commit to a plan, too much choice in the hands of un-
sophisticated investors can result in very costly mistakes, a reality that
should be taken into account in designing any tax advantaged savings plan.
Whatever gains that investors may obtain from choosing their own
investment portfolios is likely to be maximized with a small number of
carefully selected alternatives.246
D. SUMMARY
The likely behavioral savings and investment effects of nonqualified
deferred variable annuities are weak and in many cases actually counter-
productive. They are not designed to encourage early savings or even sys-
tematic savings plans. They are very attractive to those who have already
accumulated funds and are seeking a tax-advantaged vehicle for them, and
the available data strongly suggests that is one of the most important
reasons a large majority of policyholders purchase them.
The typical product is not simple, easy to understand, and judged
desirable by most experts. Because of its complexity, it is not suitable for a
large number of individuals with varying degrees of sophistication. It is not
designed to be particularly useful to the households most in need of
additional retirement savings-those that find themselves close to retire-
ment age without having accumulated sufficient assets. Those households
need serious assistance and cannot afford to make any costly investment
mistakes since they have so little time to recover from them. The typical
deferred variable annuity, with its broad array of investment fund options,
provides too little guidance and too much chance to make ill-advised, costly
errors. By themselves, the savings and investment aspects of variable
annuities provide no compelling reasons to accord them the special tax
status they have.
245. O'Donoghue & Rabin, supra note 203. The authors concluded: "We believe that most
people are most of the time better judges of what is good for them than are government officials,
economic theorists, and other social scientists.... But we also believe that people often make
errors, that there is some discernible pattern to these errors, and that people sometimes cause
significant harm to themselves by making these errors." Id. at 26.
246. See Shlomo Benartzi & Richard H. Thaler, How Much is Investor Autonomy Worth?
(unpublished manuscript) ( available at
www.anderson.ucla.eduL/faculty/shlomo.benartzi/autonomy.pdf) (last visited Dec. 1, 2003).
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V. POLICY PRESCRIPTIONS
A. INTRODUCTION
Since neither the savings and investment aspects nor the annuitization
aspects of deferred variable annuities as they are currently designed provide
any persuasive policy reason to grant them the special tax status they have,
there are two plausible responses: treat them like regular taxable mutual
funds during the accumulation phase or search for a more rational design of
the product that would justify granting them preferred tax status.
B. CAN A MORE RATIONAL DEFERRED VARIABLE ANNUITY BE
DESIGNED?
1. Introduction
The threshold policy issue is whether any product should be granted
the special tax benefits currently accorded to deferred variable annuities
during the accumulation phase. A recent GAO report concludes that such
benefits are unwarranted because they provide benefits mainly for middle
and upper-income individuals; while low income people receive their
benefit largely through the Social Security system.247 While the "tax
shelter" aspect of deferred variable annuities is the usual criticism advanced
by those who oppose their special tax status, an even more troubling factor
is that because of their many tax and non-tax disadvantages, they are simply
not a very good investment vehicle, despite their tax sheltering potential.
They are being inappropriately marketed to such purchasers with con-
siderable success. Unless the product can be redesigned in such a way that
it is simpler and more suitable for large numbers of individuals with vary-
ing degrees of sophistication, is judged to be a sound program by most
experts, is unlikely to be purchased by someone who values only its tax
shelter possibilities, is difficult to inappropriately market to purchasers for
whom it is an unsuitable investment, and will be more likely to be
annuitized, then the conclusion reached in the GAO report is correct.
The rest of this section discusses possible policy prescriptions for such
a redesign. The proposals are of two kinds: those designed to enhance the
247. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, SUPPORTING CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT: BUD-
GETARY IMPLICATIONS OF SELECTED GAO WORK FOR FISCAL YEAR 2003 (GAO-02-576, 2002).
The same proposal was included in a 1990 report. See ACCOUNTING OFFICE, TAX POLICY: TAX
TREATMENT OF LIFE INSURANCE AND ANNUITY ACCRUED INTEREST (GDD-90-31, 1990).
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annuitization aspects of the product and those designed to enhance the
savings and investment aspects of the product.
2. Enhancing the Annuitization Aspects
a. Mandatory Annuitization
The clearest way to distinguish deferred variable annuities from other
investment products and to enhance their annuity aspects is to require that
purchasers commit to annuitize when they purchase the annuity. In fact, if
the resistance to voluntary annuitization is not primarily economic but
rather because the complexity and psychological difficulty of the annuity-
zation decision are insuperable hurdles to free choice, then the only alter-
native may be to require at least some level of annuitization. 248 Mandatory
annuitization might also have the beneficial side effect of reducing the
adverse selection problem. Requiring purchasers to commit to annuitiza-
tion when purchasing a deferred annuity would not permit them to wait
until they gained more information about their longevity prospects, which
would tend to make the pool of annuitants more heterogeneous and less
self-selected. 249
Mandatory annuitization also has negative effects. It would be harmful
to those in poor health or who otherwise can accurately predict a lowered
life expectancy; it would potentially be administratively burdensome to
enforce, and it is likely to be politically unpopular in this country because it
severely restricts individual choice. 250 While utilizing life contingent
annuitization with a guaranteed payout period, joint and survivor annuities,
and front loaded annuity payments could substantially mitigate the possible
harmful effects of mandatory annuitization, the administrative and political
problems would still be substantial. Furthermore, mandatory annuitization
can have undesirable distributional consequences. It would entail wealth
transfers from those with lower life expectancies to those with higher life
expectancies-from African Americans to Whites and Hispanics, from the
248. BROWN & WARSHAWSKY, supra note 19, at 37-38.
249. Id. at 38.
250. Id. The authors discussed the recent policy discussion in the United Kingdom, which is
considering softening its current requirements that those with personal or occupational pension
plans annuitize 75 percent of their accumulations by age seventy-five. Id. The new proposals
would allow a participant to annuitize only to the extent necessary to reasonably insure that
income would be sufficient to be above the level of eligibility for state welfare support. Id. at 38-
39.
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less educated to the more highly educated, and from the less wealthy to the
more wealthy. 251
A requirement that a purchaser commit to some level of annuitization
when the annuity is purchased would also make the deferred annuity
particularly unattractive for younger purchasers who face more uncertainty
about their life expectancy, and the reluctance would be even greater for
those in groups with statistically lower than average life expectancies. 252
One possibility to encourage annuitization without mandating it is to re-
quire less conservative mortality guarantees, which would make an-
nuitization more economically attractive to individuals with average life
expectancies. Less conservative guarantees would require higher mortality
expenses and would no doubt deter some purchasers, but if those deterred
were the individuals primarily seeking only a tax-sheltered investment
vehicle and not an annuity, that would be desirable.
Unfortunately, such a feature would probably also deter some legiti-
mate annuity purchasers. In particular, it would be very unattractive to
younger individuals legitimately desiring to begin a consistent, long-term
supplemental savings plan for retirement but who face significant uncer-
tainties concerning their future health prospects and likely longevity.
Forcing them to pay large insurance charges for benefits that may turn out
not to be valuable to them will likely induce them to avoid the product. 253
An attractive compromise is to require a commitment to at least partial
annuitization if the deferred annuity is purchased after a certain age, for
instance after age 59 _, the point at which under current tax law, the
possible tax penalties on withdrawals cease. A mandatory annuitization
requirement for those purchasers would discourage those who do not intend
to utilize the annuity payout aspects of the annuity, for whom it is very
likely an unsuitable investment, from purchasing it. Once the tax penalty
no longer applies, the deferred variable annuity appears to be a closer
substitute for other taxable investments, such as mutual funds. There is
evidence that deferred annuities are being marketed to seniors as tax-
251. JEFFREY R. BROWN, CTR FOR RETIREMENT RESEARCH AT BOSTON COLLEGE, How
SHOULD WE INSURE LONGEVITY RISK IN PENSIONS AND SOCIAL SECURITY? (August 2000).
252. It would also not be a simple matter to determine the optimal age at which to require
annuitization. Due to the high costs of annuities, optimal economic behavior may well be to
postpone the decision whether to purchase a life contingent annuity at least until about age
seventy, perhaps even longer. See supra Part III. Requiring an early commitment to
annuitization would likely deter even purchasers who do value the annuity aspects of the product.
253. It is also unclear how such a legislatively mandated level of payout mortality guarantees
would be formulated and, equally important, updated in a timely manner as new actuarial
information on longevity becomes available. There is little to counsel optimism about the likely
results of government action that attempts to mandate the mortality charges on a complex
insurance product like annuities.
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advantaged mutual funds, and the factors that make them unsuitable for
investors who do not value their annuity aspects are completely ignored or
downplayed. Since the break-even point for variable annuities as opposed
to other investments is at least ten years, perhaps even much longer, they
are particularly unsuitable for older individuals who buy them as substitutes
for other investments since there is a higher probability they will not sur-
vive until the break-even point. A requirement of mandatory annuitization
for older purchasers would be an effective way to end such abusive sales
practices. The purchase age at which a mandate of annuitization should be
imposed is a policy determination, but it should apply at some age. For
example, is there any legitimate reason why a person aged seventy-five
should be allowed to purchase a deferred variable annuity without
committing to some level of annuitization?
254
b. Encouraging Annuitization by Lowering Costs and
Changing Perceptions
If the problem underlying resistance to voluntary annuitization is
pricing of annuities, then policies designed to reduce the cost of annuities
may be appropriate.2 55 A number of alternatives have been suggested. The
establishment of a plan like the Federal TSP program could lower
transaction and search costs and could underwrite product research and in-
novation to encourage annuitization, reducing adverse selection. However,
this might be seen as unfair competition to insurance companies that are
well run and provide low cost annuities to the public.256
One researcher, writing in the context of Social Security reform,
suggested the possibility of creating a federal board of overseers of annuity
providers as well as a national clearinghouse for commercially sold
annuities so that annuities from competing insurers could be offered in a
clear and rational manner.2 57 While such a proposal has some merit, the
254. BROWN & WARSHAWSKY, supra note 19, at 38-39. Even if mandatory annuitization is
rejected, at the very least, annuitization should be required to be the default option in a deferred
variable annuity. Id. Psychological research indicates that inertia and status quo bias may be
sufficient to increase annutization rates merely by encouraging annuitization by making it the
default option. Id. However, most current deferred variable annuities provide for life annuities at
age sixty-five, and that has not been effective. The resistance to voluntary annuitization seems
strong enough to overcome even inertia and status quo bias.
255. Id. at 37.
256. Id. at 42.
257. See Mark J. Warshawsky, The Market for Individual Annuities and the Reform of Social
Security, BENEFITS Q. 66, 75-76 (Fourth Quarter 2001) (suggesting that this would deal with
solvency and fraud as well as obviate the need for commissioned agents and brokers, thereby
lowering overall expenses and reducing the wide spread in annuity payouts that currently exists in
the private market).
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cost and administrative burdens of creating an additional governmental
bureaucracy would be substantial, and the likely political resistance to such
a proposal is obvious. Furthermore, given the vast array and complexity of
deferred variable annuities currently being marketed, it isn't clear what a
federal board or national clearinghouse could accomplish. Only in conjunc-
tion with simplification and rationalization of the design of deferred
variable annuities would such a proposal be at all feasible. The optimal
prescription would be to simplify the design of the product enough to
diminish the need for such a board or clearinghouse.
One intriguing possibility for lowering costs and changing perceptions
about annuitization is to permit a true risk pooling of annuitants, like the
current CREF retirement annuity for qualified plans, which provides no
mortality guarantees in either the accumulation or payout phase. Annuity
payments vary with both investment and mortality experience. While the
annuitant does bear some mortality risk, that risk is minimized through risk
pooling. Each annuitant is still promised annuity payments for life, but the
mortality experience of the annuitant pool will affect the level of the
annuity payments. With a large enough annuity pool and reasonable
mortality assumptions used to compute initial annuity payments, mortality
experience is not likely to differ greatly from the mortality assumptions
used to compute the initial payments, and any changes will occur very
slowly.
The CREF retirement variable annuity has been operating since 1952 in
its stock account with no discernible problems. Because mortality assump-
tions used to compute the initial annuity payments are not guaranteed, the
initial payments under the CREF variable annuity backed by the stock
account are computed somewhat less conservatively than those used for the
guaranteed annuities issued by TIAA. The actuaries can be less conser-
vative in their initial mortality assumptions because errors may be corrected
by future adjustments in annuity payout levels. The CREF annuity
payments based on the stock account have tended to work slightly lower
over time due to actual mortality experience because the actuaries were not
conservative enough in their initial assumptions. However, the decreases
have been very small.258
One extremely beneficial aspect of actually pooling the annuity
mortality risk is that it eliminates the perception that the insurance company
is betting against an individual's longevity and will benefit if the mortality
258. I obtained this information in informal communications with researchers at the TIAA-
CREF Institute, who informed me that they are currently working on an "Issue Brief' discussing
the pros and cons of such a fully participating variable annuity.
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experience of the pool is greater than was assumed in pricing the annuity.
Any benefits of mortality experience will flow through to the survivors in
the pool, who will receive greater future annuity payments, and not go to
the insurance company. 259 Each survivor in the annuity pool would be
assured of receiving the correct "mortality premium" for having taken the
risk of purchasing a life contingent annuity, making the product potentially
more attractive. To be effective, the annuity pool would have to be large
enough to assure sufficient risk pooling and avoid too much year-to-year
variance in annuity payments due to mortality experience. Given the
current thin market for voluntary annuitization in the United States, that
might require pooling annuitants across a number of separate companies or
the utilization of one common annuity pool for all deferred variable annuity
contracts in the payout phase.
Because no mortality guarantees are provided, there would be no
mortality charges during the accumulation phase or the payout phase,
making the product more attractive. The current weak mortality guarantees
provided on deferred variable annuities, which add to both the cost and
complexity of the product, could be eliminated. 260 Eliminating mortality
guarantees would also eliminate one of the disincentives to encouraging
annuitization that insurance companies now have-the losses they may
incur if their annuity mortality tables turn out to be inaccurate.
This proposal is attractive because it would lower the costs of the
deferred variable annuity and decrease its complexity, making it easier to
sell. This proposal is important because it would address one of the
primary psychological barriers to voluntary annuitization, the perception
that the insurance company is betting against the annuitant's longevity and
stands to gain from his or her early demise. The primary downside of such
an annuity is that it does not provide true insurance against longevity in the
sense of guaranteed payout rates. However, the experience of the TIAA-
CREF retirement annuity indicates that lack of insurance is not likely to be
259. In my informal contacts with researchers at the TIAA-CREF Institute concerning this
issue, I was informed that this recently occurred with respect to the CREF retirement annuity
backed by one of its newer funds, the inflation linked bond fund. A wealthy annuitant in that fund
passed away very early and because his payments were a substantial portion of the total annuity
payments being made from that fund, his early demise resulted in the other annuitants in that pool
getting an increase of approximately 10 percent in their annuity payment levels. Had this been a
guaranteed annuity, the other participants would not have shared that mortality gain, which would
have gone instead to the insurer.
260. Even if it is determined that a payout annuity without mortality guarantees is not viable,
there is no reason why there must be mortality payout guarantees during the accumulation period.
Given the fact that they are so extremely weak that it is never intended that they will be used, they
seem only to add to the complexity and cost of the product.
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a substantial economic factor if a sufficiently large and diverse annuity pool
could be formed.261
While such an annuity might be attractive, it would be a significant
departure from current mainstream annuity design. It would also require
tax legislation because such a product would probably not be treated as a
tax-advantaged, nonqualified deferred annuity under current law since it
lacks any insurance guarantees. Furthermore, if there were no mortality
guarantee charges during the accumulation phase and there were no
requirement of annuitization, it would be even more likely that people
would purchase it primarily or solely as a substitute for other retirement
investment options and not for its annuity aspects. Thus, this option would
only be appropriate in conjunction with other policy prescriptions that
served to reasonably insure that the product was not being purchased
primarily for its tax deferral benefits.
c. Use of Penalty Provisions to Encourage Annuitization
Another way to encourage annuitization without mandating it is to
penalize any distributions that are not in the form of annuities. 262 Currently,
there are penalties for early withdrawals from nonqualified annuities, but
they only apply to distributions before age 59 _. After that age, there is no
penalty, even for cashing the policy in and taking a single lump sum
payment. The penalty provisions for deferred variable annuities should be
designed to insure not only that the amounts accumulated are used for
retirement purposes, but also that they are used to provide a retirement
annuity. Therefore, unlike the penalty provisions applicable to qualified
retirement plans, the only function of which is to insure that the funds are
used in some way for retirement purposes, the penalty provisions for
deferred variable annuities should extend to all ages. 263 Extending the
penalty would also clearly differentiate deferred annuities from other
investments for senior citizens to whom they are routinely being marketed
261. To prevent extreme fluctuations, a possible middle ground would provide doomsday
insurance that would be effective if the mortality experience of the annuity pool improved too
dramatically.
262. BROWN & WARSHAWSKY, supra note 19, at 42 n.21.
263. If the penalty were extended to later ages, then an exception should be provided for
distributions to pay extraordinary medical expenses, including long-term care expenses. Such an
exception is currently provided for distributions from qualified plans. I.R.C. § 72(t)(2)(B) (2002).
Extending the penalty would not have the same potential adverse effects on policyholders who are
in poor health that mandatory life annuitization would have. To avoid the penalty, the
policyholders need only take distributions in the form of a fixed period annuity over their life
expectancy. See supra note 56.
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as alternatives to other taxable investments, even though they are often
unsuitable investments for them.
Extending the penalty would also strengthen the commitment aspects
of the deferred annuity by discouraging distribution patterns not designed to
produce lifetime income, making it a more desirable product for those who
are unsophisticated or lack self-control. Psychologically, it would also
facilitate the formation of private rules to use the accumulation to provide
lifetime income. The only private rules suggested by the current penalty
provision is to live to at least age fifty-nine and then spend the
accumulation in any way the policyholder desires or die and leave it to
heirs. 264
One final possibility is to penalize non-annuity distributions by
reducing policyholders' investment in the contract-the amount they may
recover tax-free-if they take distributions in any manner other than a life
annuity. Under current law, policyholders' investment in the contract
includes all premiums paid, even though a part of those premiums are used
to pay the insurance charges related to the guaranteed pay out rates and
annuity death benefits. To encourage life annuitization, their investment in
the contract would be reduced by those charges if they choose any
distribution scheme other than a life annuity. To avoid administrative
burdens, rather than tracing the actual insurance charges levied under each
contract, the statute could provide for a reduction in basis of 1.25 percent
per year (the average insurance charges). If an annuity were in
accumulation over a long period of time, the cumulative reduction in basis
would be very substantial and would provide a strong incentive to
annuitize. 265 However, if the penalty applied to any distribution other than
264. Even more extreme would be extension of the penalty coupled with some minimum
distribution requirements like those applicable to qualified retirement plans. Qualified plans
generally require that minimum distributions begin no later than age 70 - and are designed to
exhaust the balance in the account over the life expectancy of the participant. See JEFFREY R.
BROWN ET AL., TAXING RETIREMENT INCOME: NONQUALIFIED ANNUITIES AND DISTRIBUTIONS
FROM QUALIFIED ACCOUNTS, (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 7268, 1999).
The minimum distribution rules were recently changed to provide more flexibility in the
designation of beneficiaries, reduce significantly the amount of the required distributions for many
individuals, impose an enforcement mechanism, and simplify administration. See Mark J.
Warshawsky, Further Reform of Minimum Distribution Requirements for Retirement Plans, TAX
NOTES 297 (April 9, 2001). However, it is not clear what minimum distribution requirements
would be appropriate for nonqualified annuities, and such a requirement would add to the
administrative cost of the annuity, as it has with qualified plans.
265. Such a provision was part of President Clinton's fiscal 1999 budget proposals. That
proposal would have reduced basis unless the policyholder annuitized at the guaranteed rates in
the policy. Those guaranteed rates are so conservative that it is unlikely they will ever be used, so
the budget proposal would have penalized nearly all policyholders. See infra, Part III. Life
annuitization at either the guaranteed rates or at current rates should be sufficient to avoid the
penalty if its purpose is to encourage annuitization.
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a life annuity, it would unfairly penalize policyholders who purchase
deferred annuities with every intention of eventually annuitizing but who
later ascertain that their life expectancies are substantially shorter than
average, perhaps due to the development of chronic illness. To address this
legitimate concern, the adjustment should also not apply to annuitization for
a fixed term equal to the actuarially computed life expectancy of the
policyholder.
d. Restricting Annuity Death Benefits
Even the basic return of premium death annuity benefits may be vastly
overpriced, and all of the enhanced death benefits are extremely
complicated and irrationally priced. Whether any of them are reasonably
priced, even in the aggregate, is a question the actuaries can't definitively
answer. Enhanced death benefits may also induce less than optimal
investment behavior and may provide strong incentives not to annuitize.
266
Only the basic return of premium death benefits should be allowed.
267
To be fair to life insurance companies, some mutual funds are offering
similar coverage as a selling tool for their products, and the insurance
companies selling annuities feel they are in competition with mutual fund
companies in attracting savings for investment. However, mutual funds
offer it as a separate term life insurance benefit that is excludible from the
beneficiary's gross income. Furthermore, if annuities are so close eco-
nomically to non-annuity mutual fund investments that they do not have
sufficient distinguishing characteristics to permit them to be marketed
effectively without mimicking mutual funds, what does this say about
whether they should be granted the special tax status they now have?
Analogous to the carpenter whose answer to every problem is to pound
in another nail, the answer for an insurance company to every competitive
problem with respect to deferred annuities has been to add another
266. While it may be puzzling why a policyholder would purchase such a bizarre form of life
insurance, the insurance company has a clear motive for the current design of this benefit. IRAs
and other qualified tax plans are prohibited from investing in life insurance contracts. IRC §
408(a)(3) (2002). If the nonqualified deferred annuity had a separate term life insurance benefit, it
could not be sold to qualified plans, which currently represent over half of the market for them.
The companies could sell the currently designed deferred annuity to qualified plans and design
another annuity with a separate term life insurance benefit for other sales. It would be difficult,
even embarrassing, to try to explain why the death benefits on the two annuities were differently
priced and differently treated for income tax purposes.
267. To prevent insurance companies from encouraging policyholders to exchange annuity
policies to obtain a higher death benefit, the return of premium death benefit should not be stepped
up to the cash value of the policy when one policy is exchanged, as is the current industry
practice.
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expensive layer of insurance. Annuity death benefits are a good illustration
of competition that has caused the consumer more harm than good.
e. Lowering Tax Rates on Annuity Income
The current industry proposal for encouraging annuitization is to tax
the income element in an annuity payment at capital gains rates rather than
ordinary income rates.268 A taxpayer in a 15 percent tax bracket would
instead pay 10 percent; while a taxpayer in a 30 percent or higher tax
bracket would instead pay 15 percent. It seems unlikely these mild
reductions in the tax rate on the annuity income would be sufficient to
overcome the very strong resistance to voluntary annuitization, particularly
if it is due to loss aversion. The fact that the tax benefit is of greater value
to a person in a higher tax bracket is also troublesome. Lower income
individuals, who are likely those with the lowest amounts of other sources
of annuitized income, are those who would reap the greatest welfare
benefits from additional annuitization and who need the greatest incentive
to annuitize. 269 Yet this proposal provides them with the least additional
incentive.
Merely adding an additional tax benefit at the annuitization stage of a
deferred annuity will not do anything to deter purchasers who value the
product primarily for its tax deferral aspects or deter marketing the product
to purchasers for whom it is an unsuitable investment. Additional tax
benefits without other design changes will not produce an optimally
designed deferred variable annuity.
3. Enhancing Savings and Investment Aspects
a. Limitations on Contributions
One recurring proposal is placing limits on allowable contributions to
nonqualified deferred annuities. 270 All other tax advantaged retirement
savings plans have some limit on contributions, which strengthen their
commitment aspects by making it harder to backslide or procrastinate and
268. See supra note 145 and accompanying text.
269. BROWN & WARSHAWSKY, supra note 19, at 38. Individuals with moderate amounts of
assets who are likely to qualify for welfare or other government assistance if they outlive their
assets have the least incentive to voluntarily annuitize their assets. Id. In fact, they may have an
incentive to spend their assets quickly in order to qualify for government assistance. Id.
Mandatory annuitization under the current Social Security system in this country and mandatory
pension annuitization requirements in the United Kingdom are aimed at curing this moral hazard
problem. Id.
270. See, e.g., Carol V. Calhoun, Tax Law and the Nonqualified Variable Annuity, 41 TAX
LAWYER 765, 772 (1988).
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catch up with larger contributions later. A contribution limit would also put
an upper limit on the amount that that could be sheltered in a deferred
annuity by persons who have no intention of annuitizing, such as the
wealthy or those who already have other adequate sources of annuity
income from qualified retirement plans.
Contribution limits on deferred variable annuities are probably not
sound policy. Certainly, we don't want to discourage a beneficiary of a life
insurance policy who has suffered the loss of an income generating family
member or the seller of a business who must use the cash proceeds to
finance retirement from investing the life insurance benefits or sales
proceeds in an annuity to manage their assets and insure a steady flow of
income. Many annuity purchasers fall into those categories and would very
likely be adversely affected by binding limits on contributions. The lack of
contribution limits for nonqualified annuities is also likely to be "especially
important in the common situation where a household finds itself
approaching retirement with relatively little accumulated wealth and it
needs to build up a substantial nest egg over a relatively short period of
time." 2
7 1
Because any acceptable contribution limitation provision would likely
be subject to so many legitimate exceptions that it would be burdensome
and costly to administer, avoiding limits would be preferable. Furthermore,
limits on contributions would not address some of the more fundamental
defects with the current design of the product.
b. Restricting Investment Choices
There is one other measure that would serve to distinguish deferred
variable annuities from other investment options and strongly encourage the
insurance industry to emphasize and promote the income options and long-
term management aspects of annuities. That measure is to severely restrict
the allowable investment choices in deferred variable annuities. It would
substantially reduce the costs and increase the welfare benefits of the
product with few, if any, unintended negative consequences.
The original CREF variable annuity for qualified plans provided for no
investment choices; there was one diversified investment fund that was
managed by CREF. The only choice the participant had was whether to
maintain the variable annuity or transfer all or part of the accumulation to a
fixed annuity. Transfers could be accomplished only by mail and only on
the first day of a calendar month. It was not even necessary to price the
271. MICHAEL J. BOSKIN ET AL., THE ECONOMIC ROLE OF ANNUITIES 88 (Catalyst Institute
Research Project, March 1998).
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accumulation units daily since all contributions and distributions occurred
only on the first day of a month. Once transferred to a fixed annuity, those
amounts could not be transferred back to the variable annuity. 272 In other
words, CREF made the product as simple as possible.
While investment risk was borne by the policyholder, the only
investment fund was managed by CREF and provided virtually no choice to
a participant except whether to commit retirement funds to the variable
annuity. It worked quite well in that form for many years, and it was not
until the 1980s that competitive pressures caused CREF to add more
investment choices, adopt daily pricing, and provide more flexibility for
transfers between CREF funds and between the variable and fixed
annuity. 273 Whether this additional investor choice has substantially
benefited the average participant is difficult to determine. Investing in the
CREF retirement annuity is now more complicated, requiring significant
additional educational efforts on the part of participating institutions in
cooperation with CREF.
The original design of the deferred variable annuity dictated that the
participant would rely on the investment expertise of the annuity provider.
It was not contemplated that a variable annuity would become essentially a
family of mutual funds covered by a veneer of costly and nearly impossible
to value insurance, shifting not only investment risk but also investment
responsibility to the participant. Whether intended or not, that is what has
happened over the past fifty years. Over the past twenty years, the siren
song of individual choice and autonomy, together with workplace and other
broader societal changes, has brought about a similar shift in investment
risk and responsibility from the employer to the employee in qualified
retirement plans. Whether that is good policy and will result in greater
individual welfare is still an open question. The unprecedented rise of
financial markets from 1981 until early 2000 virtually stifled all dissent, but
272. The original CREF variable annuity was available only for qualified retirement plans
for employees of teaching and research institutions. As part of its retirement plan, an individual
institution still has the right to impose similar restrictions on the accumulations of its employees,
but none do. There was an exception for amounts paid into what are called supplemental
retirement plans, which were required by law to be cashable. Amounts in supplemental plans
could be transferred back from the fixed annuity to the variable annuity , only on the first of a
month and through instructions by mail.
273. The investment choices now include four stock funds, two bond funds, one fund that
invests in both stocks and bonds, and a money market fund. CREF now prices its funds daily and
permits telephone exchanges. It also permits transfers from the fixed annuity to the variable
annuity, only over a ten-year period. To transfer funds from a fixed annuity, the account holder is
issued what is called a transfer payout annuity (TPA), which is essentially a ten-year term certain
annuity. Annuity payments for the ten-year term are computed with a conservative guaranteed
rate, but TIAA credits additional dividends to each year's payment based on its investment
experience, making the TPA a participating annuity.
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the prolonged market downturn over the past three and a half years has
starkly illustrated the risks inherent in the transition. Many individuals
made bad investment decisions that will have far reaching ramifications,
and individual investor autonomy seems a lot less alluring now.
Over the years, the Internal Revenue Service has issued warnings that
too much investment choice in a deferred variable annuity might result in
unfavorable tax treatment, but it never issued regulations quantifying its
precise position on how much choice is too much. Perhaps it determined
that any bright line test would be too easy to game, while an amorphous
"investor control" doctrine with uncertain contours would be sufficient to
cause a rational and historically conservative insurance industry to police
itself. If that was their assumption, history has certainly not proved them
right.
There are several cogent policy reasons why significant restrictions on
investor choice should be required as a condition to tax advantaged status of
a deferred variable annuity. First, severely restricting investment choices
will discourage the purchase of deferred variable annuities by those who are
primarily interested in using them as a tax deferred active trading vehicle
and will provide enhanced welfare benefits in the long run for policyholders
who do purchase them. The evidence is very clear that the quest to find the
superior fund that will consistently beat the market averages and the
constant shifting of accumulations into last year's hottest funds, although
psychologically appealing, are overwhelmingly losing propositions. The
best investment strategy for retirement savings is a low cost portfolio made
up of broadly diversified funds held for the long term. Active investors and
short-term traders, who are convinced that have the ability to consistently
beat the market averages, would tend to avoid any investment vehicle that
severely restricted investment choice.274 Thus, taking advantage of investor
psychology, an excellent investment product can be designed that those
interested primarily in tax deferral would not purchase.
Second, annuities should be designed to be appropriate for a broad
range of individual investors with varying degrees of sophisticatication and
for those households nearing retirement age with insufficient assets, who
274. Anecdotal evidence suggests that it is only a small number of variable annuity policy-
holders who account for the exchanges between subaccounts, and they tend to be the policy-
holders with the largest accounts. Kenneth P. Mungan et al., Session 113PD The Impact of
Policyholder Behavior on Variable Annuities, Panel Discussion Before the Toronto Spring
Meeting of the Society of Actuaries (June 20-22, 2001), in 27 RECORD No.2 at 5-6. The results
are based on a sampling of exchanges between variable annuity subaccounts at Nationwide Insur-
ance Co. from December 2000 through February 2001. Id. The survey also disclosed that
policyholders who had purchased from a broker are more likely to engage in exchanges than
policyholders who purchased from an agent. Id. at 6.
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likely arrived at that point through some combination of lack of self-control
and inability to plan and implement long-term savings and investment
programs. These are the groups most often mentioned in policy debates as
likely purchasers of annuities, but they are more likely to benefit from
narrowly focused savings programs than those providing a bewildering
array of investment choices. More choices increase the deliberation costs of
making optimal investment decisions and increase the possibility of costly
investment mistakes. Avoiding costly mistakes is particularly important for
those who find themselves nearing retirement with few assets since they
may be inclined to take undue risks to catch up more quickly, and they have
very little time to recover from them. Investors who wish to "roll the dice"
should not be provided a tax-advantaged vehicle that facilitates or
encourages such potentially destructive behavior.
Reducing the number of subaccounts and simplifying them will also
greatly simplify the annuitization decision. If policyholders choose variable
rather than fixed payments on annuitization, they must also choose which of
the various subaccounts in which to annuitize. Too bewildering an array of
choices may lead to decision overload and inhibit variable annuitization
even though it has substantial potential welfare benefits. There are also
serious questions whether volatile sector funds, such as those concentrating
in technology, precious metals or energy, are ever appropriate to back
variable pay outs, whatever limited value they may have during the
accumulation phase.
Severely restricted investment choices would make the product more
appropriate for all purchasers without impairing its utility. Since the pro-
duct would likely be most attractive to purchasers who are unsophisticated
or who have self-control problems, the redesign would give insurance
companies greater incentive to advertise and market the product to that
segment.
Third, from a behavioral point of view, unlimited investment choice is
often detrimental. Whether intended or not, the menu of fund choices
subconsciously shapes the investment strategies of policyholders in ways
not intended by the companies. As the research with respect to investment
choices in 401(k) plans indicates, some investors tend to view the menu of
choices as the advice of "experts" concerning appropriate asset allocation
strategies. 275 Too many choices, particularly choices that are complicated
and difficult to assess, may result in procrastination and can often result in
naive diversification strategies. Too many choices also facilitate the
potentially disastrous tendency of individual investors to trade too much
275. See supra note 224.
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and consistently move money into last year's best performing funds rather
than maintain a consistent long-term investment strategy.
Fourth, a redesigned deferred variable annuity with restricted
investment choices, particularly if coupled with limited death benefits and
extension of the penalty provisions, would be a suitable investment for
many more individuals that value both its investment and annuity aspects
but who are hesitant to purchase the current product due to its complexity
and high cost. The redesigned product would be much more difficult to sell
to unsuitable purchasers because it would be clearly differentiated from
other taxable investments. Tax efficient equity investing outside of an
annuity is most often superior to equity investment in a deferred annuity,
particularly in the case of older individuals who have no intention of taking
advantage of the annuity pay out options. The current design does not
distinguish the deferred variable annuity clearly enough from other
investments like mutual funds, making it too easy to market them to
purchasers for whom they are inappropriate investments. A redesigned
annuity will effectively deter those practices without adversely affecting the
utility of the product for its legitimately intended purposes.
Fifth, the resulting simplification of the product, particularly if
accompanied by elimination of most death benefits, would have several
very desirable behavioral effects. Targeted tax benefits are effective in
altering behavior when they facilitate focus on particular issues. Under
current law, no focus is required, and the majority of insurance companies
have designed a product that is focused neither on annuitization nor on any
particular manner of saving or investing for retirement. Severely restricted
investment choices coupled with elimination of all but a basic death benefit
would greatly simplify the product and substantially reduce its costs,
blunting two of the major criticisms of the product as it is currently
designed. Since insurance companies will have to spend less of their time
and advertising money trying to counter legitimate negative assessments of
the product, they will better be able to focus their efforts on marketing an
attractive product. A simple, more focused product will be easier to
advertise and sell to suitable purchasers. In short, it would satisfy the two
requirements of a good savings plan: that it be simple to understand and
use and that it be judged sound by the experts.
Sixth, severely restricted investment choices would serve to more
clearly differentiate the nonqualified deferred annuity from other tax
advantaged retirement savings plans, such as IRAs and 401(k)s. The less a
nonqualified deferred annuity is perceived as an easy method to "catch up"
for failure to utilize those other tax advantaged plans, the less likely its
existence will facilitate procrastination in implementing retirement savings.
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If the "catch up" method provides significantly less freedom of investment
choice, it will not be seen as an attractive substitute for those other plans,
which may cause an increase in their utilization.276 Because the welfare
benefits of early and consistent saving through IRAs and 401(k)s are
significant, policies designed to discourage such procrastination are highly
desirable.
Lastly, restriction of investment choices will encourage insurers to
compete on the basis of the annuity aspects of the product. Competition
will produce more innovative and attractive payout options, making it more
likely that the purchasers will eventually annuitize their accumulations even
if they are not required to do so. For example, if the resistance to
annuitization is a rational one based on legitimate concerns over illiquidity,
then perhaps the best solution is to trust the marketplace to design
appropriate products that address liquidity concerns, as has already occurred
with respect to long term care expenses. 277 Much like the nondiscrimina-
tion requirements of 401(k) plans have encouraged firms to be highly
creative in promoting participation by moderate income employees,
encouraging the industry to compete on the basis of the payout features of
an annuity can have similar beneficial effects. Shifting the focus of the
product from merely an alternative investment accumulation vehicle to a
payout vehicle may also have positive psychological effects. If the account
is mentally classified as an annuity rather than as merely another asset
account, there may be greater likelihood of ultimate annuitization.
How restricted should. the investment -choices be? Assuming that
ultimate annuitization is not required, the investment choices should be very
restricted because that aspect must function as the primary deterrent to
purchase of an annuity primarily for tax deferred active investment
purposes, to make it a suitable investment for large numbers of individuals
with differing degrees of sophistication, and to reasonably insure it cannot
be effectively marketed to purchasers for whom it is unsuitable. The
restrictions should not be so severe, that they substantially impair the
investment aspects of the annuity. No more than about a half dozen should
suffice: a fund that tracks the entire United States stock market, a global
equities fund, one or two bond funds, a balanced fund investing in both
stocks and bonds, perhaps a real estate fund, and a money market fund.
Where possible, the funds should adopt a passive, indexing approach to
minimize costs. No sector funds or other specialty funds should be
276. See supra note 203 (discussing psychological evidence).
277. BROWN & WARSHAWSKY, supra note 19, at 36-37.
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allowed. An annuity should be kept as simple and as suitable for all
purchasers as reasonably possible.
There should also be significant restrictions on transfers between fund
options to make the product even more inappropriate for market timers or
speculators. Rather than attempting to define an optimal number of
transfers and impose that limit by statute, a more administrable solution
would make excessive transfers taxable transactions. For example, one
exchange or simultaneous series of exchanges among the subaccounts may
be allowed each year to permit the annual rebalancing of a portfolio; while
any further exchanges would be treated as immediately taxable.
Had the industry exercised more judgment and discretion rather than
conducting a competitive race to the bottom, then the imposition of such
restrictions would not be necessary. It is not an adequate answer to say that
a few companies have been responsible and have resisted the urge to join
the competitive race. The marketplace noise created by those companies
that did not take the high road is deafening, making it difficult for those
other companies to gain any significant market share. More important, the
fact that there are some well designed deferred variable annuities worthy of
the name should not permit other companies to market a tax advantaged
product to purchasers for whom it is often an unsuitable and unwise
investment.
If investment choices were severely restricted, so that the deferred
annuity were clearly differentiated from other investments like mutual
funds, then providing special income tax rates for the gain in life contingent
annuity payments chosen under deferred variable annuities would be more
acceptable since it is more likely that the additional tax advantage would be
used to encourage annuitization rather than as merely another selling point
to gain competitive advantage for deferred annuities as an attractive
investment option to mutual funds. 278 Since such a redesigned product
would probably not be particularly attractive to higher income individuals
who have other significant sources of retirement income, the tax benefits
would more likely be targeted to moderate-income individuals.
278. If encouraging annuitization is the goal, perhaps individuals with assets accumulated in
taxable accounts outside of deferred annuities should also be allowed to transfer them without
recognition of gain to purchase immediate annuities.. If that were allowed and the annuity gains
were taxed at capital gains rates, individuals might be more willing to use investment assets with
unrealized capital gains to purchase annuities. Whether such transfers should be permitted to
deferred variable annuities is a harder question since the primary purpose for such a transfer might
be merely the desire to change investments without immediate taxation of the gains. If the
deferred variable annuity were redesigned as proposed in this article, that would be less likely.
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4. How Likely is it that Congress Would Impose Investment
Limitations?
While the Service has long considered itself to have the authority to
define how much investor control an insurer may legitimately cede to the
policyholder, 279 the type of investment restrictions suggested here would
require legislation.
Given the clear trend toward more investor autonomy in retirement
plans and the current debate over whether to extend that policy to the Social
Security system, how likely is it that Congress would amend the statute and
impose severe restrictions on investment choice in deferred variable
annuities? Three and a half years ago, when the equity markets were
279. In the preamble to the temporary and proposed regulations published in 1986
concerning the fund diversification requirements, the IRS stated that formal guidance on the
investor control issue would be forthcoming, but none has yet been issued. ANNUITIES ANSWER
BOOK, supra note 27, at Q 6:56. The first ruling approving a variable annuity separate account
involved a single segregated asset account with no subaccounts that was invested solely in a
mutual fund managed by the insurance company or its affiliate. Rev. Rul. 81-225, 1981-2 C.B.
12, 14. Later published rulings went further but involved only a very small number of funds,
typically not much more than a stock fund, a bond fund, and a money market fund. See, e.g., Rev.
Rul. 82-54, 1982-1 C.B. 11. In 2003, the Service published a ruling that mentioned an annuity
backed by twenty mutual fund choices and once-a-month transfers between funds, but gave no
indication why it viewed twenty fund choices as acceptable or whether annuities with more than
twenty fund choices. Rev. Rul. 2003-91, 2003-33 I.R.B. 347.
The Service has never clearly articulated any basis for its position that solely too many
choices among otherwise acceptable subaccounts might constitute prohibited investor control. It
always based its investor control position on the technical legal issue that too much control would
cause the investment accounts to be treated as owned by the investor rather than by the insurer.
The only suggestion for a doctrinal basis has been the substance-over-form principle of tax law.
ANNUITIES ANSWER BOOK, supra note 27, at Q 6:56.
It is a curious position and one that never seems to surface with respect to other tax
advantaged retirement plans, particularly qualified plans such as IRAs and 401(k)s. There are
very few restrictions on permissible IRA investments, and while the number of investment choices
in many 401(k) plans is limited, they may have even more extensive menus than the typical
variable annuity. The Investment Company Institute reported that the median number of
investment options in 401(k) plans in 1998 was six; while Hewitt Associates reported that the
median was nine. Engen & Lehnert, supra note 17, at 803 n.25. Since a 401(k) plan is an
employer plan, the employer determines the available investment options.
The investor control issue has also not been advanced with respect to nonqualified salary
deferral plans. A nonqualified salary deferral plan is an agreement with an employer to pay part
of the employee's salary in the future. So long as the plan does not set up a separate fund for the
employee that cannot be reached by the employer's creditors, the cash method employee reports
the income when he or she actually receives it, even if the deferred amount is invested and the
amount ultimately paid will include investment gains. See Rev. Rul. 60-31, 1960-1 CB 174, 178.
The employer may set aside the deferred amounts into an actual account, commonly called a
"rabbi trust," that it invests in securities, so long as the account is subject to the claims of its
creditors. Currently, many companies provide expansive investment choices for the deferred
amounts, and employees may redirect the amounts from one investment fund to another. Perhaps
the IRS is unaware of the fact that these plans allow choice or the range of choices being offered,
but they have raised no challenges thus far to the deferral of salary under these plans on the
ground that too much choice will result in the employee being treated as the owner of the funds
and therefore currently taxable on them.
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soaring and anyone who invested in the stock market was on her way to a
comfortable retirement at age fifty, the chance might have been near zero.
In today's difficult investment environment, the complexities and risks of
investing have become much clearer. To its credit, the federal government
has demonstrated that it knows the elements of a sound savings and
investment program; it chose a program for its own employees, the Thrift
Savings Program, 280 which is almost identical to the one this article
proposes for deferred variable annuities. In appropriate circumstances, the
proper function of government is to stand against the prevailing winds and
adopt sound policy, even if it may be unpopular.
C. SUMMARY
Accepting the fact that insurance companies are able to provide very
valuable income options and long-term asset management and financial
planning assistance during both the accumulation and the payout phases, the
task is to design a deferred annuity that will accentuate and facilitate those
aspects. What is clear is that the current design-essentially leaving almost
all substantive decisions up to the industry-is not calculated to accomplish
that goal and has not been successful in doing so. The special tax status of
deferred variable annuities gives them an important competitive advantage
over other forms of nonqualified retirement savings, but that advantage has
been misused by the insurance industry to define and market a product that
is needlessly complex, overly expensive, and unsuitable for a large number
of individuals who purchased them. Without design requirements imposed
on them, the industry will continue to emphasize only those aspects of the
annuity that are the easiest to sell rather than the ones that are most valuable
from a public policy standpoint and most suitable for use by large numbers
of participants with varying degrees of sophistication.
If investment options were severely restricted, penalties for non-
annuity distributions were extended, and all but a very basic death benefit
were prohibited, then sound asset management and creative and attractive
income options would be the only aspects of deferred annuity design that
could be competitively exploited by insurers. The extremely competitive
annuity marketplace would provide the industry the incentive to enhance
those aspects of their deferred annuities, resulting in significant welfare
gains and quite possibly including an increase in annuitization rates. It is
the best prescription to encourage annuitization short of a mandate to
280. See supra note 122 (explaining the Thrift Savings Program).
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annuitize, and it avoids the significant administrative costs and unintended
consequences of such a mandate.
Critics may respond that these proposals will destroy the market for
deferred variable annuities. There is no doubt they will make the product
much less attractive for those purchasers who have no interest in anything
other than a tax-sheltered investment vehicle. If the desired results from the
proposed design changes do not materialize and the market for deferred
variable annuities does wither and die, then it should; if promoting and
enhancing long-term retirement asset management and attractive income
options-the only aspects of a deferred annuity that can properly
distinguish it from any other nonqualified retirement savings plan-do not
make it an attractive product, then it should die a quick and natural death.

